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INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIGM
PETER A. APPEL*
Since the time that the late Abram Chayes coined the term “public law
litigation” in his landmark Harvard Law Review article, commentators have
analyzed federal court cases aimed at reforming public institutions under
Chayes’s theoretical description1 rather than the more traditional view of
civil litigation.2 Although Chayes first coined the descriptive phrase in 1976,
the phenomenon of lawsuits aimed at institutional reform and the remedial
devices used to effect that reform had existed for many years, as Chayes
himself recognized.3 Moreover, the phenomenon that Chayes dubbed “public
law litigation” and the general subject of public interest litigation had
numerous intellectual antecedents in description and analysis before Chayes
wrote his article.4 Nevertheless, Chayes’s term has stuck, and analysts of
public law litigation use his work as their usual starting point.5
Litigation which Chayes labeled “public law litigation” grew especially
quickly in the decade immediately before Chayes wrote his article. This
growth was due, in no small part, to the 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.6 These amendments introduced a more
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., J.D. Yale University. I
formerly served as an attorney in the Appellate Section of the Environment and Natural Resources
Division, United States Department of Justice, and the ideas in this article stem from ideas that
occurred to me in the course of cases I litigated. For whatever interest it may have for the reader, I
have identified those cases in which I served as the primary counsel for the federal government on
appeal. I would like to thank the following people for their generous help and suggestions: Robert D.
Brussack, Dan Coenen, C. Ronald Ellington, Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Margaret V. Sachs, James Smith,
Jay Tidmarsh, Carl Tobias, Alan Watson, Camilla Watson, Rebecca White, and, of course, Christine
Albright. All errors that remain are, of course, my own. I dedicate this article to my parents.
1. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
2. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
Fuller’s article was a posthumous publication of an essay first written in 1957. See id. at 353.
3. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 481-86 (1980); see also Chayes, supra note 1, at 1288
(dating origins of public law litigation to approximately 1875).
4. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
5. For a thoughtful consideration of Chayes’s article and its impact, see Richard L. Marcus,
Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647 (1988). The most
impressive, albeit most crude, measure of the article’s impact is that in 1996 it was the sixth most-
frequently-cited law review article in other law review articles. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV 751, 766 (1996).
6. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383 U.S.
1029 (1966).
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transactional approach to litigation and made the rules concerning party
structure more flexible. In particular, the amendments modified Rule 19,
which governs joinder of nonparties by the parties to the suit;7 Rule 23,
which governs class action lawsuits;8 and Rule 24, which governs
intervention by nonparties into ongoing litigation.9 According to the major
proponents of public law litigation, making party structure more flexible
should encourage public law litigation to flourish. The 1966 amendments
would have had this effect, proponents assert, were it not for resistance of the
bench to public law litigation. In particular, the proponents of public law
litigation contend that judges have excluded parties that should be included
in the litigation by denying intervention to outsiders. According to the
standard argument, the absence of these intervening parties has had two
negative effects. First, it has limited the ability of the court to receive the
useful information supplied by outsiders and to structure appropriate
remedies. Second, it has injured the absentees.10
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
10. For the standard account that courts have been unduly and unwisely unreceptive to proposed
intervenors, see, for example, Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of
Right and the Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263 (1999); Emma Coleman
Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 (1979) [hereinafter Jones, Litigation Without Representation]; Emma
Coleman Jones, Problems and Prospects of Participation in Affirmative Action Litigation: A Role for
Intervenors, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 221 (1980) [hereinafter Jones, Problems and Prospects]; Carl
Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270,
322-28 (1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Public Law Litigation]; Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 415 [hereinafter Tobias, Standing to Intervene]; Ellyn J. Bullock, Note, Acid Rain Falls
on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing’s Criteria Should Not Be Incorporated into Intervention of
Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 605; Joshua C. Dickinson, Casenote, Standing Requirements for
Intervention and the Doctrine of Legislative Standing: Will the Eighth Circuit “Stand” by its Mistakes
in Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri & Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Ehlmann, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV.
983 (1999); Brian Hutchings, Note, Waiting for Divine Intervention: The Fifth Circuit Tries to Give
Meaning to Intervention Rules in Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 43 VILL. L. REV. 693 (1998);
Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1990); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 288
(1990).
Academic commentary questioning this argument is rare, but it exists. See, e.g., Jack H.
Friedenthal, Increased Participation by Non-Parties: The Need for Limitations and Conditions, 13
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 259 (1980); Rodrick J. Coffey, Note, Giving a Hoot About an Owl Does Not
Satisfy the Interest Requirement for Intervention: The Misapplication of Intervention as of Right in
Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. Department of the
Interior, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811 (1998). For commentary taking an intermediate position, see
Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School
Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 244 (1977) (“It is my thesis that such an expansion of intervention
doctrines can be useful if the courts recognize that the participation of additional parties under these
circumstances is serving special functions.”); Ernest E. Shaver, Note, Intervention in the Public
Interest Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
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Using the jurisprudence that has developed concerning intervention as of
right under Rule 24(a),11 this article questions these two assertions. First,
courts have been receptive to amorphous party structure in public law cases,
allowing intervention in many instances where it would not have been
allowed before the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Even with more recent limitations on intervention as of right by
some courts of appeals— in particular, requiring applicants for intervention to
demonstrate that they possess constitutional standing to sue— most federal
courts permit the flexible party structure called for by public law litigation
advocates. Second, it is far from clear in many instances how allowing
intervention assists the litigation, particularly when the outsider has
intervened as a defendant. Rather, in many instances the parties and the judge
can realize the advantages of involving an outsider to the litigation without
formal intervention as of right. Thus, contrary to the arguments of most
scholars in this area, I believe that the courts have, for the most part, decided
the cases correctly, and have certainly allowed intervention in more cases
than they would have prior to the 1966 amendments.
These conclusions stem in part from analysis of a form of public law
litigation frequently overlooked or inadequately analyzed in the standard
literature, namely environmental and natural resources litigation. The
underanalyzed characteristics of this litigation undermine the general
arguments about the value of intervention in all public law litigation.
Environmental cases are just as sprawling and complex as the civil rights
cases often associated with public law litigation. Nevertheless, environmental
cases are frequently different from civil rights cases because of the types of
rights involved (statutory as opposed to constitutional), the administrative
setting, and the consequent standard of review and evidentiary limitations
1573-74 (“Although applicants seeking to represent the public’s interests in an action may often
perform a useful service to society, courts must carefully regulate intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) to
protect the rights of the original parties to the action and to insure that applicants do not abuse the
judicial process by intervening unnecessarily.”). One of the articles by Emma Coleman Jones and the
article by Jack Friedenthal appear in Problems of Intervention in Public Law Litigation: A Symposium,
13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 211 (1980) [hereinafter Symposium: Problems of Intervention].
For analyses of intervention under Rule 24 from primarily a private law perspective, see Edward
J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal
Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978); John E. Kennedy, Let’s All Join In: Intervention
Under Rule 24, 57 KY. L.J. 329 (1969); David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968); Gene R. Shreve, Questioning
Intervention of Right— Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 894
(1980); Jeffery L. Rensberger, Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction and Intervention Under Federal Rule 24:
Analysis and Proposals, 58 IND. L.J. 111 (1982); Comment, The Litigant and the Absentee in Federal
Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 531, 541-44 (1968).
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
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that apply. A recent series of cases from the Pacific Northwest involving
endangered and threatened stocks of salmon illustrate the distinction between
environmental and civil rights cases. These cases show that intervention is
both frequently granted and of questionable utility.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I explores the theoretical
development of public law litigation, with a particular focus on the
overlooked role that environmental litigation and its peculiarities should play
in this thinking. Part II examines the history and development of intervention
as a procedural device, and then outlines how it presently functions in public
law cases. Part III then examines the interrelated claims that federal courts
generally have been too stingy with potential intervenors12 and that an
increased role for intervenors necessarily benefits public law litigation. The
best case that supporters of a broader right of intervention have to support
their argument that courts are hostile to intervenors is that some courts of
appeals require intervenors to show that they have standing to sue under
Article III of the Constitution. Although I agree that courts should not
incorporate standing as part of the interest requirement, I nevertheless
conclude that this requirement does not, in the end, threaten a broad right to
intervene. In addition, many of the benefits that promoters of a broad right of
intervention argue exist simply do not. Part IV then suggests modest changes
to intervention practice in public law litigation. Part IV suggests changing the
standard of review that the courts of appeals use in weighing appeals over the
denial of intervention, adding more criteria for courts to consider, and
explicitly providing a rule for outsiders to participate as amicus curiae in trial
courts. These proposals preserve the flexibility that has characterized
intervention and public law litigation while making such litigation more
manageable.
The fact that I suggest changes to intervention practice should not be
taken to mean that I oppose intervention in public law cases. To the contrary,
I believe that intervention can often benefit litigation and the courts that must
decide these disputes. Throughout this piece, I will indicate cases in which I
believe the court erred in denying intervention. For the most part, however, I
believe that courts are quite receptive to intervention petitions.
12. Every law review article should have its author stake out a position on a matter as important,
fractious, and disputatious as spelling, and this one is no exception. There is a hot debate in the legal
literature whether an intervening party should be called an “intervenor” or an “intervener.” The
standard law dictionary does not list the “er” ending. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (6th ed. 1990).
Nevertheless, Professors Shapiro and Shreve explicitly stake out the “er” claim, and others follow
without comment. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 725, n.18; Shreve, supra note 10, at 896 n.8; see also,
e.g., Kennedy, supra note 10, at 330 (using “er” ending without comment). I have decided to use the
“or” suffix.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
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I. THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
As typically portrayed in the public law litigation literature, the traditional
form of civil action consists of one party suing another: A v. B. A sues B,
either because B breached a legal right of A, causing an injury that B should
rectify, or because B was for some other reason responsible for rectifying A’s
injury (such as an injury to A caused by B’s servant). The remedy that ensues
from this examination of past conduct takes a concrete form and follows
directly from the right that the defendant violated. If the court finds B liable,
it orders B to pay money in damages to A to compensate A for the damages
that the law recognizes. Alternatively, the court can order B to refrain from
an activity— “B shall nevermore trespass on A’s land”— or to undertake a
specific activity— “B shall return A’s lawful property to A.”13
Professor Chayes described a different form of civil action, one he labeled
“public law litigation.”14 Chayes believed that this “new” form of civil action
was an altogether different animal from the traditional model. In this form of
litigation, the subject of the dispute is not merely a private controversy but a
“grievance[ ] over the administration of some public or quasi-public program
and to vindicate the public policies embodied in the governing statutes or
constitutional provisions.”15 As defined by Chayes, public law litigation has
several interrelated characteristics. Chayes reduced these characteristics to
eight qualities, which can in turn be summarized in four points. First, the
parties and the court, rather than outside principles of law, shape the lawsuit,
leading to a “party structure [that] is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and
amorphous.”16 Second, the relevant set of facts are not simply past facts but
future predictions, leading to relief that is not grounded merely in the past but
“is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial
lines.”17 Third, “[t]he remedy is not imposed but negotiated,” not simply
among the parties but also the court, for the “administration [of the remedy]
requires the continuing participation of the court.”18 Throughout, the judge
remains “active, with responsibility . . . for organizing and shaping the
13. Although injunctive relief is often characterized as equitable, see, e.g., Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), Professor Subrin describes instances in which common law
courts could award nonmonetary relief. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 915 & n.30
(1987).
14. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284.
15. Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4,
4 (1982).
16. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
17. Id.
18. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.”19 This role for the judge
reflects the fourth and final characteristic of public law litigation, that the
“subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals
about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.”20
Chayes recognized21 and others have elaborated,22 that the supposedly
new form of civil action that Chayes described has historical antecedents in
other types of civil actions. In an influential article, Professors Eisenberg and
Yeazell argued that the “novelty” that Chayes identified, “lies in substance
and power, not in procedure and remedy.”23 Looking at historical precedents,
Eisenberg and Yeazell found that “old litigation frequently involves the
elaborate decrees requiring continuous supervision that is quite common in
institutional cases.”24 These complex historical antecedents involved a
number of different types of cases, including elaborate personal trusts and
receiverships involving large corporations, particularly railroads.25
Chayes’s article became the most prominent example of a set of
scholarship which arose at the same time. Much of this writing concerned the
role of the courts, in particular, the federal courts, in shaping social policy.
Many heralded the involvement of the courts in shaping social policy.26
Others expressed concerns about the legitimacy of this enterprise and doubts
about whether the courts possessed the institutional competence to undertake
broad changes in social policy and social institutions.27 What distinguished
Chayes’s 1976 article, then, was not its entry into the general (and still
ongoing) debate about the role of the courts in shaping issues that affect
broader social policy, but its assertion that a new form of litigation had
emerged— or, in the broadest version of Chayes’s argument, that litigation
now more typically consisted of institutional reform or public law litigation
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1288-89 (tracing origins of public law litigation to changes occurring “[s]ometime after
1875”).
22. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3.
23. Id. at 467.
24. Id. at 481.
25. See id. at 481-86.
26. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 4. As Richard Marcus has observed:
By 1976, the concept of public law was hardly new. Neither was the phenomenon of public law
litigation wholly new. For some time, commentators had been writing about the “new wave”
lawyers who brought nontraditional cases. Others had recognized that this activity raised problems
that were difficult to explain in traditional terms. . . . Beyond that, concern about the legitimacy of
judicial efforts to implement social policy through structural decrees was widespread.
Marcus, supra note 5, at 656 (footnotes omitted).
27. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Gerald Frug,
The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Fuller, supra note 2.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
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rather than private litigation.
The term “public law litigation” defies crisp definition. Reduced to the
basic principle that public law litigation consists of lawsuits that concern “the
operation of public policy,”28 the term could easily consume most litigation
that involves the interpretation of the Constitution or a statute of broad
application. For example, the decision in Miranda v. Arizona29 affected law
enforcement nationwide, but it did not result from complex litigation. The
law-generating function of courts is inherent in any system based on stare
decisis. Indeed, Owen Fiss has argued that, to the extent that litigation
generates law through precedent in a system that relies on stare decisis,
courts should not engage in settlement efforts that compromise this law-
generation function on behalf of the public.30 Few, if any, other
commentators have gone quite this far, but most accept that one of the
hallmarks of public law litigation is that it will generate norms that govern
people not parties to the litigation— that the litigation will have “important
consequences for many person including absentees.”31 When I use the term
“public law litigation,” then, I mean the lawsuits that meet Chayes’s original
eight criteria, his benchmarks for determining whether a case is public law
litigation or not.32
Whatever the merits of the criticism of public law litigation, federal
lawsuits aimed at reforming public institutions are now a settled part of the
legal landscape.33 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
different and more flexible set of remedial rules may come into play in
28. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
31. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
32. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text; see also Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
33. In a subsequent article, Chayes criticized the Burger Court for attempting to cut back on
public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 15. Nevertheless, he concluded that the Court could not
resist public law litigation.
[E]ven a conservative Court is reduced . . . to practicing public law litigation. When, for example
the Court pronounces on the constitutionality of an indemnity scheme for nuclear accidents or the
existence of a statutory requirement for deinstitutionalization of retarded persons, the essential
character of the litigation is the same whether the Court upholds the claim or rejects it. Whatever
the outcome, the Court is not engaged in settling a dispute between private individuals, or even
between an individual and a public official. It is resolving a controversy growing out of “the
systemic effects” of governmental action. Such decisions will necessarily have far-reaching effects
on myriads of persons not individually before the Court and on political, economic, and
institutional structures. Whatever the result, the determination rests more-or-less directly on
considerations of public policy. . . . It is these characteristics that define public law litigation and
that account for the departures from the traditional model at the level of procedure and judicial
role.
Id. at 57-58 (footnote omitted). Thus, Chayes believed that courts could not resist involving
themselves in public law litigation, whatever tactics they might use.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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institutional reform litigation.34 Courts have also repeatedly dealt with cases
that involve many parties and implicate legal principles of broad application.
Federal courts have reorganized school systems, instituted prison reform, and
changed the direction of public works projects. Thus, federal courts are now
familiar, if not entirely comfortable, with the institutional reform lawsuit.35
The principal means through which most courts gained their familiarity
with public law litigation was through civil rights lawsuits aimed at
institutional reform based on constitutional values. These lawsuits then
shaped how federal courts would cope with public law litigation generally.
After briefly describing the civil rights litigation and its effect on the thinking
in this era, I will show how the ideas developed in that context spilled over
into other areas of public law litigation. Whether the lessons learned in the
civil rights context were appropriately applied in other situations will be
explored in Part III.
A. The Civil Rights Paradigm
Most of the analysis of public law litigation uses as paradigmatic the civil
rights dispute, specifically cases concerning school desegregation, prison
reform, and mental institution reform. Indeed, a 1980 symposium on the
question of intervention in public law litigation focused exclusively on public
law litigation involving civil rights questions.36 Mark Tushnet has argued that
public law litigation arose directly from the desegregation cases following
Brown v. Board of Education.37 Tushnet claims that once federal courts
34. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1992). Just as the
Supreme Court has recognized the institutional reform lawsuit, Congress has made efforts to take it
away. In 1996, Congress limited the discretion that federal judges have in public law litigation aimed
at reforming state and federal prisons. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 194-134, tit. VIII,
sec. 802(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Supp. III 1997)).
35. In this sense, I am something of a fatalist about the state of the case law in this area. Compare
Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1769 (1993) (book
review). Schuck divides scholarly views on public law litigation into three groups: “strong-court”
scholars, “court skeptics,” and “court fatalists.” Id. The first group “believe[s] that the courts are often
effective reformers by reason of their unique institutional features.” Id. The second group “hold[s] that
court-directed reform, although not inevitably doomed to failure, is highly problematic.” Id. Schuck
describes “court fatalists” as those who “maintain that the effectiveness of social reform depends on
factors that courts can perhaps reinforce, but to which they are otherwise either irrelevant or
epiphenomenal.” Id. I am a court fatalist not in the sense that I believe that courts cannot achieve
social reform by themselves, but because I believe they are constrained in institutional ways (both by
statute and their own precedent) that makes reform through litigation cumbersome. Nevertheless,
courts necessarily become fonts of reform because they are faced with cases that they must decide and
that can have an impact on many people beyond those who are parties before them.
36. See Symposium: Problems of Intervention, supra note 10, at 211.
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of
Brown, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1992).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
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“gain[ed] experience in supervising important bureaucratic institutions in the
school setting, the lower courts began extending their supervision to other
institutions similarly regulated by the Constitution.”38
Much of the scholarship surrounding public law litigation thus uses these
prototypical cases as its standard example.39 The reason for this heavy
reliance on the civil rights cases for the concrete context in which these
authors theorized is obvious. The courts in those cases met with resistance
and intransigence by the officials in charge of the schools, mental hospitals,
and prisons that were the subjects of the litigation. The social milieu in the
two decades preceding the publication of Chayes’s article saw the great
struggles for equal rights for minorities and women, attempts to modernize
the care for the mentally disabled, and horror at brutal prison conditions.
The civil rights cases are thus an important underpinning of the arguments
of the commentators that favor public law litigation generally. These cases
also have at least three important similarities with each other. First, the rights
involved emerge from the development of constitutional principles. When a
court involves itself in overseeing the conditions at a prison, it does so
because it has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to require the court’s
involvement and supervision.40 Similarly, when a court oversees the
management of a mental institution or orders a school district to desegregate,
it does so to vindicate constitutional values. This aspect of public law
litigation led Eisenberg and Yeazell to argue that the novel aspect of public
law litigation was not new procedural rules but new substantive rights.41
Second, the litigation usually involves a judicial determination of the factual
basis for the lawsuit, rather than the review of a record created by another
governmental entity. The court must ask itself whether a school district
engaged in discrimination or whether the conditions in which prisoners live
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Third, a court need not pay any
special deference to any of the parties of the lawsuit. While a court can listen
to the views of the prison officials or school supervisors, it determines for
38. Tushnet, supra note 37, at 25.
39. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1984) (tracing development of public
law litigation); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979) (finding
origins of structural reform in desegregation, mental hospital, and prison cases).
40. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571
(8th Cir. 1968) (barring use of corporal punishment). For a recent consideration of the role of prison
litigation in the development of public law litigation and the questions of creating new rights, see
Stephen P. Garvey, Did Making over the Prisons Require Making up the Law?, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1476 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998)).
41. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 467; see also text accompanying note 23.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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itself the facts involved and the remedial measures to take. As I will now
show, these features of civil rights litigation do not necessarily apply to other
types of public law litigation, specifically environmental litigation.
B. Environmental Public Law Litigation
Although they are important examples of public law litigation, the civil
rights institutional reform cases do not make up the entire universe of public
law litigation. Another important form of public law litigation is the
environmental lawsuit. Chayes and others give a passing nod to the
environmental dispute as a candidate case for being public law litigation.42
But their writings, and those of others, reveal that these scholars have not
considered the particular qualities of most environmental cases that involve
public law litigation.43
It is not hard to see why scholars initially focused on civil rights litigation
and largely ignored environmental litigation, except in passing. At the time
that Chayes wrote his article, sweeping federal statutes governing
environmental conduct were fairly young. The civil rights struggles, by
contrast, had been in the courts and debated publicly for a much longer time.
Moreover, although environmental issues were entering the social
conscience, litigation had not been used as extensively as a tool of achieving
environmental ends as it had in the civil rights arena. Finally, to the extent
that litigation was used, it generally did not have the sweeping effects of the
civil rights lawsuits. Rather, it resembled the older type of litigation, like
common law nuisance suits, that Chayes believed were fading in importance.
Environmental law may have simply supplied statutory criteria for behavior,
as opposed to the balancing called for by common law nuisance.
Environmental litigation, for the most part, did not generate new forms of
procedure and new types of remedies.44
42. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284; Chayes, supra note 15, at 6 (citing Clean Water and
Clean Air Acts as examples of statutes “mandating or inviting affirmative enforcement by the courts”);
Fiss, supra note 39, at 29 (mentioning in passing reference environmental cases as part of new
litigation).
43. One notable exception to this statement are the thought-provoking articles of Professor Carl
Tobias. His articles frequently use case examples from the environmental area. See, e.g., Tobias,
Public Law Litigation, supra note 10, at 294 n.158, 320-25. Also, some analyses of public law
litigation focus on the environment as an issue. Indeed, the most recent commentary on intervention
has largely focused on environmental concerns. See, e.g., Bullock, supra note 10; Hutchings, supra
note 10; Vreeland, supra note 10. Nevertheless, these more extensive analyses of environmental public
law litigation, like the passing references in the writings of Chayes, Fiss, and others, do not examine
more fully the salient features of environmental litigation that I explore below.
44. An important exception to this general statement is United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56
F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972). I discuss Reserve Mining below. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
p215 Appel.doc 09/15/00   4:55 PM
2000] INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 225
Cases concerning the environment fit the definition of public law
litigation. As noted earlier, Eisenberg and Yeazell have identified several
types of older cases (such as probate cases and large corporate
reorganizations) that fit the definition of public law litigation.45 One example
they overlook is the general stream adjudication. A general stream
adjudication is akin to a bankruptcy proceeding. It quantifies the relative
rights and priorities of claimants to a single water source.46 The party
structure is not A v. B, but rather A against the entire world for a share of the
water in the disputed water body. In some respects, the general stream
adjudication resembles the old form of civil action because the end result is a
decree over a limited resource. It could thus be characterized as simply a
complicated interpleader action, an action by a stakeholder to determine to
whom the stake belongs.
If one were to characterize the general stream adjudication as simply an
interpleader action, however, one would fail to take into account other
characteristics of this sort of litigation, in the same way that so characterizing
a bankruptcy case would ignore other facets of certain bankruptcies.47 A
general stream adjudication decides numerous issues that have important
ongoing consequences for the water body at issue. The court in such an
adjudication decides how much each claimant can take in a year and what the
relative priority of the claims is. The court must also quantify the previously
unquantified rights of sovereigns such as the federal government and any
Indian tribes claiming a right from the water body.48 As a practical matter,
such decisions can make or break economic development on an Indian
reservation and can determine future uses of federal public lands.49 A general
stream adjudication can also enforce the principle of beneficial use, a driving
force in the water law of the West.50 While beneficial uses include such
text.
45. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 481-86.
46. One of the most extensive uses of the bankruptcy analogy is found in Rettkowski v.
Department of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 238 (Wash. 1993).
47. Cf. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 485-86.
48. Under the reserved water rights doctrine, the courts have held that, when the federal
government reserves public lands, it also reserves a sufficient quantity of water to satisfy the needs of
the reservation. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). If the reservation was set aside for
Indians and the federal government sought to encourage agricultural development, the amount of water
that the Indians will receive is the amount necessary to irrigate all practicably irrigable acreage on the
reservation. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). For an interesting insight into the possible
future of this standard, see Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft
Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1997).
49. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705.
50. Under the law of most western states, a claimant from a water body must put any water
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traditional uses as mining, irrigation, power production, and municipal water
supply, courts now recognize that leaving water in the system— so-called
instream flows— is a beneficial use as well.51 These determinations can
decide the fate and health of an entire water system.
Scholars of public law litigation may have overlooked the example of the
general stream adjudication because these cases, for the most part, take place
in state courts.52 Thus, although similar to other public law litigation in
complexity, the general stream adjudication provides little guidance for the
workings of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in public law litigation.53
Two other situations from the field of environmental law provide better
examples of the relevance of environmental litigation to the study of public
law litigation. The first example is often cited by scholars of public law
litigation: the litigation that ensues from cleaning up a hazardous waste site
or controlling pollution at a site.54 These cases can involve complex problems
of the extent to which the pollution at the site causes harm, the propriety of
allowing the polluter to continue polluting, and the economic consequences
of closing the polluting firm. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., involving
pollution of Lake Superior by a large industrial facility, is frequently cited as
an example of this type of litigation.55 In that case, the district court faced
appropriated to a “beneficial use.” See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.03(c) (Robert E. Beck ed.,
1991) (“Beneficial use is required universally.”); see also id. § 12.03(c)(2) (explaining concept of
beneficial use). The opposite of beneficial use is waste, which the law proscribes.
51. See, e.g., Department of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d 1306
(Wash. 1993) (recognizing instream flow to benefit salmon in Yakima River).
52. The federal government waived its sovereign immunity to suits in state courts to establish
relative rights to waterbodies in the McCarran Amendment. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). The Supreme
Court has held that this waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity also waives its
sovereign immunity with respect to its role as trustee for Indian tribes, so that tribal rights may also be
litigated in state courts. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). Thus, all
relevant sovereigns may be joined in a single state court proceeding to determine the relative rights in
a waterbody. A notable exception to this statement is the Arizona v. California litigation over rights to
the Colorado River, which the Supreme Court heard in its original jurisdiction. See Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
53. Nevertheless, the general stream adjudication is a helpful example to add to those offered by
Eisenberg and Yeazell in their article, namely the examples of probate and trusts. Eisenberg &
Yeazell, supra note 3, at 482-85. Probate cases take place in state courts, and often in specialized
courts, as do general stream adjudications.
54. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284 (including “environmental management” cases in
public law litigation; Fiss, supra note 39, at 29 (mentioning “environmental” cases as evidence that the
standard story concerning the function of courts misleads).
55. The reported opinions in the Reserve Mining case include: United States v. Reserve Mining
Co., 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); United States v. Reserve Mining Co.,
56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972) (granting intervention to fifteen parties but limiting participation). For
more thorough discussions of the Reserve Mining case, see THOMAS F. BASTOW, “THIS VAST
POLLUTION...” (1986); FRANK D. SCHAUMBURG, JUDGMENT RESERVED: A LANDMARK
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allegations of the pollution of the water supply of a major city (Duluth,
Minnesota) and questions of the risk, if any, posed by that pollution. The case
also involved a facility that employed hundreds of people in the community.
For many scholars, Reserve Mining is noteworthy for its grappling with the
judicial role in deciding the acceptable risk from pollution.56 This weighing
of risks to health against the value of jobs involves some of the policy-
making functions that Chayes identifies as part of the role of the judge in
public law litigation.57 For purposes of this article, however, the importance
of Reserve Mining lies in its approach to the party-structure issue that forms
the focus of this article. In Reserve Mining, the district court judge, Miles
Lord, allowed a number of parties to intervene both as plaintiffs and
defendants. In a passage that Chayes’s article would later echo, Judge Lord
justified allowing the parties to intervene because of the nature of the
litigation.
The role of a court in such a situation, because of the nature of the
proceedings and considerations which must be reviewed and
undertaken pursuant to the statute, transcends ordinary civil litigation
and makes a reviewing court more of an administrative tribunal than a
court in an ordinary adversary civil case.58
Thus, for purposes of intervention, “the ‘interest’ requirement in the context
of this environmental case, should be viewed as an inclusionary rather than
exclusionary device.”59 In the third section, I will examine this premise more
critically.
The second type of environmental public law case is at least as complex
as that involving hazardous waste cleanup or pollution control, if not more
so. It is the struggle over the management of a multilayered resource, like a
general stream adjudication. Illustrative of this sort of case are the ongoing
ENVIRONMENTAL CASE (1976); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 15-34 (1999).
56. See, e.g., Daniel A Farber, The Legacy of Reserve Mining, 83 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1998)
(discussing impact of the case and cataloguing other scholars hailing the case as groundbreaking).
57. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1293 n.57 (discussing Reserve Mining), 1297, 1302 (arguing
that judicial factfinding in public law litigation is legislative, not adjudicative, in nature and that “a
judicial decree establishing an ongoing affirmative regime of conduct is pro tanto a legislative act”);
see also Fiss, supra note 39, at 46 (arguing that fashioning a remedy in structural reform litigation
“forces the judge to abandon his position of independence and to enter the world of politics”).
58. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413; see Chayes, supra note 1, at 1296-98.
59. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413. As Richard Marcus has noted of these words, “the basic
thrust is a democratic one–before it enters a decree that will affect a large number of people, the court
should allow them to be heard.” Marcus, supra note 5, at 663. Of course, “[t]his democratic thrust was
substantially eroded by the judge’s simultaneous imposition of a variety of restrictions on the
intervenors’ freedom of action.” Id. at 663 n.64.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p215 Appel.doc 09/15/00   4:55 PM
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:215
disputes over the survival of wild stocks of salmon in the Pacific
Northwest.60 The salmon cases are not unique; similar complex litigation has
arisen from the spotted owl controversy.61 Nevertheless, the salmon cases
provide an excellent example of the range of litigation that arises in the
environmental context, and they therefore deserve more elaborate
description.
Once legendarily plentiful, salmon populations in the Columbia and
Snake River system have hit all-time lows. The National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) first listed some stocks of salmon as threatened under the
Endangered Species Act in 1991, and has recently listed even more stocks.62
The salmon problem has received national media coverage,63 and the
60. It would be hard to provide a complete catalog of the reported cases involving this dispute,
but some of the key appellate cases include: Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175
F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999); Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520
(9th Cir. 1997); American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 109 F.3d 1484, as amended, 126
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1997) (author served as principal government counsel on appeal); Oregon Natural
Resource Council v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1996); Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir.
1996); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 92 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 1996); Idaho
Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Swanson v. United States Forest Serv.,
87 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 56 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.
1995); Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995);
Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995)
(author served as principal government counsel on appeal); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game
Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1994); Pacific N.W. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th
Cir. 1994); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371 (9th
Cir. 1994); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994); Northwest Resource Info.
Ctr. v. NMFS, 25 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. In 1987, a number of environmental plaintiffs petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service to list
the northern spotted owl as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. See Northern
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (remanding Fish and Wildlife Service’s
decision not to list); see also Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(requiring designation of critical habitat). The subsequent listing resulted in restrictions on the logging
of old-growth timber in the Pacific Northwest, and cases arising from the situation were heavily
litigated. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (holding congressional
response to spotted owl problem constitutional); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1996); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc’y
v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
For a popular account of the roots of the problem, see WILLIAM DIETRICH, THE FINAL FOREST (1992).
62. See, e.g., Threatened Status for Two ESUs of Chum Salmon in Washington and Oregon, 64
Fed. Reg. 141,508 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223); Threatened Status for Snake River
Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed.
Reg. 14,653 (1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227); Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222).
63. A crude measure of the impact of a story is whether it appears on the front page of the New
York Times. Recent events concerning the salmon and the possible effect that its listing may have on
the residents of the Pacific Northwest have made the grade. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Agency to List
Pacific Salmon as Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 1999, at A1; see also Sam Howe Verhovek, An
Expensive Fish, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1999, at A14 [hereinafter Verhovek, An Expensive Fish];
Saving a Regional Icon, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 1999, at A24 (unsigned editorial). In addition, the
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accompanying legal problems have received considerable attention in legal
academic literature.64
NMFS attributes the decline of the salmon to roughly four human-
induced causes.65 One court has dubbed these the four Hs: hydropower,
habitat management, harvest, and hatcheries.66 The primary cause of the
decline in the salmon population is the extensive hydropower system on the
Columbia and Snake Rivers and other rivers in the Pacific Northwest.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has depicted much of the salmon litigation as a
struggle between these “two great natural resources of the Columbia River
Basin.”67 The dams along the rivers pose two obvious threats to the salmon.
The salmon lead an anadromous life, that is, they are born upstream, migrate
downstream to the ocean, and return to their natal spawning grounds at the
end of their lifecycle. The dams block migration of the salmon in both
directions. When the adult salmon return to spawn, the dams stand in their
way. To overcome this obvious problem, many of the dams have fish ladders
to allow upstream passage. The dams also hinder downstream migration, and
the managers of the dams have four main methods to help the juvenile
salmon migrate downstream: improvement of river flow (typically, making
the river flow faster), spilling the juveniles over the tops of the dams,
bypassing the juveniles around the dam through diverting facilities, and,
using these same facilities, collecting the juveniles for barge transport around
the dams.68
salmon problem merited a colorful two-page diagram in Time magazine. Jeffrey Kluger, Saving the
Salmon, TIME, March 29, 1999, at 60.
64. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653 (1997); Colloquium, Who Runs the
River?, 25 ENVTL. L. 349 (1995); Timothy Weaver, Litigation and Negotiation: The History of
Salmon in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677 (1997); John M. Volkman, The
Endangered Species Act and the Ecosystem of the Columbia River Salmon, 4 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51 (1997); see also Symposium on Salmon Recovery, 74 WASH. L. REV. 511
(1999). This is a very incomplete listing of the literature. For the most part, these articles deal with the
substantive legal problems concerning the salmon litigation. They do not deal with the public law
litigation lessons that the salmon cases teach. One exception is Arthur D. Smith, Programmatic
Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act: An Anatomy of the Salmon Habitat Litigation, 11 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 247 (1996).
65. Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status for
Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, supra note 62, at 14,660-61.
66. See Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886, 889 n.4 (D. Or. 1994), vacated
as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
67. Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1375
(9th Cir. 1994); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1157
(9th Cir. 1999).
68. See Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 889 n.5; see also Northwest Resource Info.
Ctr. v. NMFS, 56 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to three methods for helping juveniles:
“river flow improvement, spill control, and surface transportation”) (author served as principal
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“Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages, both for the
salmon and the hydropower interests that benefit from the inexpensive
electricity generated by the dams.”69 Flow improvements are designed to
improve the speed of the river, which some studies suggest improves
downstream migration.70 Passing juveniles over the spillways prevents the
juveniles from traveling through the turbines of the dam, but it can cause the
fish to develop gas bubble disease if the water becomes supersaturated with
nitrogen as a result of plunging over the spillway.71 Both flow improvements
and spill control, however, can disadvantage those who wish to maximize the
generation of inexpensive electricity. Flow improvements use too much
water during seasons in which it is needed for peak electrical demand, and
spilling water over the spillway takes it away from the turbines.72 Bypassing
juveniles around dams or placing them in barges or other transportation units
also presents problems. If river conditions are not sound, bypassing juveniles
back into the river relieves them of the threat from dams but not from the
river overall. Some studies also indicate that transportation may stress
juveniles and promote the transmission of disease.73 In addition,
environmentalists object to long-term reliance on transportation as a solution
for the problems salmon face, even if transportation were the most effective
solution to the problem.74
Salmon habitat includes everything from small tributaries, in which the
salmon spawn, to the Snake and Columbia Rivers and the Pacific Ocean.
Numerous external threats can harm salmon in their habitat. First, land uses
in upstream watersheds can damage the salmon’s habitat through
sedimentation or polluted runoff.75 Second, activities that the operators of the
dams on the rivers take can affect river conditions in ways that can benefit or
harm the salmon.76 Finally, conditions in the Pacific Ocean, where the
government counsel on appeal).
69. Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., 56 F.3d at 1063.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1064.
72. See id. at 1063-64.
73. See id. at 1064.
74. See American Rivers v. NMFS, 109 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 126 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 1997) (author served as principal government counsel on appeal).
75. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Swanson v.
United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d
1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
76. See Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. NMFS, 56 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing
flow improvements from dams) (author served as principal government counsel on appeal). According
to some, the dams have destroyed salmon habitat by creating a series of warm, slack-water reservoirs
between the dams, when salmon are adapted to colder, fast-moving water.
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salmon spend most of their lives, can obviously affect survival.77
The third factor in the decline of the salmon population is harvest. Salmon
are harvested commercially in the Pacific Ocean as well as in rivers. The
harvesting of salmon includes commercial harvesting, harvesting by Indians
pursuant to treaty rights, and sport harvesting.78 Hatcheries form the fourth
and final cause of the decline of wild salmon stocks. Some studies indicate
that hatcheries may have contributed to the decline of wild salmon runs by
weakening stocks and promoting excessive harvesting of wild stocks.79
The players in the salmon litigation divide into roughly four interest
groups. The first interest group is comprised of the federal agencies. Many
different agencies within different cabinet-level departments have an interest
in the salmon litigation, either as parties to the litigation or as interested
agencies. The agencies that plaintiffs have named as defendants are
numerous. The Army Corps of Engineers (an agency within the Department
of Defense) runs several of the dams on the Columbia River.80 The National
Marine Fisheries Service (an agency within the Department of Commerce)
has jurisdiction over the endangered and threatened salmon under the
Endangered Species Act.81 The Bureau of Reclamation (an agency within the
Department of the Interior) runs some of the larger projects on the Columbia
River and its tributaries, including the Grand Coulee Dam.82 The Bonneville
Power Administration (an agency within the Department of Energy) markets
the hydroelectric power that the dams generate.83 The United States Forest
Service (an agency within the Department of Agriculture) manages forest
lands which drain into the Columbia and Snake river systems.84 All of these
agencies have been sued.
Other federal agencies have an interest in the litigation, even if they have
77. Some ocean conditions may not be human-induced. See Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v.
NMFS, 850 F. Supp. 886, 889 n.4 (D. Or. 1994) (citing “El Nino’s depletion of the ocean food supply”
as a potential source of salmon mortality), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
78. For potential conflicts that could arise in this context, see Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish
& Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1994).
79. See Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened Status
for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, supra note 62, at 14,661 (“[H]atchery programs have
contributed to the further decline of wild . . . salmon through the taking of fish for broodstock
purposes, behavioral and genetic interactions, competition, predation and the spread of disease.”).
80. See Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., 56 F.3d at 1063.
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994) (dividing responsibility for Endangered Species Act
between Secretaries of the Interior and of Commerce); 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4 (1998).
82. See Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., 56 F.3d 1060, 1063 n.3.
83. See Association of Pub. Agency Customers v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158,
1163-65 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing role and authority of Bonneville Power Administration).
84. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Pacific
Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
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not been named as parties. The Fish and Wildlife Service, part of the
Department of the Interior, has no formal jurisdiction over the salmon but
shares responsibility with the National Marine Fisheries Service for
enforcing the Endangered Species Act.85 The Bureau of Indian Affairs, also
within the Department of the Interior, manages the federal government’s trust
relationship with tribal government and seeks to protect tribal interests.86 The
President’s Council on Environmental Quality oversees the enforcement of
the National Environmental Policy Act and will take an interest in any
litigation challenging federal agency action under that statute.87 The
Department of State, which manages the international relations of the United
States, will take an interest in any litigation challenging the federal
government’s ability to negotiate agreements with Canada concerning river
management.88 When involved in litigation, all of these agencies struggle to
speak with one voice through the Department of Justice, which attempts to
balance the concerns of all agencies and faithfully represent the federal
government as a whole.89 Thus, the structure of the federal defendants in this
litigation alone exemplifies the amorphous party structure and sprawling,
disparate interests typical of public law litigation.
The second interest group is other sovereigns. These include domestic
sovereigns, i.e., the state and tribal governments, and a foreign sovereign, i.e.
Canada. These groups have varying interests. The coastal state governments,
such as Washington and Oregon, wish to preserve the commercial salmon
industry in perpetuity. The inland states, such as Montana and Idaho, wish to
preserve the salmon, but not at the expense of drawing down reservoirs in
their states that provide water for irrigation and recreation. Alaska also has an
interest in the salmon, but it wishes to see fewer restrictions on harvesting
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994).
86. See 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (“The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of
the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the
management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations.”)
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1994) (creating Council on Environmental Quality); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1515.2(b) (1998) (describing Council’s primary responsibilities).
88. In 1961, the United States and Canada signed a treaty governing the development of water
resources on the Columbia River Basin. Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water
Resources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, U.S.-Can., 15 U.S.T. 1555. Environmentalists
have unsuccessfully attempted to challenge actions taken pursuant to this treaty. See Northwest Envtl.
Defense Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1997). Recently, the United States
and Canada have reached an agreement concerning allocation of the salmon that migrate across the
international boundary. See Sam Howe Verhovek, U.S. and Canada Agree on a Plan to Restrict
Catches of Endangered Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A24.
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General.”).
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because its stocks are plentiful. Alaska’s aggressive approach to harvesting
recently led to the blockade of an Alaskan ferry by Canadian fishing boats
because the Canadians thought the Alaskans were taking too many salmon.90
The tribal governments seek to protect their treaty right to take fish equal to
the non-Indian commercial harvest.91
The third interest group is the environmental community. This consists of
national organizations such as the Sierra Club and American Rivers, and
local organizations such as the Oregon Natural Resources Council, the
Western Environmental Law Center, and the Northwest Resource
Information Center.92 These groups have different strategies and motivations
for participating in the litigation.
The fourth and final interest group is the industrial community. This
group includes the commercial fishers, who rely on a plentiful salmon
harvest for their livelihood, and farmers, who rely on water from the rivers to
irrigate their crops. Public and private utilities (and thus their customers)
benefit from the cheap hydropower that the federal government markets, as
do the direct-service industries (DSIs), which are large industrial consumers
of electricity (primarily aluminum companies) that buy power directly from
the federal government.93 The most recent listings have created speculation
that real estate developers and individual households within listed salmon
habitat may see their actions curtailed to protect the fish.94 These actions may
include everything from limiting logging and agricultural practices to
affecting how often households may wash their cars.
This amorphous dispute has led to much litigation. No party wishes to see
the wild salmon stocks become extinct— or at least no party has taken that
position publicly. All parties have different theories about what precisely
causes the decline of the stocks, and each has its own theory about how best
to restore the stocks. The environmental community wants downstream
migration of juvenile salmon improved, but rejects the technological
improvement that the Army Corps of Engineers has selected, namely, putting
the juvenile salmon in barges and transporting them past the dams.95
90. See Verhovek, An Expensive Fish, supra note 63, at A24.
91. There is too much to the dispute between the Indian and non-Indian harvesters to provide a
comprehensive set of citations. Interested readers may wish to begin with Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
92. The cases cited at supra note 60, show all of these parties participating.
93. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999);
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 56 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. See Verhovek, An Expensive Fish, supra note 63, at A14.
95. See American Rivers v. NMFS, 109 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 126 F.3d 1118
(9th Cir. 1997); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. NMFS, 56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995) (author served
as principal government counsel on appeal in both cases).
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Irrigators, utilities, and the industries relying on cheap hydropower want to
see the minimum protection necessary to preserve the salmon so that water
can be used for consumption or hydropower or irrigation, rather than for fish.
In any event, some of these interests blame the commercial harvest and
deteriorating ocean conditions, not the conditions in the river systems, for the
decline of the species.96
There is no question that the lawsuits arising from the dispute over the
salmon falls within the definition of public law litigation. The various
lawsuits involve questions of how to protect and enhance the life of the fish
at each stage of their lifecycle, from birth and downriver migration to the
ocean, through their lives in the ocean and survival of the commercial, tribal,
and sport harvest, and back through the return of these species to their natal
spawning grounds to give birth to the next generation of fish. These
questions concern how to manage forests to mitigate their effects on the
salmon habitat,97 how best to accommodate migration of juvenile salmon
downstream,98 how to limit the ocean harvest of salmon while
accommodating the commercial and tribal interests in the salmon,99 how to
run the dams on the river to protect the salmon while generating hydropower
for commercial and residential uses,100 and what changes to make to
individual practices in the home that might affect the survival of the species.
The list is endless.
I have described the ongoing dispute over the salmon in some detail not
simply to show that the litigation arising from the underlying disputes is
public law litigation, but also to show that some of the assumptions of
defenders of public law litigation do not necessarily apply here. The salmon
cases, and cases like them,101 differ from the cases in the civil rights
paradigm in several salient ways. First, the legal rights involved are primarily
statutory. In addition to the Endangered Species Act,102 the lawsuits typically
96. See, e.g., James L. Buchal, Some Fallacies About Salmon Restoration, 25 ENVTL. L. 375
(1995) (authored by attorney for DSIs).
97. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
98. See Northwest Resource Info. Ctr.v. NMFS, 56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
ongoing juvenile salmon transportation program not a “connected action” to flow improvements to
river to aid downstream migration for purposes of National Environmental Policy Act) (author served
as principal government counsel on appeal).
99. See Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999);
Pacific N.W. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
101. As mentioned above, another useful example is the litigation concerning the survival of the
northern spotted owl and the old growth forest habitat on which it depends. See supra note 61. I prefer
the example of the salmon cases because it is even more sprawling than the spotted owl cases and
involves more parties.
102. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1534 (1994).
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arise in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),103 the
National Forest Management Act and other statutes governing the planning
and management of the national forests,104 or the Northwest Power and
Planning Act.105 Although most civil rights cases have their basis in a general
statutory cause of action,106 the environmental statutes are more dynamic.
Not only are some of the key environmental statutes subject to periodic
congressional reauthorization,107 but Congress also has waived the
applicability of these statutes in certain circumstances.108 Such congressional
waivers, which typically take the form of a congressional declaration that
agency action satisfies certain environmental laws, have withstood
constitutional challenge.109 The added dimension of congressional
interference in litigation— the fact that Congress could change the ground
rules at any time, and the demonstrated propensity for it to do so— changes
the dynamic of this form of litigation.110 A party might not want to win too
much in a particular case for fear of losing it all the next legislative session.
Second, because the rights at issue are primarily statutory and not
constitutional, the court has less leeway to develop the substantive rules it
will apply to the alleged violation. In contrast, in a case to desegregate a
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); see, e.g., Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. NMFS, 56 F.3d
1060 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994); see, e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d
1345 (9th Cir. 1996); Swanson v. United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 839-839h (1994).
106. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
107. Most crucial in this context is the Endangered Species Act, which has expired and has existed
only on continuing appropriations for several years.
108. A recent noteworthy example is the timber salvage sale rider of 1995. See Emergency
Salvage Timber Sale Program, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 194, 240-47 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1611 (Supp. IV 1998)). That act expedited consideration and preparation of certain timber
sales, established expedited judicial review to challenges to the sales, and provided that environmental
documentation prepared for the sales “shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements” of a number of
environmental laws. Id. § 2001(c), (f), (i), 109 Stat. at 241-46; see also Sierra Club v. United States
Forest Serv., 93 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting reach of salvage rider); Idaho Conservation
League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting same where sale could affect listed
salmon); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996). For a criticism
of the salvage sale rider, see Victor M. Sher, Surveying the Wreckage: Lessons from the 104th
Congress, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 589 (1997).
109. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1993); see also Sandra Beth Zellmer,
Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (1997) (arguing for constitutional amendment to end practice of
substantive riders).
110. To be sure, Congress has acted broadly and restricted the jurisdictional and remedial powers
of district courts involved in prison reform litigation under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3626 (Supp. III 1997). This restriction on jurisdiction represents an unusual move in the civil
rights context, one that came years after the first prison reform lawsuit. Congressional involvement in
the environmental arena is much more common.
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school system, for example, a court looks at the constitutional obligation of
the state government to provide equal education to all citizens.111 The remedy
turns on how the school system can provide that education to students and
live up to the constitutional command. Because the Constitution does not
provide standards that govern, for example, how to measure whether a school
is desegregated or whether the size of a prison cell violates the Constitution,
the courts must derive the applicable measure for a given case from its own
sense of justice and of the facts before it.112 In environmental litigation,
however, the statute frequently provides a substantive standard against which
to measure the defendant’s conduct, and often administrative regulations that
the court must interpret and apply in determining whether the underlying
conduct has violated a legal norm.
Third, the rights involved in the traditional civil rights litigation are
primarily substantive rights, including the right to desegregated schools, the
right to decent mental health care, and the right to a humane prison.113 In
environmental litigation, the rights involved are often procedural, especially
to the extent that the rights at issue arise under NEPA. NEPA requires federal
agencies to “include in every recommendation or report on . . . major Federal
actions significantly affecting the qualify of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . [t]he environmental
impact of the proposed action. . . .”114 Congress enacted NEPA to require
each federal agency to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of its
proposed actions before the agency acts.115 NEPA does not, however,
“mandate particular results” from the environmental review.116 If a court
finds that an agency has not carried out its obligations under NEPA, it has the
111. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. Owen Fiss has justified this practice in the context of constitutional litigation:
The Constitution does not say anything about reports, showers, or isolation cells; much less does it
say anything about the date reports are due, the temperature of showers, or the maximum numbers
of days that can be spent in an isolation cell. But it does say something about equality and humane
treatment, and a court trying to give meaning to those values may find it both necessary and
appropriate–as a way of bringing the organization within the bounds of the Constitution–to issue
directives on these matters. The court may also find it necessary and appropriate to be quite
specific in these directives, either as a way of minimizing the risk of evasion or as a way of
helping the bureaucratic officers know what is expected of them.
Fiss, supra note 39, at 50.
113. Of course, one important exception to this statement are the cases making up the so-called
due process revolution, which reached its zenith in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For a
recent discussion of the rise and fall of this view, see Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Giving Substance to
Process: Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9 (1997).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
115. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (quoting Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
116. Id.
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authority under its general equitable powers to enjoin agency action pending
further examination of the potential environmental impact of the proposed
project.117 But a victory for environmental plaintiffs may prove only
temporary. While the plaintiffs may secure a delay of the federal project, they
cannot necessarily halt it permanently.118
Fourth, the statutory basis for judicial review significantly limits the
proceedings that the trial court may conduct in most environmental cases. In
cases challenging federal agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act,
where it applies, limits courts to reviewing of the record that the agency has
assembled.119 Only in rare cases may the court look beyond that record, and
in those cases the court is limited to taking new evidence only to explain
technical or scientific information or if the challenger makes a strong
showing of agency bad faith.120 Moreover, the reviewing court may reverse
the agency’s decision only if the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
contrary to law.121 The reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for the
agency’s.122 These limits on the reviewing court’s role in the litigation
distinguish the salmon cases from the civil rights paradigm.123
117. See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1989); Sierra Club v.
Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1097 (10th Cir. 1988). Except where the relevant statute limits the equitable
discretion of the court, a statutory violation does not automatically lead to injunctive relief. Compare
Amoco Prod. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (holding that court must find
irreparable harm before issuing injunction halting project while agency conducts study), and
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982) (holding that court must weigh equities
for violation of Clean Water Act), with Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978)
(finding limit on court’s discretion under Endangered Species Act). The precise limits on a court’s
equitable discretion to impose injunctive relief in environmental cases exceeds the scope of this article.
Whatever the bounds of that discretion, a court hearing a case involving an alleged violation of NEPA
has the authority to enjoin a proposed federal action only pending completion of the necessary
environmental study.
118. In one opinion, Judge Posner said that the environmental impact statement “is very costly and
time-consuming to prepare and has been the kiss of death to many a federal project.” Cronin v. United
States Dep’t of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). While this may be true as a practical matter,
a federal agency bent on completing a project can go forward once it has adequately completed only its
compliance with NEPA.
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (“In making the foregoing determination [concerning the validity
of agency action] the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party. . . .”).
120. See Florida Power & Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (reviewing court should
review “the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the
reviewing court” (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973))); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d
349 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying exception where defendant agency did not compile record); Newton
County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding exception not
applicable); National Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying bad faith
exception); Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining
types of exceptions to general rule limiting court to administrative record).
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
122. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
123. In a recent article, Professor Frank Cross questions the legitimacy of judicial review of
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Fifth, and finally, the interested parties in an environmental case often
have participated in the matter before it reaches court because of the agency
setting. Article III standing principles do not limit the parties who may
participate in the agency’s own decisionmaking process. Often, agencies will
allow any party who expresses an interest in the matter to submit comments
on a proposed decision or to otherwise participate in what becomes the
agency’s final decision. That ability of concerned parties to participate in the
decision-making process, coupled with the limitations placed on a court’s
review of the agency’s ultimate decision, minimizes in many instances the
need for formal intervention as of right.
To be sure, not all environmental cases resemble the salmon cases in
complexity or in the limitations on review. For example, many statutes have
“citizen suit” provisions that authorize suits against the federal government
(or other actors) for violations of the substantive provisions of the relevant
act.124 Thus, environmental plaintiffs could sue a federal agency for
discharging pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit in
violation of the Clean Water Act. Such lawsuits might implicate military
installations or other important government institutions.125 Moreover, in such
cases the court would not pay deference to the actions of the agency that is
violating the relevant act. Private groups can also sue federal agencies for
failing to meet nondiscretionary, inflexible statutory deadlines to issue
regulations.126 In such litigation, a court would have to decide when the
agency must issue the regulation despite the fact that it has already violated a
clear congressional command. This litigation would affect the regulated
community as well as the federal agency, but not as extensively as the
salmon cases might.127 Thus, not all environmental cases are alike.128
agency rulemaking. See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999). I accept for purposes of this Article that there will be
judicial review of agency decisions, including rulemaking.
124. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (Endangered Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994)
(Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1994) (Clean Air Act). In addition, the Superfund law makes the federal government liable for
cleaning up sites where hazardous substances have been disposed of the same as any private party. 42
U.S.C. § 9620 (1994).
125. For examples of such litigation, see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
126. For examples of such litigation, see In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d
545 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
127. See, e.g. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(ordering intervention for representatives of industry in proceedings carrying out consent decree that
set timetable for regulation).
128. In a series of articles, Professor Linda Mullenix has suggested that mass tort litigation does
not fit into Chayes’s paradigm of public law litigation. See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation:
Paradigm Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass
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The same conclusion holds true for public law litigation generally–not all
cases are alike. Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, at least with regard
to the procedural device of intervention, courts have treated the cases alike
and have imported uncritically the decisions from one sort of public law
litigation to another. This similarlity in treatment results to some degree from
the historical development of intervention as a procedural device, rather than
a thoughtful approach to applying the modern device to particular cases.
Thus, a consideration of the salient features of environmental public law
litigation provides a new perspective on what courts do and should do in
public law litigation generally and with regard to intervention specifically.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVENTION IN FEDERAL
PRACTICE
In the standard private lawsuit, A v. B, the procedural device of
intervention falls within the larger context of multiparty practice, that is, how
and under what circumstances outsiders are added to the original litigation.129
Thus, if A sues B to require B to repay a debt to A, and C claims an interest in
the transaction— for example, C claims that B owes C money as well, and
paying A will interfere with C collecting from B— various devices can be
used to involve C in the litigation. If the original parties believe C’s presence
necessary for a complete adjudication, they may use the device of joinder to
involve C, even perhaps against C’s wishes.130 If C believes that the two
original parties have colluded or will otherwise dispose of C’s interest
without C’s involvement— for example, if A sues B for repayment on the
Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999).
Mullenix’s series responds to the call of Judge Jack Weinstein and Professor David Rosenberg to see
mass tort cases as fitting into Chayes’ theoretical construct. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
849 (1984); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 472
(1994) (“Mass tort cases are akin to public litigations involving court-ordered restructuring of
institutions to protect constitutional rights.”). Unlike Mullenix, I have not singled out environmental
litigation as not fitting within Chayes’ original description of public law litigation. Rather, I believe
that cases like the salmon cases do fit within Chayes’s paradigm, but nevertheless deserve different
treatment from other cases that also fit within the paradigm, at least with regard to the use of the
procedural device of intervention.
129. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.16 (4th ed. 1992); 7C
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 1901, at 228-29 (2d ed.
1986). Earlier scholarship concurs in this portrayal of intervention. See James Wm. Moore & Edward
H. Levi, Federal Intervention: I. The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565, 565
(1936) (“Intervention may be defined as the procedural device whereby a stranger can present a claim
or defense in a pending action or in a proceeding incidental thereto, and become a party for the
purpose of the claim or defense presented.”).
130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
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debt, and B is in collusion with A and knows that A will not enforce the
judgment— then C may get involved through the device of intervention to
protect C’s interest.131 If there are many As in the world who are similarly
situated with respect to B— for example, B has breached a legal duty to A and
many people like A— then A can sue B in a class action and A can serve as a
representative for the As of the world.132 One might add to this litany the
procedure of interpleader, in which B, knowing that both A and C have a
claim, say, in Blackacre, will sue both of them, usually disclaiming any
interest in the property and sometimes putting the property claimed into the
custody of the court if possible.133
Like many of the federal rules concerning party structure, the rules
concerning intervention derive largely from equity and admiralty practice.134
The practice of intervention was then expanded definitively to all civil
actions in Rule 24 of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the original Rule 24 was limited and inflexible,
culminating in the now much-criticized decision in Sam Fox Publishing Co.
v. United States.135 Arguably, Sam Fox eliminated the possibility of
intervention in many cases, especially class actions where the intervenor
claimed that the class representative did not adequately represent the
intervenor. In response to Sam Fox, the Supreme Court adopted a
recommendation to amend Rule 24 in a way that eased the restrictions on
intervention.136 This amendment significantly increased the instances in
which courts recognized the right of an outsider to intervene in litigation.
Now, the instances in which courts will find intervention warranted greatly
exceed those instances in which courts traditionally found it necessary.
Although the advisory committee originally designed the party structure
rules for the business or transactional context, commentators advocating
public law litigation seized on the device of intervention as a means of
adding previously disallowed outsiders. The public law litigation advocates
ignored the history of intervention, how that history led to confusing and
unanswered problems with the procedural device, such as the status of the
131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22. Rule 22 does not require the plaintiff-stakeholder to disclaim an
interest in the property at issue; it is merely to avoid the possibility of multiple recoveries against the
same party. Deposit is required by the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
134. Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 566. There is historical evidence that there was a statutory
form of intervention available in the law courts (as opposed to equity courts) in England. See Ralph V.
Rogers, Intervention at Common Law, 57 L.Q. REV. 400 (1941).
135. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
136. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383 U.S.
1029, 1051 (1966).
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intervenor, the intervenor’s potential liability for fees, and the extent to which
the original parties could control the prosecution, and, more importantly,
settlement of the litigation despite the intervenor’s desires. Public law
litigation theorists put great hope into intervention, but because of the
historical development of the device, these commentators may have put more
hope into intervention than it could bear.
A. The Development of Intervention in the Original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
The exact origin of intervention practice in the federal courts is somewhat
unclear. Professors Moore and Levi recount what has emerged as the
standard history in their 1936 Yale Law Journal article.137 A close
examination of that article reveals some faults in their account, although no
scholar to date has attempted to undertake correcting them. The following
section will not attempt to write the complete and correct history of the
procedural device of intervention; such a complete history must await the
work of other scholars and lies beyond the mission of this article.138 The aim
of this section is twofold. First, I wish to retell the standard history and
suggest areas in which that history has flaws. In particular, Moore and Levi
wanted to make the case that a broad right of intervention would assist
litigation, and they tried to find support for this in the then-existing case law.
Oddly enough, Moore and Levi overlooked some sources that would have
strengthened their argument in favor of a broad right of intervention. My
second purpose is to highlight the historical limitations on intervention and
some of the problematic aspects of this procedural device.
To start their history, Moore and Levi contend that Roman civil procedure
recognized the practice of intervention;139 others have followed this assertion
137. Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 568-77.
138. As for completely rewriting the standard history of the procedural device of intervention,
future scholars may find the task daunting and less rewarding than the effort required. The materials
necessary for such an endeavor are hard to find and hard to understand in modern parlance, rendering
them simultaneously inaccessible both to the modern researcher and to the modern reader. In a similar
vein, Professor Hazard has observed that the practice and procedure books of the early eighteenth
century “varied in approach, some being abridgements with a minimum of independent editorial
content and others showing some of the narrative style of later treatises. They also varied in quality,
ranging from efforts to do a fairly thorough job to little more than hornbooks for students.” Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1254, 1262 (1961). This is not to say that future endeavors would inevitably be fruitless. Scholars
have conducted many successful historical studies of procedural devices relating to party structure, for
example, STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION (1987), and Hazard, supra.
139. Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 568-69. Moore and Levi make a somewhat tenuous
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uncritically.140 As an example, Moore and Levi suggest that “a relative of a
argument on this score, although fault may lie with Friedrich Kessler, on whom Moore and Levi relied
for their information on the procedure of intervention in civil legal systems. Id. at 565 n.*. This is not
to say that Moore and Levi’s assertions concerning civil law systems are incorrect, but only that their
account of Roman law has flaws. Moore and Levi assert that
intervention practice in Roman law was rather extensive, although intervention seems to have
taken place only at the appeal stage and then on the theory that the losing party might refuse to
appeal or might not be vigilant in prosecuting the appeal and the petitioner’s interest thus be
inadequately protected.
Id. at 568. To support this argument, Moore and Levi rely on certain selections from Justinian’s
Digest. These selections do not support the assertion that intervention “was rather extensive,” id., at
least as the term intervention is used today to describe outsiders to civil litigation interposing
themselves in an ongoing dispute, especially at the trial level. Moore and Levi cite no evidence to
support the notion that an outsider could intervene in any proceeding other than an appeal. Many of the
passages deal with the instance where a person represented by a procurator loses and the procurator
fails to appeal; in those instances, the jurists hold that the original party (whom we might call the real
party in interest) could prosecute the appeal. See, e.g., DIG. 49.1.4.2 (Macer, On Appeals, 1) (“A
person who has an interest can appeal on the condemnation of someone else. One who has brought and
lost [an action] by means of a procurator is such a person; but the procurator may not appeal in his
own name.” (bracketed material in original translation)). These passages do not imply that Roman law
had a procedural device that we would call intervention. Moreover, some evidence exists that third
parties to a case were permitted to appeal in only limited instances. For example, before listing the
types of appeals described by Moore and Levi, Justinian’s Digest quotes Marcian as saying, “It is not
possible for there to be an appeal against a judgment passed between other parties. . . .” DIG. 49.1.5
(Marcian, Appeals, 1). Later, Ulpian is quoted as saying, “It is not customary for appellants to be heard
except those whose interest is affected, or who have been given a mandate, or who are without
authorization administering another’s business which will however shortly be ratified.” DIG. 49.5.1
(Ulpian, Edict, 29). In addition, there is some evidence that some appeals could be prosecuted by the
real party in interest, not by a representative. See DIG. 49.9.1 (Ulpian, Appeals). Thus, the conclusion
that intervention “was rather extensive” in Roman law is probably incorrect.
The final reason to doubt the quality of Moore and Levi’s treatment of Roman law is a revealing
typographical error. All of their citations to the Digest follow a form since abandoned by scholars. In
this citation form, an author would refer to “L.”, then the section and item number, followed by “D.”
for Digest, and then the book and section number. The letter “L.” in this older citation form stood for
“lex.” All of the “ls” in Moore and Levi’s citations are rendered as the arabic numeral “1”. Of course,
at that time, the lowercase letter “l” on a typewriter was frequently used as the numeral “1”. My point
is only that Moore and Levi probably proofread this section of their article poorly because they did not
frequently use the sources they cited as support.
It is easy to see, however, why Moore and Levi reached their conclusion on the extent of
intervention in Roman Law. First, neither author, nor their colleague and consultant Kessler, was a
Roman law scholar (nor am I). Second, both Moore and Levi supported expanding the role of
intervention in civil practice. See Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 577 (“The tendency towards an
extensive use of the allowance of intervention seems advantageous.”). Finding support for the practice
in Roman law may have, in their eyes, improved the pedigree of the device.
140. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.10, at 366 & n.2 (2d ed.
1993); JAMES, supra note 129, § 10.17, at 542; 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, § 24 App. 101, at 24 App. 8 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 7C
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1901 at 228 & n.1; Hutchings, supra note 10, at 702 & n.31;
Rensberger, supra note 10, at 114-15 & n.22. On the hazards of finding Roman origins for modern
legal doctrine, see Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. &
CIV. L.F. 19, 25-26 (1996). I am especially indebted to my colleague Alan Watson for his assistance
with the materials on Roman law.
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person sentenced to death might intervene to appeal.”141 Moore and Levi also
trace early forms of intervention to English ecclesiastical courts,142 and they
make the claim, found elsewhere,143 that the influence of Roman law on
Louisiana civil law influenced the practice of intervention in the United
States and formed the first use of the practice on these shores in actions at
law.144
As with their claims about Roman law, Moore and Levi may have
misstated the historical record concerning the development of intervention in
the United States. Sources predating the American Revolution recognized the
device of intervention in at least some form. In particular, Lord Chief Baron
Gilbert’s treatise on the High Court of Chancery, a book known as Forum
Romanum, gave detailed instances where outsiders were admitted to ongoing
141. Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 569. Cf. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (denying
“next friend” standing to mother seeking to appeal on behalf of son sentenced to death.)
142. See Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 569. They depict the right as a broad one, but again,
they provide thin support for their assertion that “a third party was said to be entitled to intervention if
he ‘consider[s] that his interest will be affected.’” Id. The quotation within the quotation is from a
treatise on practice and not from the case that they cite, Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Rep. 602
(1811), cited in Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 569 & n.22. Dalrymple in turn involved a marriage
in which the proposed intervenor was the putative second wife of one of the parties. This does not
support the contention that anyone who simply considered that her interest was implicated could
intervene; rather, the intervenor in that case had a direct interest in the outcome of the proceeding.
143. See, e.g., 2 C.L. BATES, FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE: A TREATISE IN SUITS IN EQUITY IN
THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES § 624 (1901); CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 65, at 287 (1928). Commentators have since repeated the argument that the
origins of intervention “in the United States lie in the civil law of Louisiana.” Hutchings, supra note
10, at 702 & n.32.
144. Moore and Levi argue that, “in the United States, the Roman law influenced the Louisiana
practice, and through this practice, to some extent, the common law of this country.” Moore & Levi,
supra note 129, at 569. The origins of the “Louisiana theory” that actions at law did not welcome
intervention may be the arguments and dissenting opinions in Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
478 (1854). In that case, the states of Florida and Georgia pursued an original action in the Supreme
Court to settle a boundary dispute. The United States petitioned the court to allow it to appear
essentially as an intervenor. Id. at 480-81. The United States sought this litigating status because it had
granted lands in Florida to private parties, and Georgia claimed that the granted lands belonged to it
and not the United States; the United States also claimed that the change of the boundary between
Georgia and Florida could affect issues such as the apportionment of the House of Representatives.
See id. at 481-82. The Supreme Court granted the motion of the United States, holding that it would
model its rules in boundary disputes between states on equity and admiralty practice “with a
discretionary authority, however, to deviate from that rule where its application would be injurious or
impracticable.” Id. at 492; see also id. at 493 (holding that court “will deviate from [the rules of
chancery practice] where the purposes of justice require it, or the ends of justice can be more
conveniently attained”). The Court thus granted the federal government’s motion. The dissenting
justices referred to the civil code of Louisiana in their dissents to demonstrate, in part, that the Court
should have denied the federal government’s motion. See id. at 501 (Curtis, J., dissenting); id. at 516
(Campbell, J., dissenting). Both of these justices urged that under the French and Louisiana practice,
an intervenor became a party to the litigation like an original party. Because they believed that the
United States could not be a party in litigation with a state in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, they dissented.
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litigation if they could show a sufficient interest.145 Gilbert argued that
intervention was a species of interpleader.146 Joseph Story, in his original
1836 treatise on equity jurisprudence, recognized (but did not agree with) the
argument that interpleader contained some form of intervention.147 Evidence
for intervention in actions at law in federal court is minimal. This dearth of
evidence with respect to federal courts is not surprising, however, because at
that time Congress had provided that, for actions at law, the federal courts
would apply the procedural rules of the states in which they sat. Evidence of
the contemplation of intervention in actions at law exists in some state
jurisprudence.148
Whatever its precise origin, some form of the practice of intervention has
existed in the federal courts for a considerable period of time, at least in some
types of cases. Here, Moore and Levi’s account appears to be correct. On the
federal level, admiralty cases form the most accessible and readily
identifiable documented cases involving intervention as a familiar
procedure.149 The nature of admiralty cases in rem required intervention by
necessity if courts were to protect the rights of third parties. If not, “the
greatest injustice would be done, because a decree of the court in rem is
binding on all the world as to points which are directly in judgment before
it.”150 In equity and law actions, the practice was originally more limited. In
addition to the form of interpleader mentioned above,151 equity practice
recognized the examination pro interesse suo as another, more cumbersome
form of intervention. In that procedure, outsiders who claimed an interest in
property that was the subject of the litigation could petition a court of equity
to question them about the extent of their interest.152 The parties and the
outsiders could then use this examination as the basis of the outsider’s claim
145. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 47-48
(Samuel Tyler, ed., 1st American ed., Washington, D.C., W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1874, 1st ed. 1758).
Interestingly, Moore and Levi do not cite Gilbert, even though he describes a broad right of
intervention. For recent scholarship discussing the Forum Romanum, see Harold J. Berman & Charles
J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J.
437, 485 & n.95 (1996).
146. See GILBERT, supra note 145, at 47.
147. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 114 n.1 (1836). Moore
and Levi claim that Story did not recognize the device of intervention, but they cite only his treatise on
equity practice, not his Commentaries. See Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 570.
148. See, e.g., Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 552 (Md. 1797) (“For any apparent defect
in the proceedings before the court, the attachment may be quashed upon suggestion of such defect to
the court, either by the defendant himself, or a third person claiming an interest in the property
attached.”).
149. See, e.g., Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4, 9 (1834) (“This is very familiar.”).
150. The Mary Anne, 16 F. Cas. 953, 954 (D. Me. 1826) (No. 9,195).
151. See supra note 146, and accompanying text.
152. See 2 BATES, supra note 143, § 627, at 663; GILBERT, supra note 145, at 79-80.
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and litigate who had the superior claim.153
By the time of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when
Moore and Levi wrote their article, the rules for admiralty and equity actions
in federal courts allowed intervention in appropriate cases.154 Admiralty
Rules 34155 and 42156 authorized courts to allow intervention, as did the
Equity Rules.157 In addition, some federal courts allowed intervention to take
place ancillary to actions at law, such as a proceeding to attach or execute
upon property claimed by an outsider.158
Whatever fault one might find with Moore and Levi’s history, their article
has proven to be immensely influential. Moore and Levi identified two types
of intervention, namely an absolute right to intervene and a discretionary
right to intervene. As they saw it:
The absolute right exists when the petitioner claims an interest in
property in the hands of the court, or when the petitioner is
inadequately represented in an action controlled by the court and in
153. See 2 BATES, supra note 143, § 627, at 663-64.
154. Under the Conformity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1934), federal courts applied appropriate state
rules of procedure in actions at law before the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
155. This rule provided:
If any third person shall intervene in any cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in rem
for his own interest, and he is entitled, according to the course of admiralty proceedings, to be
heard therein, he shall propound the matter in suitable allegations, to which, if admitted by the
court, the other party or parties in the suit may be required, by order of the court, to make due
answer; and such further proceedings shall be had and decree rendered by the court therein as to
law and justice shall appertain. But every such intervenor shall be required, on filing his
allegations, to give a stipulation with sufficient sureties or an approved corporate surety to abide
by the final decree rendered in the cause, and to pay all such costs and expenses and damages as
shall be awarded against him by the court on the final decree whether it is rendered in the original
or appellate court, not to exceed however in any event the agreed or appraised value of the
property so claimed by him, it or them, with interest at six per cent. per annum and costs.
Admiralty Rule 34, 254 U.S. 693-94 (1920).
156. This rule provided:
Any person having an interest in any proceeds in the registry of the court shall have a right,
by petition and summary proceedings, to intervene pro interesse suo for a delivery thereof to him,
and on due notice to the adverse parties, if any, the court shall and may proceed summarily to hear
and decide thereon, and to decree therein according to law and justice. And if such petition or
claim shall be deserted, or on a hearing, be dismissed, the court may, in its discretion, award costs
against the petitioner in favor of the adverse party.
Admiralty Rule 42, 254 U.S. 697 (1920).
157. This rule provided, in part: “Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be
permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in
recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding.” Equity Rule 37, 226 U.S. 659 (1912). This rule,
unlike the rules in admiralty, expressly directed the court to take into account the original proceedings
and the effect of the intervention on the original parties.
158. See Edward C. Eliot, Interventions in the Federal Courts, 31 AM. L. REV. 377, 380 (1897)
(stating that courts will entertain intervention petitions “at law as well as in causes in equity”).
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which a decision will be binding upon the petitioner. The discretionary
right to intervene exists when the petitioner has an interest in a
question of law and fact common to the pending litigation. The
discretionary right is a matter of trial convenience. The absolute right
is given as a protection to the petitioner.159
Moore and Levi recognized that the rules in existence at the time did not
make this distinction, but they urged that courts in fact drew the distinction
between intervention of right and intervention as a matter of discretion in the
trial court.160
When the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1937,161 the new Rule 24 provided for intervention. Moore and Levi’s
influential article is the only American secondary authority cited by the
Advisory Committee. Moreover, the structure of the rule followed Moore
and Levi’s division of intervention into two types.162 On intervention of right,
Rule 24(a) provided:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant’s
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the
applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof.163
159. Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 581 (footnotes omitted).
160. See id.
161. The Supreme Court promulgated these rules under the Rules Enabling Act, presently codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The propriety and desirability of engaging the Supreme Court in this sort
of rulemaking is an interesting and controversial subject, but it is beyond the scope of this article. For
materials on this subject, see, for example, Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999); Sherman L.
Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1198 (1966).
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 1937 advisory committee note.
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a), 308 U.S. 690-91 (1937) (amended 1946). On discretionary or
permissive intervention, the original rule provided:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of
the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b), 308 U.S. at 691 (1937) (amended 1946). This rule has since been amended to
allow government officials to intervene when one of the parties calls into question the application of a
statute or regulation they administer. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). Unlike the rule concerning
intervention of right, the rule regarding permissive intervention expressly directs the court to consider
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This rule took much of its form from the earlier equity and admiralty
rules. The rule also reflected Moore and Levi’s categorization of cases in
which courts allowed intervention of right: where the applicant for
intervention has an interest in property or a common fund in the hands of the
court, where the applicant might be bound by a judgment, and where the
representation of the applicant’s interest is inadequate.164
The new rule also clarified several matters from the historical practice.
First, it made clear that intervention was available in all civil litigation, thus
settling the question of whether courts could allow intervention without
express statutory authority.165 Second, the new Rule 24 set forth a substantive
standard by which a court was to measure a proposed intervenor’s motion.
Third, it made clear that an application had to be timely, implying that late
applications could be denied on that ground alone. For the most part, the
intervention contemplated was intervention in private litigation. The
proposed intervenor had to be either prospectively bound by the judgment or
a claimant for property. This version of the procedural device was therefore
not adapted for public law litigation for reasons that will become clearer
below.166
The Supreme Court amended Rule 24(a) in a minor way in 1946, keeping
the same focus on private litigation. The amendment changed subpart (3) to
expand its coverage. The rule now provided for intervention “when the
applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or
disposition of the court or an officer thereof.”167 The Advisory Committee’s
notes indicate that the amendment was intended to change the scope of the
Rule so that it “cover[ed] the situation where property may be in the actual
custody of some other officer or agency— such as the Secretary of the
Treasury— but the control and disposition of the property is lodged in the
court wherein the action is pending.”168 This amendment retained the private
litigation focus of the original rule.
Results under the original Rule 24 varied. In particular, courts struggled
the effect of the intervention on the original parties.
164. See Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 582-95.
165. Compare Eliot, supra note 158, at 380, and Annotation, Intervention, 123 AM. ST. REP. 280,
281 (1908) (stating that there can be no intervention in actions at law without express statute), with
Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 570 n.31 (disagreeing with the foregoing).
166. To the extent that Moore and Levi’s article influenced the private law focus of Rule 24 as
originally promulgated, their article stressed the need for intervention in a particular private law
setting, namely the setting of reorganization and receivership cases. See Moore & Levi, supra note
129, at 595-607.
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(3), 329 U.S. 853 (1946) (amended 1966) (emphasis added).
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 1948 advisory committee’s note.
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to interpret subsection (a)(2), which allowed intervention when the
applicant’s interests were inadequately represented and where the “applicant
is or may be bound by a judgment in the action,” and subsection (a)(3),
which allowed intervention in cases in which the disposition of property
involved in the case could adversely affect the proposed intervenor.169 The
Supreme Court’s efforts to interpret these subsections came mostly in
antitrust cases appealed directly from district courts to the Supreme Court
under the Expediting Act.170 This particular context may explain why the
cases provided little solid guidance to the lower courts. These cases were on
direct appeal with no decision from the court of appeals to assist the Supreme
Court and no circuit conflict on the issue to flesh out the arguments. In
addition, the cases reflected underlying policies that the Court had developed
in the context of antitrust litigation, especially the effect that private litigation
could have on government enforcement actions and vice versa. Finally, to the
extent that the early cases provided guidance, the case law reflected a
hostility toward intervenors. The Expediting Act was intended to speed
resolution of antitrust cases, so the Supreme Court may have been less
receptive to outsiders stepping into ongoing litigation in this context, lest they
slow it down. Nevertheless, these cases from the Supreme Court provide
insight into the Court’s approach to intervention in public law litigation cases
prior to the 1966 amendments of the Federal Rules. Each case involved the
possible effect of a large antitrust case on an outsider to the government
enforcement litigation. In each case, the Court denied intervention.
The Supreme Court first considered the requirements of Rule 24 in Allen
Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co.171 In that case, the United
States sued National Cash Register (NCR) and obtained a decree requiring
NCR to obtain court approval before acquiring any competitors.172 When
NCR later requested permission to acquire a competitor, another competitor,
Allen Calculators, petitioned to intervene apparently because it believed that
the proposed merger would eliminate competition in the industry.173 The
district court originally allowed Allen Calculators to participate in the
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2), 329 U.S. 853 (1946) (amended 1966).
170. 32 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (1994)).
171. 322 U.S. 137 (1944). The Court had earlier encountered the new Rule 24 in Missouri-Kansas
Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 (1941). That case involved an attempt to modify a
consent decree that had settled earlier antitrust litigation. The consent decree specifically provided that
the proposed intervenor in that case could intervene in the litigation to enforce one clause of the
consent decree. See id. at 507 & n.2. The Court consequently concluded that “the codification of
general doctrines of intervention contained in Rule 24(a) does not touch our problem.” Id. at 508.
172. See Allen Calculators, 322 U.S. at 138-39.
173. See id. at 139.
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proceedings, but eventually denied intervention for many reasons including
that the court knew that the president of Allen Calculators would be called as
a witness by the government.174 Thus, the district court would hear the claims
of Allen Calculators in the government’s case in determining whether the
proposed merger would have the anticompetitive effect that Allen
Calculators claimed. On appeal, the Supreme Court briefly reviewed the
requirements of Rule 24(a) and found that Allen Calculators did not fall into
any of the enumerated categories of intervenors.175 It also held that the
district court properly denied permissive intervention because “where a suit
is of large public interest, the members of the public often desire to present
their views to the court in support of the claim or the defense. To permit a
multitude of such interventions may result in accumulating proofs and
arguments without assisting the court.”176 In this case, the Court found that
the existing parties produced an adequate record without the assistance of
Allen Calculators, especially considering the fact that the government called
the president of Allen Calculators as a witness.177 Overall, however, one can
see that the pre-1966 attitude of the court was that members of the public
would often want to participate and would often not assist the court.
The Supreme Court also dealt with Rule 24 in Sutphen Estates, Inc. v.
United States.178 That case, arose from the reorganization proceedings
concerning Warner Bros., in which the movie production and movie theater
businesses would be reorganized into two companies.179 Sutphen Estates
leased property to a subsidiary of a subsidiary of Warner Bros., and under the
decree of dissolution only the new theater company would be the guarantor
of the lease.180 Sutphen Estates sought to intervene to protect its interest in
the guaranty, and claimed that the equivalent to the old guaranty would be a
guaranty from both of the new companies to secure the leases.181 The district
court denied intervention and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held
that Sutphen Estates had no right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) because it
was not in privity with Warner Bros., and therefore would not be bound by
the judgment and could not be represented by it.182 Further, the Court held
174. See id.
175. See id. at 140-41.
176. Id. at 141-42.
177. See id. at 142.
178. 342 U.S. 19 (1951).
179. See 342 U.S. at 20-21; see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948) (holding that then-existing form of theater and production ownership violated antitrust law).
180. See 342 U.S. at 21.
181. See id. at 22.
182. See id. at 21.
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Sutphen Estates could not intervene under subsection (a)(3), because it had
not shown sufficiently that its interest in the unified Warner Bros. would be
adversely affected by the consent decree.183 The Court also suggested that
Sutphen Estates could litigate the issue in a separate forum should the
guaranty from the new theater company prove insufficient, but it did not
identify either the forum or the type of proceeding it envisioned.184
Thus, neither Allen Calculators nor Sutphen Estates provided clear
guidance to the courts of appeals. The courts of appeals split on their
interpretations of both Rule 24(a)(2) and 24(a)(3). Some courts interpreted
the requirement of subsection (a)(2) that the applicant “is or may be bound
by a judgment in the action” to mean that the applicant had to demonstrate
that it would be bound in the legal sense under the doctrine of res judicata.185
Other courts interpreted the term “bound” in a broader, more practical
sense.186 Similarly, some courts interpreted subsection (a)(3), which allowed
intervention when an applicant claimed an interest in property or a common
fund in the court’s custody or control, to apply strictly to property before the
court.187 Other courts found ways of interpreting the “common fund” notion
quite broadly.188
The Supreme Court resolved the tension between the circuits over the
interpretation of the term “bound” in Rule 24(a)(2) in its decision in Sam Fox
Publishing v. United States.189 That case involved an antitrust enforcement
action that the United States brought in 1941 against the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), a member organization of
musical publishers that functions as a clearinghouse for licensing musical
compositions.190 The government contended that ASCAP restrained trade in
two ways, first through its dealings with outsiders and second with its
dealings among its own members.191 Specifically on the second alleged
183. See id. at 22.
184. See id. at 23. Justice Black dissented from the opinion because of this possibility. Id. at 23
(Black, J., dissenting) (“I cannot assent to an opinion that permits this question of impairment to
remain open for adjudication elsewhere at some indefinite time in the future.”).
185. See, e.g., Archer v. United States, 268 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1959); Cameron v. President &
Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946); see also Note, Intervention and the
Meaning of “Bound” Under Rule 24(a)(2), 63 YALE L.J. 408 (1954) (approving this approach).
186. See, e.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960); Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915
(7th Cir. 1953).
187. See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, 170 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1948).
188. See, e.g., Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding that trade
secret constituted common fund). Moore and Levi reported that some pre-rule cases also interpreted
the common fund notion broadly. See Moore & Levi, supra note 129, at 589-90.
189. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
190. See id. at 685.
191. See id. at 685-86.
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restraint of trade, the government asserted that a few large publishing houses
dominated the governance of ASCAP, controlled the ASCAP board of
directors, and dictated the apportionment of the licensing fees all to the
disadvantage of the small publishers.192 The government sought to change
the method by which ASCAP selected its board of directors and to make the
distribution of licensing fees more equitable.193 The parties settled the
original dispute by consent decree.194 Later, the government twice moved to
amend the consent decree— once in 1950 and again in 1959— to make
ASCAP more responsible to its small-publisher members.195
Sam Fox Publishing and other small publishing houses sought to
intervene in the proceeding only after the government filed its second motion
to modify the consent decree. The small publishers contended that “the
proposed modifications did not go far enough toward ameliorating the
position of the small publishers as against the few large publishers.”196 In
essence, they wanted the government to pursue more relief against ASCAP
and thus to weaken even more the hold that the large publishers had on the
organization. The district court denied intervention and the small publishers
appealed.
The case turned on the knotty problem of adequate representation and the
binding nature of the judgment in the original litigation. The small publishers
argued that their interests were not adequately represented by either the
United States or ASCAP. As to the former, the small publishers argued that
the government had sold short the interests of the small publishers and had
therefore sought insufficient relief for their needs.197 As to the latter, the
small publishers argued that ASCAP clearly did not represent their interests
because it was under the stranglehold of the large publishers, but, as
members of the defendant class, they would still be bound by the decree.198
The Supreme Court rejected both contentions. First, the Court held that, in
the context of a government-initiated antitrust enforcement action,
192. See id. at 686.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 686-87.
196. Id. at 687.
197. See id. at 688-89.
198. Id. at 690. The Court described the small publishers argument:
Their claim is that [ASCAP], acting through its Board of Directors, could not adequately represent
their interests as small publishers, whose very claim is that they are caught between the practical
need to remain in the Society and the impossibility of obtaining adequate representation on the
Board of Directors which determines both the weighting of votes in Board elections and the
distribution of Society revenues.
Id.
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intervention by a private party would be inappropriate because it would entail
questioning the wisdom of the government’s policy decisions.199 In any
event, the Court reasoned, the small publishers would not be bound by the
consent decree because of the nature of antitrust enforcement actions and the
established principle that government and private enforcement actions
coexist.200 “[J]ust as the Government is not bound by private antitrust
litigation to which it is a stranger, so private parties, similarly situated, are
not bound by government litigation.”201 The small publishers could always
bring their own action against ASCAP and attempt to obtain relief they
considered adequate.
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the small publishers could not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) that they be both inadequately
represented and bound by the judgment in the litigation. The Court
understood why the small publishers felt inadequately represented. But as the
Court saw it, the small publishers “face[d] this dilemma: the judgment in a
class action will bind only those members of the class whose interest have
been adequately represented by existing parties to the litigation; yet
intervention as of right presupposes that an intervenor’s interests are or may
not be so represented.”202 Thus, the small publishers would be bound by the
judgment only if they were adequately represented in the class action; if the
representation was inadequate, then they would not be bound. Intervention
was not necessary in either scenario. While at first glance this reasoning may
seem to exclude any potential intervenor, the Court further explained that its
result turned on the particular setting of the case and the particular claims that
the government pursued against ASCAP. The government sued ASCAP
alleging antitrust violations from ASCAP’s dealings with outsiders and also
from its internal functioning; the small publishers were concerned only with
the internal governance claim. As the Court saw it:
[A]s to any claims or defenses which [the small publishers] have
against the Government, the representation of ASCAP is entirely
adequate, and as to any claims which they may have against ASCAP
there is nothing to require [the small publishers] to bring them into this
199. See id. at 689. The Court concluded that,
[a]part from anything else, sound policy would strongly lead us to decline appellants’ invitation to
assess the wisdom of the Government’s judgment in negotiating and accepting the 1960 consent
decree, at least in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the
Government in so acting.
Id.
200. See id. at 689.
201. Id. at 690.
202. Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
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litigation, simply because they are “bound” for other purposes.203
Even though the small publishers lost in their effort to enter the
government’s lawsuit against ASCAP, the Supreme Court made it clear that
the small publishers could initiate their own action against ASCAP.204 The
Court realized that the existing consent decree might as a practical matter
dissuade another court from imposing different relief more favorable to the
small publishers.205 Nevertheless, because the small publishers were not
legally bound by that decree, they could not establish a right to intervene
under Rule 24.
Although it is difficult to determine the effect of the Sam Fox decision,
the reported cases suggest that it became something of an impediment to
intervention. Most of the reported court of appeals and district court cases
after Sam Fox and before the subsequent amendment to the rules discussed
below denied intervention to proposed intervenors.206 The limited secondary
literature that reacted to the case similarly predicted that the Court’s decision
would eliminate or drastically limit the right to intervene, especially in class
action cases.207 Moreover, Sam Fox did not resolve the tension in the
appellate cases involving Rule 24(a)(3), allowing intervention if a common
fund were subject to the control of the court. As mentioned above, some
courts read this narrowly and others broadly. Pressure to amend the rule
grew.
203. Id. at 692.
204. See id. at 694.
205. See id.
206. See Carey, Baxter & Kennedy, Inc. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 346 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1965);
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. granted sub nom. Holt v. Alleghany
Corp., 381 U.S. 933 (1965), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 28 (1966); Degge
v. City of Boulder, 336 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1964); Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964);
Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (D.
Minn. 1966); Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966); Blocker v. Board of
Educ., 229 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (denying intervention to local taxpayers in school
desegregation case); H.K. Ferguson Co. v. Mickel Processing Corp., 33 F.R.D. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Haiduk v. Atlantic Indep. Union, 31 F.R.D. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1962); United States v. ASCAP, 202 F.
Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). There were, however, cases that allowed intervention, some in instances
that the decision in Sam Fox appeared to preclude. See Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d 592 (2d
Cir. 1964); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1963); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962); International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm,
301 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1962).
207. See, e.g., Recent Case, 15 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1962); John W. Stack, Note, Intervention of
Right in Class Actions: The Dilemma of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), 50 CAL. L. REV. 89
(1962); The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 162-63 (1961).
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B. The 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In the 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the
Supreme Court adopted numerous changes to the rules governing party
structure as recommended by the Advisory Committee. Specifically, the
changes affected Rule 19, concerning joinder, Rule 23, concerning class
actions, and Rule 24, concerning intervention. These amendments
highlighted the Advisory Committee’s new approach, a focus on using
litigation to settle all issues arising from a single transaction or series of
transactions, which the Advisory Committee saw as a more practical and
pragmatic approach. Thus, the Advisory Committee’s amendment of the
joinder rule sought to include all parties necessary to fully adjudicate a case
for both liability and remedy.208 The amendment to the rule concerning class
actions “describe[d] in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining
class actions.”209 And the rule for intervention was amended to provide
intervention of right for outsiders in litigation “which as a practical matter”
could impair the outsider’s interests.210
The Advisory Committee explicitly saw intervention as a counterpart to
joinder.211 Specifically, the Committee believed that intervention of right was
a kind of counterpart to Rule 19(a)(2)(i) on joinder of persons needed
for a just adjudication: where, upon motion of a party in an action, an
absentee should be joined so that he may protect his interest which as
a practical matter may be substantially impaired by the disposition of
the action, he ought to have a right to intervene in the action on his
own motion.212
Thus, although the language of the two rules did not resemble each other, the
Committee theoretically linked intervention and joinder, and it intended that
the new rule on intervention would fill in any gaps created by the joinder
rule.213
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 1966 advisory committee note.
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 1966 advisory committee note.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 1966 advisory committee note.
212. Id. Rule 19(a) now provides in relevant part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if . . . (2)
the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person’s ability to protect that interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
213. The joinder rule extends beyond the intervention rule in that it calls on a court to weigh the
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In its notes to the amendment of Rule 24, the Advisory Committee
singled out Sam Fox as a problematic case. Although the reasoning of Sam
Fox might have been “linguistically justified,” it was still a “poor result.”214
In particular, the Committee believed that the result in Sam Fox would make
class actions unworkable and potentially unfair. The Committee reasoned
that
[a] class member who claims that his “representative” does not
adequately represent him, and is able to establish that proposition with
sufficient probability, should not be put to the risk of having a
judgment entered in the action which by its terms extends to him, and
be obliged to test the validity of the judgment as applied to his interest
by a later collateral attack. Rather he should, as a general rule, be
entitled to intervene in the action.215
The amendment would overcome the precise problem in Sam Fox
because it would not require that the applicant for intervention be bound by
the judgment in a technical sense. On the other hand, the Committee
recognized that adequate representation under the new rule
is not confined to formal representation like that provided by a trustee
for his beneficiary or a representative party in a class action for a
member of the class. A party to an action may provide practical
representation to the absentee seeking intervention although no such
formal relationship exists between them. . . .216
The Committee also perceived problems in the cases that had interpreted
the common fund basis for intervention, former Rule 24(a)(3). Despite
Supreme Court cases that apparently limited the availability of this form of
intervention, “some decided cases [from the courts of appeals] virtually
disregarded the language of this provision.”217 But the Advisory Committee
did not fault the courts for doing so because the rule was “unduly
effect of joinder on the original parties to the action if the absentee cannot be joined and to consider
whether to dismiss the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). In the intervention context, this problem does
not arise because the applicant for intervention presumably wants to proceed in the court. The rule also
reflects a holdover from older third party practice. Under the traditional rule, which still prevails, a
party could not be joined if the party destroyed the basis for federal jurisdiction (e.g., the party was not
of diverse citizenship from an opposing party), but a similar rule did not apply in the context of
intervention. See Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1884).
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restricted.”218 In the Committee’s view, the right to intervene “should not
depend on whether there is a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of;”
rather, “[i]f an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense
by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be
entitled to intervene. . . .”219
To get around the problems it identified in the old rule, the Committee
unified the former separate bases for intervention— the inadequately
represented party that would be bound by the judgment and the common
fund problem— and set forth a rule that addressed the problem from its new
transactional point of view. In the 1966 amendments, then, the primary focus
of the intervention rule shifted to include a focus on complex private
litigation and class actions, and the Committee deliberately intended to assist
the litigation of these types of cases. Rule 24(a) now provided for
intervention under the following circumstances:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.220
The new Rule 24(a) retained intervention where a statute expressly
demanded it, and it retained the timeliness requirement. Instead of the two
theories of intervention, however, it replaced the required interest with a
practical concern, and it subjected all cases of intervention to the test of
whether the original parties adequately represented the applicant’s interest.
In addition to demonstrating the need for the amendment, the Committee
tacked on a closing comment at the end of its notes that did not fit with the
tenor of the rest of the notes. The Committee stated that “[a]n intervention of
right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or
restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient
conduct of the proceedings.”221 The Committee provided no reference to
support this statement, and it did not suggest what conditions or restrictions a
court could impose on an intervenor. This statement had little support in the
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 383 U.S. 1039, 1051 (1966). The Supreme Court amended Rule 24(a)
again in 1987 to eliminate the masculine pronouns. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
221. FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 1966 advisory committee note.
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prior existing case law, probably because courts usually treated intervenors
as full parties to the litigation.222 Along with providing no support for the
statement and no sense of what conditions and restrictions would be
appropriate, the rule itself did not specifically authorize district courts to
impose conditions and restrictions on intervention. As explained below, this
small fillip would prove to cause other problems in modern intervention
practice.
The Supreme Court reacted swiftly to the 1966 amendment to Rule 24 in
yet another antitrust case appealed directly to the Court under the Expediting
Act, but with a drastically different outcome than the prior cases. In that case,
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,223 the Supreme
Court considered the possible divestiture of one natural gas company from
another because the merged entity constituted an unlawful combination in
restraint of trade.224 Contrary to the narrow reading of the right to
intervention that the Court had established in its pre-1966 intervention
jurisprudence, the Court in El Paso announced a sweeping right to intervene.
El Paso involved the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline
Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas Corporation.225 The United States
objected to the acquisition, asserting that the acquisition left El Paso as the
only out-of-state supplier of natural gas to California.226 The Court agreed,
and not only held that the merger violated antitrust law but also took the
unusual step of directing the district court “to order divestiture without
delay.”227 On remand, three parties moved to intervene to challenge the
divestiture remedy: the State of California, which sought to promote a
competitive natural gas market for its citizens; Southern California Edison, a
major industrial purchaser of natural gas; and Cascade Natural Gas, a
distributor of natural gas in Washington and Oregon which alleged that the
divestiture order disadvantaged it in future competition by leaving it with
only the divested company as its sole supplier and creating conditions that
222. In the admiralty context, the rules themselves may have caused this treatment. See supra
notes 155-156 (setting forth former admiralty rules).
223. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
224. Id. at 131; see also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (holding
that acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas violated Clayton
Act); California v. Federal Power Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
225. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. at 652.
226. See id. at 657-62. The case contained an anomaly, however, because the Federal Power
Commission had previously approved the merger as being in the public interest. See id. at 663-64
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. Id. at 662; see also id. at 664 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting
from Court’s “peremptory ordering of divestiture”).
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raised the prices the new company would have to charge.228 The district court
denied intervention to all three and the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court’s opinion in El Paso stands out for two reasons, one primarily
of historical interest and the other of more lasting importance. First, it
broadly reinterpreted the right of intervention under the former version of
Rule 24(a). Where Sam Fox appeared to have almost eliminated the right to
intervene granted under former Rule 24(a)(2)— at least as it involved class
actions— the Court reinterpreted former Rule 24(a)(3) in a manner that would
have allowed intervention by the applicants in Sam Fox. In El Paso, the
Court read the category of interventions for those adversely affected by
disposition of property before the court to include the disposition of a
company alleged to be in violation of antitrust law.229 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied exclusively on its decision in Missouri-Kansas
Pipe Line Co. v. United States— a case that the Court had said did not
actually involve the application of Rule 24230— and completely ignored its
earlier decisions that the common fund type of intervention did not apply in
the antitrust context.231 This novel reading of the case law justified the
intervention of the state of California and Southern California Edison, but
even that reading would not necessarily justify intervention by Cascade.232
This problem led to the second, more significant part of the Court’s decision.
The Court held that even if intervention were not available to Cascade under
the old rule, it would surely be available under the new rule because Cascade
clearly claimed “‘an interest’ in the ‘transaction which is the subject of the
action.’”233 In so interpreting the new rule, the Court announced a potentially
sweeping reach to the right of intervention. The decision in El Paso thus set
the stage for a broad right of intervention that the appellate courts would
further refine.
C. Intervention Practice Today
Today, federal courts routinely grant intervention to parties that could not
have intervened under the pre-Rules intervention case law or the original
Rule 24. The 1966 amendments have had the effect desired by the Advisory
Committee; indeed, to the extent that the Advisory Committee saw
228. See Cascade Natural Gas v. El Paso Natural Gas, 386 U.S. at 132-33.
229. Id. at 133-35.
230. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1940).
231. See Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 22 (1951); Allen Calculators, Inc. v.
National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141 (1944).
232. See Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. at 135.
233. Id. at 135 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)).
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intervention as simply a complement to joinder, the right to intervene now
exceeds instances in which joinder would apply.
Petitions for intervention of right now must meet the four requirements of
the rule: they must be timely; they must demonstrate that the applicant
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action”; they must show that the applicant “is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant’s ability to protect that interest”; and they must show that the
applicant’s interests are not already adequately represented.234 The second
and third requirements are intertwined issues; I will therefore treat them
together.235 I will then examine the current jurisprudence concerning
appellate review of decisions on intervention motions and the status of the
intervenor in the litigation. An understanding of the underlying law of each
of these is central to my larger task, namely, describing how the device of
intervention functions in public law litigation.
1. Timeliness
The original rule required that an application for intervention be made in a
timely manner, and the revised rule did not change that requirement. The
decision of whether a motion to intervene is timely “is to be determined from
all the circumstances.”236 Courts have listed a number of factors that they
consider relevant in making the timeliness determination, including: the
status of the pending litigation; how long the applicant knew or should have
known that the pending action would affect its interest; the purpose for which
intervention is sought; the reasons that the applicant delayed moving for
234. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
235. See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 140, §  24.03[1][b], at 24-24 (“Although each
of the three criteria is independent, practical application of Rule 24(a)(2) involves a balancing and
blending of the independent components. The three criteria are not analyzed in a vacuum and, instead,
are often applied as a group.”); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1908, at 263 (“The nature of the
applicant’s interest and the effect that the disposition of the action may have on his ability to protect
that interest are closely related issues and are treated together in the present section.” (footnote
omitted)). To an extent, all of the issues surrounding intervention are intertwined. As Judge Henry
Friendly put it:
The various components of the Rule are not bright lines, but ranges— not all “interests” are of
equal rank, not all impairments are of the same degree, representation by existing parties may be
more or less adequate, and there is no litmus paper test for timeliness. Application of the Rule
requires that its components be read not discretely, but together. A showing that a very strong
interest exists may warrant intervention upon a lesser showing of impairment or inadequacy of
representation. Similarly, where representation is clearly inadequate, a lesser interest may suffice
as a basis for granting intervention.
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984).
236. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973).
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intervention; the prejudice to existing parties if the court grants intervention;
the prejudice to the applicant if intervention is denied; and the presence of
any unusual factors militating in favor of or against intervention.237 The
courts appear to weigh the factors equally and do not single out one pivotal
factor, although at least one commentator claims that the courts focus
primarily on the effect of the intervention on the existing parties.238 These
factors all help vindicate the fundamental purpose the timeliness requirement,
which “is to prevent a tardy intervenor from derailing a lawsuit within sight
of the terminal.”239
Not surprisingly, because of the multitude of different factors that courts
consider, there is great variation in the cases concerning what constitutes a
timely motion to intervene.240 For example, one court denied as untimely a
motion to intervene presented merely twelve days after the plaintiff filed the
complaint,241 while other courts have allowed outsiders to intervene even
after the court has entered judgment for purposes of appealing the
judgment.242 Courts are particularly wary about allowing intervention if the
237. See, e.g., Winbush v. Iowa by Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1479 (8th Cir. 1995)
(focusing on “the status of the proceedings at the time of the motion, prejudice others may suffer as a
result of the delay, and the reason for the delay”); Arrow v. Gambler’s Supply, Inc., 55 F.3d 407, 409
(8th Cir. 1995) (“Among the considerations that bear on the question of timeliness are how far the
litigation had progressed . . . the prospective intervenor’s prior knowledge of the pending action, the
reason for the delay in seeking intervention, and the likelihood of prejudice to the [original]
parties. . . .”); United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (author served as
principal government counsel on appeal); Linton by Arnold v. Commissioner of Health & Env’t, 973
F.2d 1311, 1317 (6th Cir. 1992) (considering “(a) the point to which the suit has progressed; (b) the
purpose for which intervention is sought; (c) the length of time preceding the application during which
the applicant knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case; (d) prejudice to the
original parties due to the failure of the applicant to apply promptly for intervention upon acquiring the
knowledge of its interest; and (e) any unusual circumstances of the case”); United States v. New York,
820 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1987) (examining “(a) the length of time the applicant knew or should have
known of his interest before making the motion; (b) prejudice to existing parties resulting from the
applicant’s delay; (c) prejudice to applicant if the motion is denied; and (d) presence of unusual
circumstances militating for or against a finding of timeliness”).
238. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1916, at 435. But see, e.g., Catazano by Catazano
v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223, 232-234 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of intervention as untimely solely
because applicant was aware of litigation and waited too long before moving to intervene); Doe v.
Duncanville Ind. School Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of intervention
as untimely because of lack of prejudice to applicant).
239. United States v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 710 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983).
240. In addition, the standard of review applied on appeal also can explain the variation. See infra
note 325 and accompanying text.
241. See Arkansas Elec. Energy Consumers v. Middle South Energy, Inc., 772 F.2d 401, 403 (8th
Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of intervention as untimely where party filed only twelve days after
complaint filed because “a substantial amount of the litigation had been completed during these twelve
days”).
242. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (allowing putative class member
to appeal denial of class certification after settlement).
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original parties have spent a great deal of time trying to formulate a
settlement.243 Nevertheless, courts will order intervention if the settlement
itself creates the interest of the outsider or reveals that a party is no longer
adequately represented.244 Otherwise, few hard guidelines define the
contours of the timeliness rule.
2. Interest and Impairment
The second (in some formulations, the second and third) requirement of
Rule 24(a)(2) is that an “applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest.”245 The Supreme Court
has opined sporadically on the nature of the interest required to intervene,
and commentators have bemoaned the resulting dearth of guidance.246
Nevertheless, the few cases from the Supreme Court provide some idea of
the interest required to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).
After the El Paso decision discussed above,247 the Supreme Court’s next
treatment of Rule 24(a)(2) occurred in Donaldson v. United States.248 In that
case, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initiated an investigation of a
taxpayer who had once worked for a circus.249 The IRS issued summonses to
the circus and its accountant to obtain employment and income records
concerning the taxpayer.250 The taxpayer sued the circus and the accountant
243. See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm’n, 865 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“‘[T]he
purpose of the basic requirement that the application to intervene be timely is to prevent last minute
disruption of painstaking work by the parties and the court.’”) (quoting Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d
15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980)).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 7 F.3d
497, 502 (6th Cir. 1993); Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm’n, 934 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1991);
Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1990); Association of Prof’l Flight Attendants v.
Gibbs, 804 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986); Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416
(10th Cir. 1984).
245. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
246. See, e.g., Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note 10, at 432 (“The Supreme Court has
rarely addressed Rule 24(a)(2), and when it has, the opinions have been peculiarly fact-bound,
affording minimal guidance, especially as to the meaning of interest.”); Vreeland, supra note 10, at
283 (“Lack of guidance in the Advisory Committee Notes and a paucity of Supreme Court decisions
on intervention of right have resulted in widely varying interpretations of the Rule 24(a)
requirements.”).
247. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967); see also
supra notes 223-233 and accompanying text.
248. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
249. See id. at 518-19.
250. See id. at 519.
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and obtained preliminary relief enjoining them from turning over the records
to the IRS.251 The IRS responded by instituting a civil action to enforce the
summonses, and the taxpayer sought to intervene.252 Neither the circus nor
the circus’s accountant cared about the litigation, and each averred that it
would submit the requested papers to the IRS were it not for the injunctions
that the taxpayer had obtained.253 Both the district court and the court of
appeals denied intervention.
On the surface, the taxpayer’s interest (in the nontechnical sense) in
preventing his former employer and the accountant from responding to the
summons was obvious: If the IRS obtained the records from the third parties,
it might have been able to substantially advance a civil or criminal
enforcement proceeding against the taxpayer. The question before the Court
was thus whether the taxpayer’s interest in hampering an investigation of him
using the records of third parties warranted formal intervention of right. In
deciding whether this constituted a sufficient interest in the sense used in
Rule 24(a)(2), the Supreme Court emphasized that
what is sought here by the Internal Revenue Service from [the
accountant] and from [the circus] is the production of [the circus’s]
records and not the records of the taxpayer. Further . . . this is not a
case where a summons has been issued to the taxpayer himself
seeking access to his books and information from his mouth. Neither
is it a case where the summons is directed at the taxpayer’s records in
the hands of his attorney or his accountant, with the attendant
questions of privilege, or even in the hands of anyone with whom the
taxpayer has a confidential relationship of any kind.254
Placed in this context, then, the issue of whether the taxpayer had a
sufficient interest in the dispute between the IRS and the circus and the
accountant was not a close question. The IRS sought information through the
summonses that it could obtain by calling the accountant or a representative
of the circus to testify or from an examination of the circus’s records
concerning its own deductions.255 The taxpayer neither owned the records,
nor had a special relationship with the circus or the accountant. Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of intervention.256
251. See id. at 519-20.
252. See id. at 520-21.
253. See id. at 521.
254. Id. at 522-23.
255. See id. at 531.
256. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440
(1964), a case that suggested intervention might be available for taxpayers in summary proceedings
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In reaching this decision, however, the Court added a new phrase to the
lexicon of intervention analysis. The Court held that Donaldson’s interest
“cannot be the kind contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2) when it speaks in general
terms of ‘an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action.’ What is obviously meant there is a significantly
protectable interest.”257 As critics have noted, the term “significantly
protectable interest” neither derives from any earlier intervention
jurisprudence, nor adds anything to the analysis of what constitutes the
necessary interest to warrant intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).258 The phrase
“significantly protectable interest” raises more questions than it answers,
including how significant the interest must be, and by what means the
interest must be protectable. One leading commentator has interpreted the
term “protectable” to mean that the interest must be “legally protectable.”259
But that formulation proves to be tautological. If the interest is “legally
protectable,” then the applicant for intervention can intervene, that is, resort
to the law, to protect it; if the interest is not “legally protectable,” then the
applicant cannot resort to law to protect it.
After a decision that essentially assumed the existence of sufficient
interest,260 the Court next discussed the interest required by Rule 24(a)(2) in
against third parties seeking to enforce summonses. In that case, the IRS issued a summons to
accountants for married taxpayers. Attorneys for the couple filed a suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief claiming that the summons was “null and void” because it unlawfully appropriated privileged
work product and violated the taxpayers’ right against self-incrimination. See id. at 441-42. The suit
came before the IRS made any attempt to enforce the summons. The Court denied relief because it
held that the attorneys had adequate relief at law. Id. at 443. Specifically, the Court determined that the
attorneys or the taxpayers could intervene in the proceeding if the IRS sought to enforce the summons.
The Court stated:
There are cases among the circuits which hold that both parties summoned and those affected by a
disclosure may appear or intervene before the District Court and challenge the summons by
asserting their constitutional or other claims. We agree with that view and see no reason why the
same rule would not apply before the hearing officer.
Id. at 445 (citations omitted). Instances in which third parties could intervene in such proceedings
included instances where “the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for
use in a criminal prosecution, as well as that it is protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 449
(citations omitted).
257. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)).
258. As one commentator noted:
Lower courts cannot ignore this direct interpretation of the rule by the Supreme Court. But
“significantly protectable interest” has not been a term of art in the law and there is sufficient room
for disagreement about what it means so that this gloss on the rule is not likely to provide any
more guidance than does the bare term “interest” used in Rule 24 itself.
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1908, at 270; see also Shreve, supra note 10, at 924 n.125;
Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note 10, at 433.
259. MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 140, § 24.03[2][a], at 24-25.
260. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) (holding that
interest in democratic union elections sufficient to warrant intervention).
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Bryant v. Yellen.261 That case involved the allocation of land in the Imperial
Valley of California. Farms in the Imperial Valley receive water from the
Boulder Canyon Project, mostly known for Hoover Dam.262 As a general
rule, the reclamation laws “limit[] water deliveries from reclamation projects
to 160 acres under single ownership.”263 The Secretary of the Interior
originally interpreted the reclamation laws to exempt lands in the Imperial
Valley that had been irrigated prior to the construction of the project from the
160-acre limitation.264 This remained the view of the Department of the
Interior until 1964, when, because of other events— including the litigation in
Arizona v. California,265 which allocated the water in the Colorado River—
the Department reassessed and reversed its position.266 It attempted to impose
the 160-acre limitation on the Imperial Valley District, which supplies water
from the Project to individual farmers, and, when the District resisted, the
United States sued for declaratory relief that the 160-acre limitation applied
in the Imperial Valley.267 The district court permitted individual landowners
in the Valley to intervene, and then ruled that the 160-acre limitation did not
apply to the lands in the Imperial Valley.268 When the government decided
not to appeal the adverse judgment, “a group of Imperial Valley residents,
who had been given leave to participate as amici in the District Court and
who desired to purchase the excess lands that might become available if [the
160 acre limitation] were held applicable, attempted to intervene for purpose
of appeal, but the District Court denied the motion.”269 The court of appeals
reversed both on the denial of intervention and on the merits.270 Thus, unless
the Supreme Court reversed, the large landowners in the Valley faced a
Hobson’s choice. They could either divest themselves of lands in excess of
160 acres— and if they did, the Secretary of the Interior would set a price that
261. 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
262. See id. at 355.
263. Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1994) (providing that Secretary of the Interior shall appraise
and sell “all irrigable land held in private ownership by any one owner in excess of one hundred and
sixty irrigable acres” at a price that does not reflect the value added by the existence of the reclamation
project).
264. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 355.
265. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
266. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. at 363-65.
267. See id. at 365.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 366. The lead intervenor was Ben Yellen, a doctor who provided medical services to
migrant farm workers. For a profile of this colorful character and the early stages of the litigation that
became Bryant v. Yellen, see Michael E. Kinsley, Ben Yellen’s Fine Madness, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.
1971, at 38.
270. See United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977), modified, 595
F.2d 524 (9th Cir.), and reh’g denied, 595 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part and vacated in part
sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
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excluded the value added by the availability of water for irrigation— or they
could withdraw from irrigation all irrigable acreage over 160 acres.
The Supreme Court did reverse, and held that the 160-acre limitation did
not apply to lands in the Imperial Valley. Before reaching the merits of the
dispute, however, the Court had to determine whether the court of appeals
correctly allowed the frustrated landowners who claimed that they would
purchase the divested land to intervene. The Court determined that “the
respondents who sought to enter the suit when the United States forwent an
appeal from the District Court’s adverse decision had standing to intervene
and press the appeal on their own behalf.”271 Like the opinions in El Paso
and Donaldson, the Court’s opinion in Bryant v. Yellen does not provide a
thorough analysis of the interest required for Rule 24(a)(2). The Court simply
held that the interest asserted— namely, a desire to purchase excess land “at
prices below the market value for irrigated lands”272— was sufficient.
In the same way that the Court’s pre-1966 intervention jurisprudence may
have stemmed from the antitrust setting of those cases, it is tempting to
dismiss the Supreme Court’s post-1966 jurisprudence concerning the
definition of “interest” for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2) as being motivated by
concerns other than the narrow question of intervention. Under this reading,
the Court read the interest requirement loosely in El Paso because it was
dissatisfied with the consent decree, and a grant of intervention was the only
way to fix the decree.273 The Court read the interest requirement narrowly in
Donaldson to vindicate the policy of effective enforcement of the tax laws.274
271. 447 U.S. at 366.
272. Id. at 367.
273. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“The majority’s splenetic
displeasure with the substantive provisions of the divestiture plan approved by the Government and the
trial court may have been an important factor in the liberal reading given Rule 24(a) in [El Paso].”);
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1908, at 266 (“Thus the Court’s desire to see that its mandate be
obeyed provided strong pressure for a liberal reading of the requirements for intervention.”); Benjamin
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 406 (1967) (“But perhaps the case is just one where an anxiety
to reach for and correct substantive error, as the Court saw it, produced questionable procedural law
which the Court will in time recognize as such.”); Shapiro, supra note 10, at 730 (“[T]he decision in El
Paso may lie outside the mainstream and . . . the apparent novelty of the rulings on intervention may
have been largely a result of the Court’s dissatisfaction with the substantive provisions of the
decree.”). One piece of evidence supporting this argument is the Court’s unusual decisions in the El
Paso litigation to first direct divestiture and then, when remanding for the second time, to direct the
“Chief Judge of the Circuit or the Judicial Council of the Circuit to assign a different District Judge to
hear the case.” Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 142-43 (1967)
(citation omitted).
274. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 1908, at 270 (“A narrow reading of the
intervention rule was thought necessary in Donaldson in order to protect the public interest in prompt
and effective investigation and enforcement of the revenue laws.”).
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The Court then read the interest requirement broadly again in Bryant v.
Yellen because it wanted to preserve the ownership of lands in the Imperial
Valley.275 Whatever the Court’s true motivation, these cases have provided
scant guidance to the lower courts.
Without firm direction from the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals
have attempted to determine what kinds of parties meet the interest and
impairment requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).276 In this sense, the courts of
appeals are in the same position as they were before the 1966 amendments,
when they were attempting to follow the scant direction of Allen Calculators,
Sutphen Estates, and Sam Fox Publishing. But, following the spirit of the
1966 amendments and the El Paso decision, the courts of appeals have
greatly expanded the right to intervene compared to past practice. Many
interests that would not have warranted intervention under the old rule now
suffice for intervention. At one extreme, courts have held that a party’s
interest in the stare decisis effect of a decision constitutes a sufficient interest
to warrant intervention.277 Usually, however, these cases involve such
unusual facts that they resemble the common fund cases described by former
Rule 24(a)(3).278 More typically, the courts of appeals require something
275. Justice Scalia has recently criticized Bryant v. Yellen in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 462 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Justice Scalia’s view, Bryant v.
Yellen “represents a crabbed view of the standing doctrine that has been superseded.” Id. According to
Justice Scalia,
Bryant was decided at the tail-end of “an era in which it was thought that the only function of the
constitutional requirement of standing was ‘to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues.’” Thus, the Bryant Court ultimately afforded the respondents standing
simply because they “had a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy,” not because they
had demonstrated injury in fact, causation and redressability. “That parsimonious view of the
function of Article III standing has since yielded to the acknowledgment that the constitutional
requirement is a ‘means of “defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power,”’ and ‘a part of the basic charter . . . provid[ing] for the interaction between [the federal]
government and the governments of the several States.’”
Id. at 462 (citations omitted; quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998)).
276. Professor Shreve has criticized the tendency of commentators to analyze intervention
problems from the point of view of appellate courts. Shreve, supra note 10, at 894-95. I agree with this
criticism for reasons explained infra at text accompanying notes 397-398. Nevertheless, to understand
the state of the jurisprudence, one must analyze the law that the courts of appeals have created, and the
reasoning of the district courts is much less important to this analysis.
277. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865
F.2d 1197, 1214 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Oneida
Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1984); Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General Elec. Co.,
581 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“[S]tare
decisis principles may in some cases supply the practical disadvantage that warrants intervention as of
right.”); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967). But see, e.g., In re Benn,
791 F.2d 712, 721 (9th Cir. 1986) (disallowing intervention based on stare decisis because applicants
were in different judicial circuit that would not be bound by stare decisis in underlying case).
278. For example, Atlantis Development Corp. “involve[d] a little bit of nearly everything— a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
p215 Appel.doc 09/15/00   4:55 PM
2000] INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 267
more substantial than a passing curiosity in how the case comes out. The
verbal formulae that the appellate courts have generated to capture the
interest necessary for intervention are no more satisfying than those
generated by the Supreme Court.279 Nevertheless, a fairly reliable set of fact
patterns has developed to flesh out what courts believe satisfies the necessary
interest requirement in the public law context. The courts of appeals
consistently have held several multifarious types of interests sufficient for
purposes of the rule. These interests include those of parents and teachers in
school desegregation cases;280 of majority employees in employment
discrimination cases brought by minority employees;281 of employees or their
representatives in other cases in which the court is restructuring an institution
like a school system, prison, or mental hospital;282 of environmentalists and
little bit of oceanography, a little bit of marine biology, a little bit of the tidelands oil controversy, a
little bit of international law, a little bit of latter day Marco Polo exploration.” 379 F.2d at 819. At
issue was the ownership of reefs off of the coast of Florida on which Atlantis wished to construct
“facilities for fishing club, marina, skin diving club, a hotel, and, perhaps as the chief lure, a gambling
casino.” See id. at 820. Atlantis asserted that the reefs lay outside the territorial jurisdiction of either
Florida or the United States. Id. at 819-20. The United States subsequently sued other parties that
attempted to build on the reefs, asserting that the reefs were subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
In granting Atlantis’s petition to intervene, the Fifth Circuit held that Atlantis’s claim would be
“worthless” if the government prevailed in its lawsuit against the original defendants. See id. at 828.
As a practical matter, if the original defendants lost, “the only way by which Atlantis can win is to
secure a rehearing en banc with a successful overruling of the prior decision or, failing in either one or
both of those efforts, a reversal of the earlier decision by the Supreme Court on certiorari.” Id.
Understandably, the Fifth Circuit believed it “an understatement to characterize these prospects as
formidable.” Id. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit limited its opinion, stating that the unusual facts of the
case, and not the normal operation of principles of stare decisis, warranted intervention in that case:
It bears repeating, however, that this holding does not presage one requiring intervention of right
in every conceivable circumstance where under the operation of the Circuit’s stare decisis
practice, the formidable nature of an en banc rehearing or the successful grant of a writ of
certiorari, an earlier decision might afford a substantial obstacle. We are dealing here with a
conjunction of a claim to and interest in the very property and very transaction which is the subject
of the main action.
Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
279. One commonly cited case derived the following formula: “What is required is that the
interest be one which the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant.”
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
banc).
280. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t has generally been
accepted that students, parents of children in the school system and parent organizations have a
sufficient interest to satisfy [the Rule 24(a)(2) interest] requirement, and that their interest could be
impaired by the disposition of a school desegregation case.” (citing cases)); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984) (allowing intervention to teachers
whose contracts with school districts could be upset by unification remedy).
281. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Howard
v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986).
282. See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dis. No. 1, 738 F.2d 82 (8th
Cir. 1984)
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other public interest groups in cases brought by the regulated community;283
of the regulated community in cases brought by public interest
organizations;284 and, to some extent, of people claiming economic interests
that the litigation could affect.285 A significant split of authority exists over
whether an organization that has lobbied for legislation has a sufficient
interest to intervene to defend the legislation. Some courts of appeals hold
that this interest provides a sufficient stake in the matter to satisfy Rule 24;286
others hold the opposite.287
The most important question that has plagued the courts of appeals in
defining the interest necessary to intervene is whether a proposed intervenor
must show legal standing to sue in order to intervene. The standing inquiry
asks whether a party has a sufficient interest in a dispute to initiate a lawsuit
in the first place. It derives from the requirement of Article III of the
Constitution that the judicial power extends to “Cases” and
“Controversies.”288 The Supreme Court has held that the standing inquiry
283. See, e.g., Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v.
Department of Interior, 100 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1996); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d
1392 (9th Cir. 1995); Sagebrush Rebellion v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983). But see, e.g.,
Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996)
284. Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But see Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1989).
285. See, e.g., United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995) (allowing
intervention by potentially responsible parties to challenge settlement of liability at hazardous waste
site); Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding interest of
members of fishing industry in consent decree concerning fishery management plan sufficient) (author
served as principal government counsel on appeal). The economic interest cannot, however, be too
generalized. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 205 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding interest in
lower electric rates too generalized).
286. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F2d. 727 (9th Cir. 1991); Washington State Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
287. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 36.96 Acres of
Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982).
288. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has most recently iterated the
requirements that a prospective plaintiff must meet to demonstrate standing in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
[T]o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an “injury
in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 704 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 444, 560 (1992). Of most relevance to the
application of the standing requirement to intervention motions is the injury-in-fact requirement. The
question of whether someone is actually injured would have great bearing on whether someone has a
sufficient interest in litigation to intervene.
Several recent cases of the supreme Court interpret the injury-in-fact requirement narrowly in the
context of environmental litigation. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt., 523 U.S. 83
(1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871 (1990). The Laidlaw case, quoted earlier, is exceptional because it held that the
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limits the federal courts to their proper role in the tripartite system of
government created by the Constitution.289 The Court has recently decided a
number of cases discussing and expanding the standing requirement,290 and
these developments in the Court’s jurisprudence have generated considerable
academic criticism.291 Evaluating the merits of the Court’s decisions in this
area and the academic criticism those decisions engender lies beyond the
purview of this article. What is relevant here is whether courts should apply
the standing criteria to the question of whether it should allow an outsider to
participate in an existing lawsuit. That presents a different inquiry. As
Professor Shapiro has observed, “A may not have a dispute with C that could
qualify as a case or controversy, but he may have a sufficient interest in B’s
dispute with C to warrant his participation in the case once it has
begun. . . .”292
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether a prospective
intervenor must have standing sufficient to satisfy the case and controversy
requirement of Article III to support a motion for intervention. Indeed, it
explicitly passed on that question in Diamond v. Charles.293 In that case, the
original plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that
regulated abortion. The lower courts held the statute unconstitutional.
Diamond was a physician who had intervened as a defendant and petitioned
environmental organizations had proved a sufficient injury-in-fact to proceed with their citizen
enforcement suit under the Clean Water Act. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704-06.
289. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (“Obviously, then, the
Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common
understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”). While
still a circuit court judge, Justice Scalia wrote an article that foreshadowed the development of much of
the Supreme Court’s recent standing jurisprudence. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). In that article,
Scalia puts the standing inquiry in “more pedestrian terms [as] an answer to the very first question that
is sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of another’s actions: ‘What’s it to you?’” Id. at
882.
290. In addition to Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, see, for example, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83 (1998); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
291. It would be difficult to list all of the articles on Article III standing. Important contributions
include: Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Fallon, supra note 39; William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221 (1988); Harold J. Kent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and
Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 (1993); Gene R. Nichols, Jr., Justic Scalia, Standing, and
Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988).
292. Shapiro, supra note 10, at 726 (footnote omitted).
293. 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene
before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) but also the requirements
of Art. III.”).
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the Supreme Court to reverse the decisions below. The Supreme Court held
that an intervenor must possess Article III standing to continue litigation on
appeal if the original party has discontinued litigating.294 It further held that
Diamond’s interests, while perhaps sufficient to warrant intervention under
rule 24(a)(2), were insufficient to establish Article III standing.295 The Court
recently revisited this holding in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,296
a case with a procedural history similar to Diamond v. Charles.297 There, the
Court expressed “grave doubts whether [the intervenors] have standing under
Article III to pursue appellate review.”298 But again, the question of whether
a lawsuit should continue absent one of the original parties if the intervenor
lacks standing is a separate question from whether courts should the
intervenor to demonstrate standing as a prerequisite to intervening.299
Three courts of appeals have held that a proposed intervenor must
demonstrate interests sufficient to satisfy the standing inquiry in order to
intervene. In the first such decision, Southern Christian Leadership
Conference v. Kelley, the District of Columbia Circuit held that Article III
required an applicant for intervention to demonstrate standing.300 More
294. See id. at 69.
295. See id. at 71. Diamond sought to protect his interests as a “doctor, father, and a protector of
the unborn.” Id. at 64.
296. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
297. The procedural history in that case was considerably more protracted than in Diamond v.
Charles, see id. at 49-64 (reciting history), but the relevant schematic is similar: A state employee
challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the Arizona constitution that made English the
official language of the state. An organization and an individual intervened on behalf of the state. The
state lost in the court of appeals and declined to appeal to the Supreme Court, so the intervenors
petitioned for certiorari.
298. Id. at 66. The Court did not rely on this justification to reach its decision. Id. (“we need not
definitively resolve the issue”). Instead, the Court determined that the case was moot because the
original plaintiff had left her job with the state. See id. at 67-75 (analyzing mootness of case). This
case is seriously misread by Coffey, supra note 10. Coffey asserts that the Court held, or at least
strongly suggested, in Arizonans for Official English that “intervenors must have Article III standing.”
Id. at 819. This reading is implausible. First, although the Court expressed “grave doubts” about
whether the intervenors had standing, it expressly did not decide the issue. See Arizonans for Official
English, 520 U.S. at 66. Second, it seems unlikely, to say the least, that the Court would “strongly
suggest” the resolution to a question it expressly passed on in both an earlier case and the case before
it.
299. As Professor Shapiro aptly put it:
A distinction between standing to intervene and to appeal makes particular sense when the
“case or controversy” limitation on the federal judicial power is recalled. Adding C to a litigation
between A and B may pose no problems under Article III of the Constitution, but permitting C to
be the sole adversary of B on appeal, when his interest in the case may be only in its value as
precedent, certainly does give difficulty since there is no real controversy between A and C.
Shapiro, supra note 10, at 753-54. I believe that Shapiro must have meant “since there is no real
controversy between B and C,” the parties to the appeal.
300. 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In that case, Senator Jesse Helms sought to intervene in
litigation between civil rights plaintiffs and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) over the
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recently, that court held that an intervenor must demonstrate Article III
standing to intervene in a case in the court’s original jurisdiction “because a
Rule 24 intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing with the original
parties to the suit.”301
The Seventh Circuit similarly requires an intervenor to demonstrate
standing to sue. That court has reasoned that a prospective intervenor must
demonstrate standing because “[t]he intervenor seeks control of the suit,
acquires a right to conduct the case in a way that may undermine the interest
of the original plaintiff . . . and may become eligible for a separate grant of
relief or an award of attorneys’ fees.”302 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit sees
imposing the standing requirement as an effective means of “keeping the
scope of intervention of right within reasonable bounds.”303
disposition of electronic surveillance tapes that the FBI made of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Id. at 778.
In 1977, the district court entered judgment, sealing the tapes for fifty years, with any disclosure to be
made only under court order. Id. Six years later, Senator Helms sought to intervene to gain access to
the tapes “to better inform his and the Senate’s vote” on whether to create the national Martin Luther
King Day holiday. See id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of intervention, holding
that the senator did not meet the requirements for legislator standing. Id. at 779-81. The Supreme
Court recently discussed the requirements for congressional standing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997).
301. City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1994)); see also Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1470-71
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Recently, the D.C. Circuit recognized an inconsistency in its case law and reaffirmed
that it would require applicants for intervention to prove Article III standing in support of their
petitions. See Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 178 F.3d 533 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), noted in Recent Case, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1557 (2000) (criticizing decision).
302. Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988). The Seventh Circuit
decided Bethune Plaza before the Supreme Court’s decision in Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989). In that case, the Court held that an intervening defendant in a
civil rights action would not be liable for attorneys’ fees unless the intervenor violated the civil rights
of the plaintiffs. More recently, the Ninth Circuit has held that an intervening environmental plaintiff
does not qualify for attorneys’ fees when it intervenes in an enforcement action brought by the federal
government under the Clean Air Act. See United States v. Stone Container Corp., 196 F.3d 1066 (9th
Cir. 1999). Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s last observation that an intervenor participates fully as a party
because it can qualify for attorneys’ fees may no longer represent good law in a number of areas.
303. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.
1996). To be sure, the Seventh Circuit stated in one decisiion that the “interest of a proposed
intervenor . . . must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement.” United
States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (1985) (emphasis added). Many commentators have
interpreted this comment literally and used it as evidence of the hostility of the courts to intervenors.
See, e.g., Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 10, at 324-25; Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra
note 10, at 437; Bullock, supra note 10, at 637 & n.310; Dickinson, supra note 10, at 995-96;
Vreeland, supra note 10, at 288.
A close examination of the decision in 36.96 Acres reveals faults in this analysis and demonstrates
that the Seventh Circuit does not hold that a proposed intervenor must show an interest greater than
that required by Article III. First, the interest that the court discussed in that case was the prudential
zone of interest standing test, not the Article III standing test. See 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d at 859
(comparing interest necessary for intervention and interest sufficient to fall within zone of interest to
bring APA action). Second, the unusual facts of the case caution against reading the opinion too
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More recently, the Eighth Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Kelley and held that the Constitution mandates that intervenors show
standing under Article III to support a motion for intervention.304 In its
decision, the Eighth Circuit concluded that intervenors must show Article III
standing because they seek to participate fully as parties to the case.305 In that
court’s “view, an Article III case or controversy, once joined by intervenors
who lack standing, is— put bluntly— no longer an Article III case or
controversy.”306 The court concluded that “a federal case is a limited affair,
and not everyone with an opinion is invited to attend.”307
Other courts of appeals have held that a proposed intervenor need not
satisfy the requirements of Article III to support intervention.308 These courts
reason that the language of Rule 24 itself does not speak in terms of standing
but only requires an interest in the litigation. Furthermore, the limitations
imposed on the courts by Article III are not violated when a party without
standing participates as an intervenor because “[o]nce a valid Article III case-
or-controversy is present, the court’s jurisdiction vests. The presence of
additional parties, although they alone could independently not satisfy Article
III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy jurisdiction already
established.”309
broadly. That case involved an attempt by the federal government to condemn a parcel of land owned
by the Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) and add it to the Indiana Dunes National
Lakeshore. When Congress enacted the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460u to
460u-24 (1994), it directed the Secretary of the Interior to acquire the NIPSCO parcel but “only if such
area can be acquired for not more than $800,000, exclusive of administrative costs of acquisition, as
adjusted by the Consumer Price Index. . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 460u-12 (1994). At the time of the enactment
of the National Lakeshore Act, the parcel was undisputedly worth over $1.7 million. 36.96 Acres, 754
F.2d at 857. The government instituted a condemnation action, but understandably abandoned it
because it legally could not pay the fair market value of the parcel. See id. at 857-58; see also Save the
Dunes Council, Inc. v. Lujan, 899 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of mandamus to order
Secretary of the Interior to condemn parcel because government could not legally pay full fair market
value). The Save the Dunes Council moved to intervene on the side of the government, but it is
impossible to see what it would have added to the proceeding unless it could provide the additional
money necessary to pay fair market value for the parcel. Since the decision in 36.96 Acres, the Seventh
Circuit has only required intervenors to demonstrate Article III standing. See, e.g., Solid Waste
Agency, 101 F.3d at 507-08.
304. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 1300.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1301.
308. See, e.g., Associated Builders and Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994);
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir.
1989); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978).
309. Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 832 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2046 (1999). To
be sure, the Ruiz case involved the application of FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(1), not 24(a)(2). Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit limited its holding to the question of whether the Constitution requires a
demonstration of standing to support intervention, not whether Rule 24(a)(2) requires such a showing.
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3. Adequacy of Representation
If a court finds that the applicant’s motion to intervene is timely and that
the applicant has shown the necessary interest and impairment of the interest,
the court must grant intervention “unless the applicant’s interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.”310 In its only decision addressing the
adequate representation issue, the Supreme Court has held that “the burden
of making that showing should be treated as minimal.”311 The Court has not
stated what level of representation would be adequate or whether the concept
of adequate representation in intervention is the same as in other contexts
such as class actions.312
The courts of appeals have developed a number of factors to determine
whether an applicant makes the necessary minimal showing of inadequate
representation. The most difficult case to find inadequate representation is
when an intervenor is seeking the same ultimate result as an original party.
After all, if an intervenor is seeking the same result as the original plaintiff or
defendant, it is unlikely that the intervenor will raise additional issues or
arguments. In this context, some courts have held that “representation is
adequate if there is no collusion between the representative and an opposing
party; if the representative does not have or represent an interest adverse to
the applicant; or if the representative does not fail in the fulfillment of his or
her duty.”313 Most courts do not now follow this narrow view of what
constitutes inadequate representation even if the proposed intervenor seeks
the same end result as one of the original parties. Rather, most courts
examine a number of factors concerning the behavior and litigating strategies
Id. at 832 n.26. The Fifth Circuit has previously implied that Article III standing is not required to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2). New Orleans Public Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line, 732 F.2d
452 (5th Cir. 1984).
310. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). There is a small debate over who has the burden to show adequate
representation. The leading treatises differ on this question. Compare MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 140, § 24.03[4][a][I], at 24-41 (“The applicant bears the burden of showing that the existing
parties inadequately represent his or her interests in the action.”) with 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
129, § 1909, at 314-15 (“[T]he language of the rule clearly suggests that [the prospective intervenor] is
to be allowed in . . . unless the court is persuaded that the representation of him is in fact adequate.”).
311. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).
312. For a recent discussion of the concept of adequate representation in the class action context,
see Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571
(1997).
313. Liddell v. Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Bradley v. Milliken, 828
F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Martin
v. Kalvar Corp., 411 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1969). One might place in this category instances where
an apparent conflict of interest could exist. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th
Cir. 1983) (finding that government inadequately represented environmental organization because
Secretary of the Interior had been associated with original plaintiff).
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of the original parties. These factors include whether the original parties will
make the arguments that the intervenor would make, whether the existing
parties are able and willing to make those arguments, whether the
intervenor’s and the original parties’ interests are sufficiently divergent to
believe that the representative will not give these interests sufficient
attention, and whether the parties will neglect any evidence or information
that the intervenor could supply.314 Nevertheless, representation is not
inadequate simply because the intervenor has a different motivation to
litigate than an existing party or because of disagreements in litigation
strategy.315
It is of particular relevance to public law litigation that courts formerly
applied a strong presumption that a government adequately represented any
party aligned with its interests, on the theory that a government would
adequately represent the views and needs of all citizens as parens patriae.316
More courts now recognize that outsiders might have interests that a
government would overlook or fail to emphasize.317 This premise opens the
314. As one court put it:
[I]n determining adequacy of representation, we consider whether the interest of a present party is
such that it will undoubtedly make all the intervenor’s arguments; whether the present party is
capable and willing to make such arguments; and whether the intervenor would offer any
necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect.
Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1498-99 (9th Cir. 1995); see
also United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding representation inadequate
where intervenor would raise constitutional issue that original plaintiff would not); California v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding representation adequate where
each of intervenor’s “concerns is being addressed by at least one of the existing parties”); United
Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133,
1135 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The applicant may demonstrate that its interests, though similar to those of an
existing party, are nevertheless sufficiently different that the representative cannot give the applicant’s
interests proper attention.”);
315. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 834 F.2d 60, 61-62 (“A putative intervenor does not have an interest not adequately
represented by a party to a lawsuit simply because it has a motive to litigate that is different from the
motive of an existing party.”); Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987) (“A mere
disagreement over litigation strategy or individual aspects of a remediation plan does not, in and of
itself, establish inadequacy of representation.”).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984-85 (2d Cir.
1984); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982). For a discussion of
intervention in government enforcement actions, see Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement
Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1976).
317. See, e.g., Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th
Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1208 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The government must represent
the broad public interest, not just the economic concerns of the [intervenors].”); Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 1993) (overcoming presumption of
adequate representation for landowners); Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 44 (1st
Cir. 1992) (finding that the “Secretary’s judgments are necessarily constrained by his view of the
public welfare”) (author served as principal government counsel on appeal).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/4
p215 Appel.doc 09/15/00   4:55 PM
2000] INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 275
possibility for intervention in a greater number of cases.
4. Appellate Review
Once a district court has determined whether to grant or deny a motion to
intervene, a court of appeals faces three questions in reviewing that order.
First, is the order reviewable through immediate appeal or must review wait
until a final judgment? Second, under what standard should the appellate
court review the district court? Finally, is intervention available to a party
who wishes to appeal a final judgment if none of the original parties decides
to appeal?
The older cases and literature spent a great deal of time on the first
question, namely, whether a party denied intervention could immediately
appeal the district court’s adverse decision. The problem surrounding
immediate appeal of the denial of intervention was that the decision denying
intervention was typically not a final judgment and an appellate court would
therefore lack jurisdiction.318 On the other hand, the decision denying
intervention was final as far as the applicant for intervention was concerned.
In the traditional view, the question of the appellate court’s jurisdiction
turned on the merits of the appeal. Under this circular view, an appellate
court had jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to deny
intervention only if the district court erred in its decision.319 If the district
court erred, then the appellate court had jurisdiction and could reverse; if the
district court acted properly, then the appellate court lacked jurisdiction and
therefore had to dismiss the appeal. Most courts of appeals now treat the
denial of intervention as an order that is immediately appealable, reversing if
the district court erred and affirming if it acted properly.320 While this
approach has not been formally adopted by the Supreme Court, and some
courts of appeals still follow the traditional approach, the effect of the
distinction between the traditional and the more modern approaches to the
318. For a classic statement of the finality requirement, see generally Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229 (1945).
319. See Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 20 (1951) (“If appellant may
intervene as of right, the order of the court denying intervention is appealable.”); accord, Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 688 (1961); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1947).
320. See, e.g. Williams v. Katz, 23 F.3d 190, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1994); Corby Recreation, Inc. v.
General Elec. Co., 581 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978). Some cours of appeals follow a related rule that
requires rejected applicants for intervention to appeal immediately following the denial of
intervention; the putative intervenor cannot wait for the final judgment to appeal. See, e.g., Credit
Francias Int’l v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1996); B.H. by Pierce v. Murphy, 984 F.2d
196, 199 (7th Cir. 1993).
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appeal of a district court’s decision to deny intervention is essentially nil.321
The circuits agree, however, that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction over a
district court’s decision to grant intervention, even when the court limits the
rights of the intervenor.322 Courts of appeals can review such orders only in
the context of an appeal from a final judgment.323
The standard of review that an appellate court should apply to a district
court’s denial of intervention, like many other elements of intervention, has
not been resolved by the Supreme Court.324 The Court has definitively held
that a district court’s determination of timeliness is committed to the “sound
discretion” of the district court and will not be reversed except for an abuse
of discretion.325 Otherwise, the circuits have split on the standard of review.
Some circuits apply the abuse of discretion standard to the other elements as
well.326 These courts reason that the district court has a better “‘feel for the
321. On rare occasions, the difference between the traditional approach— holding that courts of
appeals lack appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the denial of intervention unless the denial is
reversible error— and the more modern approach— treating all orders denying intervention as
immediately appealable final orders— may make a difference. The recent litigation over the affirmative
action policy of the Unitersity of Texas Law School provides an example. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) [Hopwood II]; Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
[Hopwood I]. In Hopwood I, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny intervention
to two organizations representing the interests of minorities that wished to defend the law school’s
affirmative action program. The Hopwood I panel affirmed on the merits. See Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at
604. This affirmance ignored the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdictional rule that requires the court of appeals to
find reversible error before it can assert jurisdiction over the appeal. Following trial, the two
organizations renewed their motions to intervene. On the second appeal, the court of appeals had to
determine the binding effect of the earlier litigation on the intervention motion. See Hopwood II, 78
F.3d at 961. If the first panel had followed Fifth Circuit practice, it should have dismissed the earlier
appeal for want of jurisdiction, thus rendering a possibly non-binding judgment. For further discussion
of the intervention problems presented in cases like the Hopwood litigation, see infra notes 409-410
and accompanying text.
322. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
323. See id. For this reason, cases reversing a district court for erroneously granting intervention
are rare, although they do exist. See, e.g., Cunningham v. David Special Commitment Ctr., 158 F.3d
1035 (9th Cir. 1998); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1988). Such reversals are
especially rare because parties seldom appeal the grant of intervention in the context of an appeal from
a final judgment.
324. The Court has also stated no standard of review for a district court’s grant of intervention, but
as argued above, the original parties cannot appeal immediately if the district court grants intervention,
and appeals of grants of intervention following final judgment are rare.
325. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973).
326. See Building & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (“We review the district court’s decision to deny intervention under an abuse of discretion
standard.”); International Paper Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of Jay, 887 F.2d 338, 343 (1st Cir.
1989); Gould v. Alleco, 883 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1989); Getty Oil Co. v. Department of Energy,
865 F.2d 270, 274 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1988); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 990 (2d Cir. 1984). In an unpublished
opinion, the Federal Circuit held that it would apply the abuse of discretion standard, see Abbott Lab.
v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1694 (Fed. Cir. 1994), but it expressly passed on the
issue in American Maritime Transp. v. United States, 870 F.2d 1559, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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case,’” and is therefore better equipped to make the various complex factual
and legal judgments that go into weighing a motion for intervention.327 Other
courts of appeals review the district court’s decision de novo.328 These courts
echo Justice Brennan’s admonition that “a district court has less discretion to
limit the participation of an intervenor of right than that of a permissive
intervenor.”329
On the final question, whether an intervenor can intervene for purposes of
appeal, the Supreme Court has held in the context of a class action that a
member of a class can intervene for purposes of appealing a judgment that
would bind the class.330 Other courts have permitted intervention solely for
the purpose of taking an appeal, especially when the original parties have no
intention to appeal because of a settlement.331
5. Status of the Intervenor
The courts vary on what rights an intervenor possesses in the litigation.
Traditionally, an intervenor was a full party to the litigation and could file
briefs, present witnesses, and otherwise fully participate in the litigation.332
This view comported with the limitations on who could intervene— because
the right to intervene was limited to those who had a close relationship to the
case, courts treated them as full parties. This result apparently held true even
under the former Equity Rule 37 which provided that the intervention would
327. See Hooker, 749 F.2d at 990; see also International Paper, 887 F.2d at 343-44
(“[A]pplication of the Rule involves the pragmatic balancing of a range of factors that arise in varying
factual situations.”); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d at 597 (“The variety of situations in which an
application [of Rule 24] may arise counsels against setting strict legal standards . . . [and] supports an
abuse of discretion standard of review. . . .”).
328. See Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Department of
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1996); Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest
Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th
Cir. 1995); Edwards v. City of Houston, 37 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); Nissei Sangyo Am., Ltd. v.
United States, 31 F.3d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1994); Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F.2d 1471,
1477 (11th Cir. 1993); Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989). In a recent opinion, the
Fourth Circuit stated that it would review an intervention decision de novo and reverse the district
court’s findings of facts only if they were clearly erroneous. In re Richman, 104 F.3d 654, 656 (4th
Cir. 1997). This appears to be a change from older Fourth Circuit case law. See, e.g., In re Sierra Club,
945 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir. 1991).
329. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 382 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
330. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
331. See cases cited supra note 244.
332. The Admiralty Rules were explicit concerning the intervenor’s status, making clear in
Admiralty Rule 34 that intervenors had to post bond and stipulate that they would be bound by any
judgment and would pay any costs, see supra note 155, and in Admiralty Rule 42 that intervenors
involving themselves through the examination pro interesse suo could have costs imposed on them.
See supra note 156 (setting out former Admiralty Rule 42).
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be “in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the main
proceeding.”333
In its notes to the 1966 amendments, the advisory committee stated that a
court had the discretion to limit its grant of intervention.334 As noted above,
the committee provided no authority for this reference. Nevertheless, more
and more courts have granted limited forms of intervention in which the
intervenor is not permitted to present witnesses or is limited in its discovery
rights. An example commentators frequently cite is United States v. Reserve
Mining Co., described above, in which the district court granted intervention
to fifteen parties, but limited the extent to which they could participate.335 As
noted above, if a district court grants a limited form of intervention, the
intervenor cannot appeal that decision until final judgment in the case.336
Participation in an appeal and in the judgment that may result from the
lawsuit are also issues that arise in the context of intervention. As stated
above, if the original party with which the intervenor is aligned appeals, then
the intervenor can appeal, but if that original party declines to appeal, then
the intervenor cannot appeal unless it can demonstrate that it has standing to
sue under Article III.337 In some cases, however, a party can intervene simply
for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal if the original parties fail to,
presuming that the applicant can demonstrate Article III standing.338 An
intervenor that cannot appeal is not bound by the judgment entered below.339
An intervenor is not liable to a civil rights plaintiff for attorneys’ fees or costs
unless the reasons for the intervention were frivolous because the intervenor
did not cause the discrimination.340
In addition to the limits that courts can place on intervention, the original
parties can in many circumstances leave an intervenor out of settlement
333. See supra note 157 (setting out former Equity Rule 37). In an article subsequent to Moore &
Levi, supra note 129, Professors Levi and Moore studied the subordination requirement and the
general status of the intervenor prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, Federal Intervention: II. The Procedure, Status, and Federal
Jurisdictional Requirements, 47 YALE L.J. 898, 907-926 (1938). Regarding the extent to which orders
bind an intervenor, they argued that the statement “that once intervention has been allowed the
intervener is a party for all purposes” was “too broad,” because federal courts had the authority and
“under the Rules the court should have the power to limit intervention to certain claims or defenses.”
Id. at 926.
334. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 1966 advisory committee notes; see also supra notes 221-222 and
accompanying text.
335. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 420 (D. Minn. 1972); see also supra
note 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing Reserve Mining).
336. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
337. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986).
338. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
339. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571, 575 (5th Cir. 1993).
340. See Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
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negotiations. An intervenor cannot block the entry of a settlement or a
consent decree “merely by withholding its consent.”341 An intervenor “is
entitled to present evidence and have its objections heard at the hearings on
whether to approve a consent decree.”342 However, “[a] court’s approval of a
consent decree between some of the parties . . . cannot dispose of the valid
claims of nonconsenting intervenors; if properly raised, these claims remain
and may be litigated by the intervenor.”343 Thus, even if an intervenor has all
of the rights of one of the original parties, the original parties can still settle
the litigation through their agreement, although the intervenor may have
rights it can assert in subsequent litigation.
III. THE SUPPOSED HOSTILITY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO
INTERVENTION AND THE SUPPOSED BENEFITS OF INTERVENTION
A review of the literature demonstrates that most commentators on the
subject of public law litigation advocate broad public participation. They
argue that courts should consider all perspectives to render the best decision,
and that a value exists in more full participation in the proceedings. There is
certainly value in participation, but there are also costs to increased
participation. These costs are borne by the court, which has to listen to and
evaluate the claims of additional parties, and by the original parties, who
have to respond to additional arguments, demands for discovery, and
witnesses. The commentators in favor of a broad right of intervention argue
that courts— perhaps reluctant to impose additional burdens on themselves or
additional cost on the original parties, or perhaps out of substantive
disagreement with the interlopers— have treated potential intervenors with
disdain. They also argue that the quality of litigation would improve if courts
reacted more favorably to the outsiders. I question both propositions in this
section.
A. Are Courts Hostile to Intervenors?
Many commentators argue that courts have read Rule 24 too narrowly
and thereby have left important voices out of public law litigation.344 Their
341. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See Jones, Problems and Prospects, supra note 10, at 225 (arguing that courts are hostile to
minority intervenors because they are hostile to claims for affirmative action on the merits); Tobias,
Public Law Litigation, supra note 10, at 328 (arguing that judicial interpretation of Rule 24(a)(2) “has
had numerous adverse implications for public interest litigants” while benefitting those with private
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attack focuses primarily on interpretations of the interest requirement and, to
a lesser extent, the requirement that the applicant for intervention show that
its interests are not adequately represented by the original parties.345 Before
evaluating these claims, it is important to recall the function of these two
requirements. All commentators recognize at least tacitly that adding
intervenors imposes costs on the original litigants and the courts, that the
presence of intervenors can delay the proceedings, and that some parties are
properly excluded from participating in the litigation. The interest
requirement serves to ensure that the court is not bogged down with
unnecessary intermeddlers who bring nothing to the litigation. A court quite
properly would not allow a citizen outraged with the result in the criminal
trial of O.J. Simpson to intervene in the subsequent wrongful death civil
proceeding or the proceedings concerning the guardianship of Simpson’s
children.346 That conclusion would not change if the prospective intervenor
had more of an interest in the case (in the sense of emotional attachment)
than most people, like a white supremacist particularly outraged by black on
white crime. Nor would the conclusion change if the proposed intervenor
was someone claiming an actionable, but unrelated, legal right against
Simpson, such as a dispute over a trademark.347 Giving voice to these
interests would not assist the court in determining Simpson’s civil liability,
the remedy the court should impose, Simpson’s fitness as a parent, or what
decision would best serve the interests of his children; it would, however,
delay the outcome of the litigation to the detriment of the original parties. As
far as the court is concerned, the problem before it has nothing to do with
race relations or the problems with the jury system in criminal cases (no
matter how much the O.J. Simpson case may have spurred popular discourse
on these and other issues). As the Supreme Court said of the interest
requirement for standing, the requirement “prevents the judicial process from
becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
interests); Bullock, supra note 10, at 639 (arguing that by incorporating standing requirements, courts
have acted “detrimental[ly] to public interest applicants”); Vreeland, supra note 10, at 309 (concluding
that courts should read Rule 24 more flexibly in public law cases); see also Bandes, supra note 10, at
288 (“The intervention device can adequately perform this function [of “public norm creation”] only if
it is released from the common law notion of legally protectable rights.”).
345. For the most part, the commentators have not focused on the possible effects that the
timeliness requirement may have on public law litigation. For an example of one commentator who
argues that the timeliness requirement places too much discretion in district court judges and thus
thwarts intervention, see Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention of Right, 89 YALE L.J. 586
(1980) (arguing that Rule 24(a) should be amended to require courts to decide interest and adequate
representation before deciding timeliness of petition).
346. See Guardianship of Simpson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (1998).
347. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff had standing to
challenge O.J. Simpson’s trademark applications for “O.J.,” “O.J. Simpson,” and “The Juice”).
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concerned bystanders.”348 As anyone who has suffered traffic delays from an
accident knows, too many concerned bystanders become a nuisance.
Similarly, the provision that allows a court to deny intervention if an
original party adequately represents the applicant for intervention makes
eminent sense. Courts do not benefit from numerous briefs that restate the
same argument repetitively. At some point, the court will simply become
overwhelmed with information and its effective use of that information will
decrease.349 A court should not need to involve as a party every person with
an opinion on a subject simply because each opinion will be expressed with
slightly different nuances.350 A court quite properly evaluates the claims of
outsiders who desire to involve themselves against the background legal
issues presented in the original litigation.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that one can find cases in which courts
exclude outsiders who want in. A review of the reported appellate decisions,
however, demonstrates that courts frequently treat applicants for intervention
favorably.351 Some courts have created presumptions in favor of
intervention.352 Courts also have decided that applicants need make only a
minimal showing that the present representation of their interests is
inadequate.353 In this connection, many decisions mark a retreat from the
former strong presumption that the government adequately represents all
interests.354 This retreat has enabled public law litigants to participate more
fully in cases that would not have involved them in the past.
In the specific context of environmental litigation, the courts have applied
uncritically principles developed in the civil rights context to the problems
before them. As suggested in the first section, environmental public law
litigation has certain characteristics that makes intervention unnecessary,
especially in the liability phase of a trial.355 If the liability phase is limited to
348. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687
(1973).
349. Professor Brunet has elaborated on this point in Brunet, supra note 10, at 715-18.
350. As the Eighth Circuit put it, “a federal case is a limited affair, and not everyone with an
opinion is invited to attend.” Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1996). Although the
Eighth Circuit used this to support its conclusion that Article III standing should be required for
intervention (a holding with which I disagree, see infra notes 357-375 and accompanying text) the
general premise is true. Despite its potentially broad impact, public law litigation arises from particular
events and leads to concrete results, even if ongoing participation of a judge may be entailed; it is not a
game that welcomes mere kibitzers.
351. See cases cited supra notes 280-285.
352. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing cases).
353. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); see also cases
cited supra note 314.
354. See cases cited supra note 317.
355. See supra notes 101-125 and accompanying text.
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the administrative record, it is difficult to see how an outsider helps the court
and the original litigants sift through that record. For example, if an
environmental organization sues a federal agency claiming that the agency is
not protecting the salmon assiduously enough, it is difficult to see how a user
of electricity whose interest is keeping electric rates low will help the court in
making that underlying decision. Yet in the salmon cases one regularly sees
the hydropower interests intervening when the environmentalists sue the
government, and vice versa.356 The cases in this area reveal no discussion of
the propriety of involving these parties; the intervenors appear to invite
themselves into the litigation. These cases surely do not resemble the crabbed
view of intervention that the Supreme Court created under the old rule in
cases such as Allen Calculators, Sutphen Estates, and Sam Fox. Rather, they
represent the modern vision of El Paso and Bryant v. Yellen.
Thus, for the most part, courts have been receptive to potential
intervenors in public law litigation. The requirement that intervenors possess
Article III standing constitutes a possible exception to this generally positive
reception, and this subject has concerned most commentators who support a
broad right to intervention. On its face, making applicants for intervention
prove Article III standing does impose an unnecessary burden on applicants
for intervention and would tend to indicate that courts that require standing
are hostile to intervention in public law litigation. Briefly stated, the standing
requirement has no basis in the text of Rule 24 or the Supreme Court’s
intervention or standing jurisprudence; the justifications offered in support of
standing are unpersuasive; and adding the requirement of standing creates
356. A quick sampling of the salmon cases cited supra note 60 shows that intervenors participated
in most of them. See, e.g., Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520,
1520 (9th Cir. 1997) (listing DSIs and several utilitites as intervenors); American Rivers v. National
Marine Fisheries Serv., 109 F.3d 1484 (listing DSIs, Public Power Council, and Pacific Northwest
Generating Cooperative as intervenors), as amended, 126 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1997) (author served as
principal government counsel on appeal); Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345, 1345
(9th Cir. 1996) (listing Intermountain Forest Industry Association as intervenor); Northwest Resource
Info. Ctr. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1996) (listing State of
Idaho, Public Power Council, Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, and DSIs as intervenors)
(author served as principal government counsel on appeal); Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. National
Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing State of Oregon, DSIs, and Pacific
Northwest Generating Cooperative as intervenors); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power
Admin., 56 F.3d 1075, 1075 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative and
Public Power Council as intervenors); Pacific N.W. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1058
(9th Cir. 1994) (listing State of Oregon as intervenor); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest
Power Planning council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing State of Idaho, DSIs, and
utilities as intervenors); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing
Northwest Forest Resource Council as intervenor); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, 25 F.3d 872, 872 (9th Cir. 1994) (listing utilities and Public Power Council as
intervenors).
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more problems than it solves. Nevertheless, even applying the criteria of
Article III standing to intervention of right has not and will not thwart
intervention in public law litigation.
The courts that have imposed this requirement have indeed imposed an
unnecessary and unwarranted burden on proposed intervenors. First, the
requirement has no basis in the rules. Rule 24 by its terms does not require an
applicant to prove standing; rather, the rule requires the applicant to show
that the litigation could impair an interest of the proposed intervenor as a
practical matter, not as a legal matter.357 The Supreme Court’s own
jurisprudence interpreting this requirement seems to indicate that intervenors
need not show Article III standing to intervene, or at least need not be able to
institute their own action to intervene. For example, in Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers of America,358 the Court held that a member of a union could
intervene in an enforcement action that the Secretary of Labor brought
against the member’s union, even though the member could not institute an
action of his own. In El Paso, the Supreme Court allowed California to
intervene to represent the interests of its citizens even though the United
States had brought the suit and presumably also represented California’s
citizens.359 Finally, in Diamond v. Charles, the Supreme Court held that the
intervenor, whom the Court held lacked Article III standing, could have
continued participating in the litigation if the real party in interest with whom
he was aligned had continued litigating.360 Thus, although some
commentators have suggested the contrary,361 Article III standing is not
required by the Supreme Court’s case law; indeed, the cases suggest the
opposite.
Furthermore, the justifications provided by those courts that require
standing to gain intervention fall flat. Some courts justify imposing the
standing requirement because the intervenor “seeks to participate on an equal
footing with the original parties to the suit.”362 But, as was discussed earlier,
357. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (allowing intervention “when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to
protect that interest” (emphasis added)).
358. 404 U.S. 528 (1971).
359. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982)
(“A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal
Government.”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923).
360. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (“Had the State sought review . . . Diamond, as
an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to seek review, enabling him to filed a brief on
the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally.”).
361. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 10, at 818-20.
362. City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam); accord Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 178 F.3d 533 (D.C.
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courts have not allowed all intervenors to participate as full parties to the
litigation.363 Intervention of right does not necessarily entail the right to
discovery or to present evidence or witnesses. Other courts require
intervenors to demonstrate standing “because intervention can impose
substantial costs on the parties and the judiciary, not only by making the
litigation more cumbersome but also (and more important) by blocking
settlement.”364 Although an intervenor can impose costs on the original
parties and on the court, the Supreme Court has held that an intervenor “does
not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent.”365 If
settlement would infringe on a legal interest or claim of the intervenor, then
the court may not enter it because it would resolve claims or impose duties or
obligations on unconsenting third parties.366 But if the settlement does not
affect legal rights of the intervenor, the court can enter it over the
intervenor’s objection.
As a final justification for requiring standing, one court of appeals has
held that
an Article III case or controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack
standing, is— put bluntly— no longer an Article III case or
controversy. An Article III case or controversy is one where all parties
have standing, and a would-be intervenor, because he seeks to
participate as a party, must have standing as well.367
But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal courts have a
justiciable case or controversy before them provided that one party has
standing to sue, even if other parties to the litigation lack standing.368
Cir. 1999); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The intervenor seeks
control of the suit, acquires a right to conduct the case in a way that may undermine the interests of the
original plaintiff (this may, indeed, be the intervenor’s principal objective, if the intervenor contends
that it has interests adverse to that party), and may become eligible for a separate grant of relief or an
award of attorneys’ fees.”).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 335-336.
364. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir.
1996). For support, the Seventh Circuit relied on dicta from Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d
525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring showing of standing when the “extra litigant may block settlement
or receive an award of attorneys’ fees”).
365. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
366. See id.
367. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
368. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316
(1999); United States Dep’t of Labor v. Tripplett, 494 U.S. 715, 719 (1990); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 720 (1986); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River
Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 302-05 (1983); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264 (1977); see also Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(allowing many intervenors to participate once one established standing). In addition to this
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Moreover, the basic question of intervention differs from the question of
whether the original plaintiff has standing to sue the original defendant, and
the addition of an intervenor does not alter the justiciability of the case.369
The former practice of allowing an intervenor into an action even though it
would destroy diversity jurisdiction similarly supports the notion that the
presence of an intervenor without standing does not alter the ability of the
courts to adjudicate the matter.370 Thus, none of the justifications for
requiring applicants for intervention to show standing prove persuasive in the
end.
My second opposition to adding an Article III standing requirement to the
interest required by Rule 24(a)(2) is that it creates conceptual difficulties.
These difficulties become exceptionally pronounced when a party seeks to
intervene as a defendant. The standing inquiry usually focuses on a plaintiff
and “whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction
and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.”371 Thus,
the question of standing— at least as to the injury-in-fact inquiry372— focuses
entirely on the plaintiff. A defendant need not prove standing to sue, and a
person wishing to intervene as a defendant might have a concrete interest in
established case law, the conclusion that the presence of an intervenor without Article III standing
somehow transforms the proceeding into one outside of the Article III case or controversy requirement
is at odds with Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). In that case the Court held that Diamond—
who, the Court concluded, lacked Article III standing, see id. at 64-71— could nevertheless have
ridden “‘piggyback’ on the State’s undoubted standing” if the state had appealed. See id. at 64. As
suggested supra notes 358-360 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court does not appear to believe
that the presence of an intervenor that lacks Article III standing somehow taints the case or renders it a
non-Article III case or controversy.
369. As Professor Shapiro observed:
[I]t must be understood that there is a difference between the question whether one is a proper
plaintiff or defendant in an initial action and the question of whether one is entitled to
intervene. . . . When one seeks to intervene in an ongoing lawsuit, the[] basic questions [of
standing] have presumably been resolved; the disposition of the request, then, should focus on
whether the prospective intervener has a sufficient stake in the outcome and enough to contribute
to the resolution of the controversy to justify his inclusion. . . . A may not have a dispute with C
that could qualify as a case or controversy, but he may have a sufficient interest in B’s dispute
with C to warrant his participation in the case once it has begun, and the case or controversy
limitation should impose no barrier to his admission.
Shapiro, supra note 10, at 726.
370. Formerly, a nondiverse party could intervene in an action without destroying diversity. See
Rensberger, supra note 10. Congress eliminated this practice by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)
(1994). Before this amendment, however, federal courts adjudicated actions using the concept of
supplemental jurisdiction to support the presence of a party whose presence would normally divest the
court of jurisdiction.
371. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
372. See supra note 288.
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the case but lack standing.373 It is difficult, but not impossible, to determine
how a court would decide that a prospective intervenor would have standing
to become a defendant, especially because the court cannot predict the
ultimate outcome of the litigation or the scope of the judgment.374 The same
could be true with a party seeking to intervene as a plaintiff, but those
problems may be less pronounced.
Even though it is therefore incorrect to require proposed intervenors to
prove standing in order to demonstrate the necessary interest for intervention,
“[t]he question of the right to intervene is inevitably linked to the question of
standing to initiate litigation in the first place.”375 Certainly, some of the
inquiries involved in determining the necessary interest for intervention of
right overlap with the requirements that one must show to initiate litigation in
373. Professor Shapiro has identified this problem in the private litigation context as well.
The difference [between the right to initiate a suit and the right to intervene in ongoing
litigation] is most evident in the case of one who seeks to intervene on the side of the defendant in
civil litigation. When property owners sue to enjoin a railroad from maintaining storage tracks in a
residential neighborhood, a local businessman who is heavily dependant on the use of that
trackage may have an important interest to protect and much to contribute to the court’s
understanding of the case, even though he has no claim that could be asserted against any of the
parties and they have none that could be asserted against him.
Shapiro, supra note 10, at 726. Shapiro’s analysis would apply in the public law context as well.
374. One could liken the problem faced by prospective intervenor-defendants to Asarco, Inc. v.
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). In that case, taxpayers sued in state court to invalidate a state law
governing the lease of state lands because the law did not conform to the terms of the original federal
grant of those lands. Id. at 609. The taxpayers won in state court and arguably would have lacked
standing to sue in federal court. Accepting jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who
receives an adverse judgment has standing to appeal that judgment to the Supreme Court even if the
original plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action in federal court. Id. at 623-24 (“When a state
court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue
under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the
judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for
our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also met.”). The Seventh Circuit, through
Judge Posner, has used similar reasoning to determine whether a party can intervene as a defendant.
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 506-08 (7th Cir. 1996); see
also Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1996) (employing similar reasoning). But in
Asarco, the Court knew exactly what the outcome of the litigation was: The state declared the
challenged law unconstitutional and that declaration had a direct effect on the petitioner. In Solid
Waste Agency, by contrast, the court knew only what the outcome “may be.” 101 F.3d at 507.
Although the Seventh Circuit held that the applicants for intervention had standing, Supreme Court
precedent requires a plaintiff to show more than a speculative effect on him or her to prove standing.
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (“The plaintiff must show that he
‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the
challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”). Thus, if courts require individuals to show standing to sue in order to
become defendants, they run the real risks of excluding parties that should be involved or of bending
the rules of standing to allow these parties into the litigation.
375. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1290.
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the first instance.376 If a proposed intervenor can prove standing to sue, it is
difficult to see how a court could find that the applicant lacks the interest
necessary to intervene.377 Thus, it is at least appropriate for a court to
investigate whether an applicant has Article III standing in deciding whether
to allow the applicant to intervene even though an applicant should not have
to make that demonstration as a sine qua non of intervention.
Federal courts also properly consider an intervenor’s standing when the
original losing party has decided not to appeal, and the intervenor seeks to
prosecute an appeal. In that instance, a party commanding the litigation to
continue should have standing so that a real case or controversy exists. Peace
would be restored were it not for the intervenor’s desire to continue waging
battle. Requiring an intervenor to prove standing to appeal without the
original losing party has two bases of support. In the traditional view of
intervention, litigation is between the original parties and the intervenor’s
claim depends on the existence of the original suit.378 Once that suit
disappears, so too does the intervenor’s claim. But the values advanced in
defense of intervention in public law litigation also support this conclusion. If
the intervenor appeals and is successful, the nonappealing party will get a
victory that perhaps it does not want. If the intervenor appeals and loses, the
nonappealing party will be stuck with an adverse decision from a higher
376. See Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989).
377. A court could, however, determine that the existing parties adequately represent the
applicant’s interest or that the applicant’s remedy in appropriate cases is to initiate litigation. The latter
suggestion would parallel the Supreme Court’s decisions in the antitrust enforcement cases decided
before the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See discussion supra notes 171-
207 and accompanying text. If the applicant for intervention could initiate an independent action,
however, a court may wish to allow intervention to decide all matters at once. Of course, the more
compelling case for intervention is when the applicant has a definite interest but cannot presently sue.
378. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 163-64
(1914); McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482, 486 (3d Cir. 1979); Black v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,
500 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1974); Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1965). Some courts
have recognized an exception to this rule: A court has discretion to adjudicate an intervenor’s claim
“in a case in which it appears that the intervenor has a separate and independent basis for jurisdiction
and in which failure to adjudicate the claim will result only in unnecessary delay.” Fuller v. Volk, 351
F.2d 323, 323 (3d Cir. 1965). As the Sixth Circuit has described the rule:
Because intervention presumes a valid lawsuit in a court of competent jurisdiction, ordinarily the
intervening party cannot breathe life into a non-existing action. However, where the intervenor
carries with it a separate and independent jurisdictional basis, it would be a senseless waste of
judicial resources to require the parties to begin again merely to arrive at the same place.
Therefore, it has been held to be within a court’s discretion to adjudicate the claims of a party who
brings independent subject matter jurisdiction.
Kelly v. Carr, 691 F.2d 800, 806 (6th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted). Most courts that have relied upon
this rule have described it as discretionary. See, e.g., Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 875 (6th
Cir. 1990); Arkoma Assocs. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990); Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768
F.2d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 1985).
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court that will bind it in the future through principles of stare decisis. Because
the court knows that there is an absent party that will be directly and
unquestionably affected by its decision, it should require the intervenor to
show a vested, concrete interest by demonstrating standing.379 Thus, the
Supreme Court correctly held in Diamond v. Charles that “an intervenor’s
right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention
was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills
the requirements of Art. III.”380 The leading commentators have endorsed
this conclusion as well.381
Even if the Supreme Court were to impose the standing requirement on
all potentional intervenors, intervention would still occur in public law
litigation. Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on standing has
tightened the requirements, the Court has, along the way, recognized that
threats to environmental concerns and other nontraditional interests can form
a sufficient injury to vest someone with standing to sue. For example, “the
desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes,
is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”382 This exceeds
the bounds of the interests traditionally protectable at common law. Thus,
public interest groups need not worry that adding standing to the
requirements of intervention will slam the door on their involvement in
litigation completely, although it may make it more difficult to intervene.383
379. One might reply that the intervenor will adequately represent the nonappealing party, and so
standing should not be required. But the nonappealing party made a conscious decision not to pursue
appellate review for whatever reason, be it a decision that an appeal would be too costly, a
determination that the case presented unsympathetic facts, or a change in administration. This decision
goes beyond a mere difference in litigating strategy or which arguments to present. See supra notes
314-315 and accompanying text. Rather, it implicates the decision of whether to litigate at all.
380. 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986).
381. See Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note 10, at 445 (“One clear instance in which
standing would be appropriately invoked is the peculiar factual context presented by Diamond v.
Charles.”); see also Shapiro, supra note 10, at 753-54 (writing before Diamond v. Charles but
endorsing basic principle). While Diamond v. Charles has received much criticism for its
determination that Dr. Diamond lacked standing, no commentator has contended that the Supreme
Court erred in holding that the consequence of his lack of standing was that he could not proceed
alone.
382. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992). Even in Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1970), the modern case first discussing standing requirments in the environmental
context, the Supreme Court held that an individual’s interest in the environment could serve as a basis
for standing. See id. at 734 (“Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients to the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal
protection through the judicial process.”).
383. A good example of the argument that imposing a requirement of standing on intervenors will
not thwart their participation is the Eighth Circuit litigation that created the standing requirement in
that circuit. The case was Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996), and it involved a challenge
to snowmobiling regulations for the Voyageurs National Park. Conservation groups moved to
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Finally, requiring standing to support intervention might benefit public
law litigation in two practical ways. First, it would help create a factual
record to assist the appellate court in evaluating the impact of the litigation
on the proposed intervenor, should the intervenor’s side lose and the
principal party fail to appeal. If a district court requires the applicant to
submit affidavits that support not merely an interest in the action but actual
Article III standing, the successful intervenor can then appeal from an
adverse decision without problem.384 This justification alone does not
intervene on the government’s side to defend the regulations. The Eighth Circuit held that the
proposed intervenors were required to show standing to intervene. See id. at 1300. The court then held
that the conservation groups had standing and were not adequately represented by the government. See
id. at 1301-1304. On remand, the district court invalidated the regulations, and the government
declined to appeal. In an appeal prosecuted by the intervenors, the Eighth Circuit reversed and
reinstated regulations that the government had abandoned. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir.
1997). This does not necessarily mean that all supporters of a regulation or agency decision will have
standing to defend that regulation. For example, in Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. NMFS, 56 F.3d
1071 (9th Cir. 1995), hydropower interests aligned with the government appealed an adverse decision
even though the government did not appeal. Although the court of appeals dismissed the case as moot,
I believe that the hydropower interests likely lacked Article III standing to defend the regulation as
well.
384. Typically, a court will not allow an intervenor to make a factual case for standing on appeal
because review in appellate courts is usually limited to the record before the district court. However,
the Ninth Circuit allowed a permissive intervenor to make out the case for standing in Didrickson v.
United States Dep’t of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992). In that case, Alaska natives
challenged regulations restricting the use of sea otters in native handicrafts. The district court granted
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) to organizations interested in protecting sea otters so that
these organizations could assist the government in defending the regulations. The district court
invalidated the regulation. See id. at 1337. Both the government and the organizations filed timely
notices of appeal, but the government dismissed its appeal. See id. The Ninth Circuit allowed the
intervenors to demonstrate their standing to appeal using affidavits originally filed in the court of
appeals. See id. at 1340. It then affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the regulation without
according the normal deference to the regulation. It reached this decision because the government
dismissed its appeal. See id. at 1341 (“The dismissal appears to be a determination that the regulation
does not properly interpret the [relevant act].”). Thus in order for the intervenors to win on appeal,
they had to show that the regulation was the only reasonable interpretation of the relevant act. See id.
at 1341.
The outcome in Didrickson is unsatisfying for two reasons. First, the court of appeals allowed the
intervenors to litigate the issue of standing directly in the court of appeals. The standing inquiry can be
intensively fact-specific, and the court of appeals is the worst forum to litigate that issue. The court
based its conclusion solely on affidavits, see id. at 1340, and the appellees never had a chance to
depose or examine these witnesses if they had doubts as to the truth of the allegations. At the very
least, the court should have remanded the case to the district court for factfinding; it also could have
reached the harsher result of dismissing the appeal because the intervenors failed to establish standing
in the district court. See United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 1992). Second, the
court gave no deference to the regulation at issue because the government had dismissed its appeal.
The court construed this dismissal as the agency’s judgment that the regulation was improper. See id.
at 1341. But the Department of Justice, not the Department of the Interior, makes litigation decisions
on behalf of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994), and regulations commit to the discretion of
the Solicitor General the decision whether to appeal an adverse judgment. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1999).
The Solicitor General “might decide for reasons unrelated to the likely outcome not to authorize
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warrant imposing a standing requirement just to address the somewhat
unlikely instance in which an intervenor becomes the sole appellant, but at
least it helps the reviewing courts.
Second, and more importantly, the standing inquiry may assist the
applicants to focus more clearly on their relationship to the litigation. In a
recent and provocative article,385 Professor Ann Carlson argued that the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions defining the injury-in-fact requirement for
standing in an environmental case386 have helped shape environmental
litigation in this respect. Although Professor Carlson believes that the recent
developments in the standing jurisprudence lack a basis in constitutional
law,387 she argues that the recent limitations on the injury-in-fact necessary to
establish standing may, from a pragmatic perspective, “have a bright side for
environmentalism.”388 In particular, she argues that the injury-in-fact
requirement transforms environmental litigation from a resource focus— by
which she means “an environmental ethic that values resources without
reference to human needs and wants. . ..”389— to a human focus— namely an
ethic which concentrates on the utility of the resource to humans.390 Carlson
concludes that “environmental litigation would be improved by a stronger
focus on the human relationship with the environmental resource at issue.”391
The benefits she identifies from this shift in focus are: 1) telling a more
gripping story by “requiring the testimony of individuals who are most
appeal. The case might be unimportant and the Solicitor General reluctant to pester the court of
appeals with an unimportant case, which might dilute the impact of other government appeals.” Solid
Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1996). If the Ninth
Circuit decided it could hear the case, it should have deferred to the judgment of the expert agency.
See National Wildlife Fed’n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying principles of
deference to agency regulation where government failed to appeal but intervenor did), cited in
Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1340; see also Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 1997)
(applying principles of deference).
385. See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1998).
386. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (denying standing to
citizen organization seeking redress for past violations of reporting statute); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying standing to challenge regulation declining to extend
obligations of Endangered Species Act extraterritorially); Lugan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990) (denying standing to citizens to challenge activity roughly in the vicinity of plaintiffs’
activities). In its most recent decision on this question, however, the Court held that an environmental
organization had standing to challenge environmental degradation caused by the defendant’s permit
violations. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
387. See Carlson, supra note 385, at 935 n.15 (“I find persuasive the arguments of several scholars
that current standing doctrine is indefensible from a constitutional perspective.”).
388. Id. at 1004.
389. Id. at 964.
390. See id. at 965-66.
391. Id. at 963.
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directly harmed by the behavior at issue”;392 2) requiring testimony about the
importance of the resource involved as opposed to focusing exclusively on
the defendant’s behavior;393 3) providing a counterbalance to economic
arguments against environmental regulation;394 4) overcoming free-rider
problems by “remind[ing] skeptical audiences why they should care”;395 and
5) encouraging more outreach by environmental organizations to groups that
historically they have overlooked.396
Much of what Carlson argues about standing applies in the intervention
context. By requiring applicants to state concretely their interest in the
litigation, courts can ensure that intervenors assist the litigation in the ways
that public law litigation scholars assert that they will. The standing
requirement necessarily focuses the court on the impact of the litigation on
the outsider. This focus could become crucial in the remedial phase, when
outsiders will feel the greatest impact of the litigation. Requiring standing
will also force institutions like trade organizations and national
environmental organizations to think twice before expending the energy
attempting to intervene, and as a result to marshal their resources more
effectively towards cases in which they can clearly show detriment to their
interests. In the end, the standing requirement might assist intervenors in
presenting their cases and assist courts in finding those outsiders whose
presence will truly benefit the litigation.
Thus, although courts should not require applicants for intervention to
prove standing based on any requirement of Rule 24, the Constitution, or the
effect that an intervenor has on the original proceeding, a standing inquiry or
requirement is not necessarily hostile to prospective intervenors. Moreover,
adding that inquiry could have pragmatic benefits. It will force trial courts to
consider, at the outset, the extent to which they should shape the intervenor’s
participation in the original litigation. It will help the trial court and the
parties to develop a record more tailored for appellate court review, thus
aiding the appellate court in the event the intervenor becomes the sole
appellant. Finally, it could help the representatives of intervenors to focus
392. Id. at 974.
393. See id. at 976-80.
394. See id. at 980-81.
[I]n a world in which economic self-interest dominates, standing rules that eliminate the injury-in-
fact standard or ignore human harm from environmental degradation may implicitly encourage
judges and juries to favor particularized gains in economic development over abstract invocations
of wilderness, without even thinking about the particular value of wilderness that might be
sacrificed to a given development.
Id. at 981.
395. Id. at 984.
396. See id. at 985-88.
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more on the individual needs of their clients and not use intervention as much
to push generalized concerns.
So far, this section has focused primarily on the case law of the courts of
appeals and the scant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to determine
whether courts are hostile to applications for intervention. This examination
of doctrinal developments, while useful, is nevertheless incomplete.397 As
explained above, courts of appeals almost always receive intervention cases
on appeal from a district court denial of intervention. For a variety of reasons
not directly relevant here, courts of appeals tend to affirm the decisions that
they receive from the district courts.398 Moreover, although courts of appeals
tend to publish those decisions in which they reverse the district court—
because such decisions are more instructive— courts of appeals nevertheless
publish a great number of decisions in which they affirm, especially if the
case has broad impact. The body of published case law developed by the
courts of appeals is heavily skewed toward cases in which the district court
found intervention unwarranted. Thus, even if one finds hostility to
intervenors in the jurisprudence of the courts of appeals— which, with the
possible exception of those courts that require standing, I do not readily
see— the data set of published appellate cases is biased toward generating
that apparent hostility.
An explanation and examination of appellate case doctrine also will not
answer the question of how a district court will actually treat applications for
intervention. Although the evidence is spotty, a good case nevertheless exists
that district courts are receptive to applications for intervention. For example,
a cursory examination of the salmon cases would support the conclusion that
district courts routinely grant intervention. But even these decisions would
not prove an accurate measure of how district courts generally react when
they receive an application for intervention.399 Similarly, an examination of
397. Thus, as stated above, see supra note 276, I agree with Professor Shreve that an exclusive
focus on the decisions of the courts of appeals in something like intervention overlooks a great deal of
relevant information. See Shreve, supra note 10, at 894 (“Legal thinking about intervention, as about
rules of procedure and evidence generally, has dwelt too much in the middle latitudes of appellate
judicial doctrine.”). Nevertheless, attention to the case law of the courts of appeals has proven useful to
demonstrate that the courts are not necessarily hostile to intervenors.
398. The federal courts of appeals reversed in only 10.1% of the cases that came to them in the
year ended March 31, 1999. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS 21, tbl. B-5 (1999). This percentage includes criminal cases, but it igure
remains about the same even if one excludes criminal cases.
399. The salmon cases are concentrated in one judicial district, the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon, and many of them involve the same district judge, the Honorable Malcolm F.
Marsh. The welcome reception that intervenors have received in the salmon cases may thus turn on the
proclivities of one judge, the culture of one judicial district, or the fact that the relevant court of
appeals reviews intervention decisions de novo. On the last point regarding the standard of appellate
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reported district court cases would not necessarily yield a sound measure of
how district courts react to intervention motions, for the reporters pick and
choose among district court decisions and publish only noteworthy ones.
Moreover, reported decisions from district courts involve only those
instances in which the district took the time to write an opinion, and not those
numerous instances in which the busy judge directs a law clerk to draft a
brief order granting the motion. A district court will likely draft a reportable
opinion only in instances in which it wishes to avoid reversal. The case that
district courts usually will entertain motions to intervene favorably must
therefore proceed indirectly, reasoning from the incentives that face a district
court when presented with an application for intervention.400
A trial court has several structural incentives to grant intervention, even if
intervention would burden the existing parties, complicate the proceeding,
not assist the court, and have limited benefits for the prospective intervenor.
These incentives stem largely from the substantive rules concerning
intervention and the rules that govern appellate review of applications for
intervention. As stated earlier, courts have read the interest and adequate
representation requirements with some flexibility and have started to limit
older presumptions against intervention. Moreover, if a district court denies
intervention, the dissatisfied applicant can appeal immediately.401 If a district
court grants intervention, however, no party can appeal that order until final
judgment.402 Thus, the district court faced with a motion for intervention has
two choices. The court can deny the motion and face a substantial possibility
of an appeal which could disrupt the proceedings later if the court of appeals
reverses. On the other hand, the court can grant the motion and simply bear
the additional aggravation of having the intervenor participate without the
possibility of immediate appellate review and a greatly reduced chance that
the appellate court will even review the intervention decision. Moreover, if
the district court can limit the intervention, it can visit most of the attendant
problems on the parties, at least relieving the judge of the burden, and
avoiding an immediate appeal.403 Thus, wholly apart from the merits of any
given intervention motion, a district court has great incentive to allow the
motion.
The incentive structure just described applies to all district courts. District
review, see infra notes 392-393 and accompanying text.
400. A useful starting point for study of the effect of rules of appellate procedure on the thinking
of district courts from a public choice perspective is in Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives
and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469 (1998).
401. See supra notes 318-323 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 322-323 and accompanying text.
403. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987).
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court judges who sit in circuits that review decisions on intervention de novo
have even more reason simply to grant the motion for intervention. If the
dissatisfied applicant appeals, the more removed court of appeals will
second-guess the trial court and not realize the full burden that the court and
the parties will face if the court grants intervention.404 Thus the structure of
appellate review creates a strong incentive for a district court to grant
intervention, especially where the court of appeals reviews the denial of
intervention de novo.405
Furthermore, if the trial court erroneously grants intervention, little
effective relief exists except in unusual cases. An original litigant burdened
by an unwarranted intervenor cannot recover the time wasted, the costs of
reproducing pleadings for the new party (with some limited exceptions),406 or
the costs spent on additional time in depositions or at unforeseen depositions
(if the intervenor is granted the right to call and examine witnesses). An
appellate court can grant relief if the intervenor wins some positive relief
against one of the parties (for example, attorneys’ fees).407 But the fact that
an appellate court can rarely fashion effective relief for the original parties
when a district court erroneously grants intervention probably explains why
the cases reversing grants of intervention are difficult to find. Affected parties
will not appeal orders that the court of appeals cannot fix effectively.
Thus, the argument that federal courts are generally hostile to prospective
intervenors has significant flaws. Many courts of appeals routinely allow
intervention for broad purposes and some have created presumptions in favor
of it.408 Some courts allow an organization that lobbied for a statute to
intervene to defend it. More courts are receptive to arguments that the
government does not adequately represent the interests of outsiders. Even
those courts that require an applicant for intervention to demonstrate standing
allow parties with less traditional interests to intervene. Furthermore, the
404. Cf. Drahozal, supra note 400, at 484 (describing approach to summary judgment of trial court
and court of appeals in similar fashion, i.e., the appellate court will not have to bear many of the
negative effects of its decision if it reverses).
405. Personal experience, albeit anecdotal, supports this claim. When I worked at the Department
of Justice, I specialized in appellate litigation. The appellate litigators would frequently caution trial
attorneys not to object to motions to intervene. This advice had nothing to do with the merits of the
motions. Rather, if the trial attorney successfully convinced the district court to deny intervention, the
appellate staff was faced with an appeal that would frequently prove a loser, especially in circuits that
review decisions on intervention de novo. This, I believe, explains why the federal government often
does not take a position on intervention motions. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher,
966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992) (author served as principal government counsel on appeal).
406. See FED. R. APP. P. 39 (authorizing collection of costs for reproducing appellate briefs).
407. See, e.g., Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 534 (7th Cir. 1988) (vacating award
of attorneys’ fees to intervenor because district court should not have granted intervention).
408. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993).
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standing inquiry, albeit unwarranted, might actually benefit the litigation in
pragmatic ways, so that incorporating the standing requirement to
intervention of right is not in all ways inimical to public law litigation.
Finally, an examination of the reported appellate cases necessarily skews
one’s impression, because the structure of intervention, particularly with
respect to appellate review, gives district court judges much stronger
incentives to allow intervention than to deny it. Despite recent perceived
threats in the reported appellate decisions, intervention is alive and well in
public law litigation.
B. The Contributions that Intervenors Make in Public Law Litigation and
the Potential Problems They Can Bring
Proponents of a broad right to intervene in public law cases make four
claims about how intervenors assist in and benefit from the litigation. First,
intervenors make new arguments and bring to light evidence that would
otherwise not be before the court. Second, intervenors might simply bring
better lawyering to represent their concerns. Third, if nothing else, a broad
right to intervene allows the intervenor to be heard, thus increasing the
legitimacy of the proceeding. Finally, formal intervention of right helps in the
remedial phase of a given case. Intervention provides the intervenor with a
seat at the table during settlement negotiations and provides the intervenor
with a formal opportunity to contest a remedy that the intervenor finds
unduly harsh.
The problems with a broad right to intervene stem from one underlying
difficulty. The commentators who favor broad rights of participation seek a
device to add more players to a particular case, especially a device that
allows unwanted outsiders to muscle their way into ongoing litigation that
the outsiders perceive will affect their interests. Searching for a means to
accomplish this end— which, I will demonstrate below, is not without
problems— the commentators latch onto the device of intervention. After all,
broadly speaking, intervention is the means for third parties to add
themselves to litigation where the original parties have not thought of them,
or more likely, do not want them. But intervention was not designed to
accomplish that end for all outsiders. Historically, the rule arose to protect the
rights of specific outsiders with specific claims to intervene. These were
parties that had such a pronounced interest in the litigation that litigating that
interest away would probably present due process problems, at least to
modern eyes. The various interests now thought sufficient to warrant
intervention go far beyond those originally permitted. But the device of
intervention is still not suited for all of the multiple uses to which the
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advocates of a broad right of intervention wish to put it. Moreover,
expanding the right of intervention too much might create practical and
theoretical problems for public law litigation. I will examine the four
supposed benefits of intervention, however, before turning to the problems of
expanding the right to intervene.
The first defense of a broad right to intervene is that the intervenor can
present arguments and evidence that the original parties will not. Emma
Coleman Jones and Alan Jenkins offer as a good example of this possibility a
lawsuit filed by a non-minority challenging an affirmative action policy at a
public university.409 In that setting, neither the dissatisfied majority
applicants nor the university will want to present evidence on past
discrimination that might justify the affirmative action policy. The majority
applicants will not make out the case because it will harm their case against
the affirmative action policy; the university will not want to admit publicly
its past wrongdoing. An intervenor interested in preserving the affirmative
action program will have sufficient incentive to make the case that the
university had to adopt the affirmative action program to make up for past
wrongs and not simply to achieve diversity in its student body. In this
context, the intervenor would assist the litigation by providing legally
relevant information to the judge.410
Not all institutional reform cases contain this possible involvement for an
intervenor, however. To return to the salmon litigation, suppose the power
industry sues the federal government and claims that federal agencies have
acted too favorably toward the fish and too detrimentally toward the
generation of inexpensive electricity. In that instance, the district court does
not take evidence or hear witnesses but is limited to the administrative record
409. Jenkins, supra note 10; Jones, Litigation Without Representation, supra note 10, at 62-69.
410. Indeed, just such a situation was presented in the litigation concerning the University of
Texas Law School. In that case, rejected white students challenged the affirmative action program at
the law school. Minority organizations moved to intervene. The district court denied intervention and
the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the minority organizations were adequately
represented. See Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The minority
organizations wished to raise the issue that former discrimination against minorities at the University
of Texas justified the affirmative action program. Texas apparently failed to raise this contention at
trial. Following trial, the minority organizations again moved to intervene and were again denied. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the students were bound by the earlier decision
under the law of the case doctrine. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 961 (5th Cir. 1996). The only
solace that the Fifth Circuit held out to the rejected intervenors was that the court expressly did not
judge the merits of the substantive issue that the minority organizations wished to make, and stated
clearly that the “associations are not precluded from instituting a separate and independent . . . action”
challenging the law school’s admissions policy. Id. at 961 n.62. It would have seemed to be in the
interest of judicial efficiency, however, to hear all challenges to and defense of the law school’s
admissions policy at once, rather than invite more litigation. The Sixth Circuit recently reached a
decision in tension with the Hopwood cases in Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
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that the agency assembles unless one of the rare exceptions to that rule
applies.411 The agencies involved develop the factual record, and the district
court must defer to the expert policy judgments of the agencies. The original
parties have incentives to comb through the record looking for information
that supports their views, and the district court has an obligation to review the
record in its entirety. The only thing an intervenor could add in these
circumstances is an additional set of eyes to review the record, and perhaps a
different motivation behind its review.412 This additional set of eyes will not
benefit the proceeding or the outcome.413
A second and related argument— although it is generally not stated in the
pages of law reviews— is that intervenors must intervene because the parties
representing their interests are inadequate. These critics do not mean
inadequate in the sense contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2), but rather in the sense
that the attorneys for the intervenors believe that the attorneys for their
interest are inept, inexperienced, overworked, underpaid, or all four.414 These
critics might also believe that the party representing their interests does not
care as passionately about the outcome of the litigation as the outsider.415 But
411. See cases cited supra note 120.
412. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 834 F.3d 60, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding representation of applicant’s interests
adequate where only difference between applicant and original party is motivation for participating).
413. To be sure, if the proposed intervenor could have brought its own lawsuit, then intervention
may be appropriate as a means of avoiding duplicative litigation. For example, if the Bureau of
Reclamation restricts water supplies from a dam to preserve an endangered species, then irrigators who
use that water and face a reduced supply can challenge that decision. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154 (1997). If an environmental organization believes that the Bureau of Reclamation is in fact doing
too little to save the endangered species, it too can challenge the Bureau’s decision in its own lawsuit.
Intervention by the environmental organization into the irrigators’ lawsuit would be appropriate to
avoid multiple lawsuits. In that instance, the irrigators would argue that the Bureau was doing too
much for the species, the environmentalists would argue that the Bureau was doing too little, and the
Bureau would argue that its actions were just right (or at least not arbitrary or capricious). My point is
that if the environmental organization agreed with the Bureau’s position, adding it as an intervenor-
defendant in the irrigators’ action against the Bureau would not aid the litigation. The attorneys for the
Bureau would have every incentive to find material in the administrative record to support the
Bureau’s decision and explain the decision to the court. In that context, unlike the affirmative action
situation presented by Jones and Jenkins, the environmental organization can add little to the
proceeding in the form of expertise. Of course, if the Bureau wavered in its support of its decision and
the environmental organization could prove standing, then a district court could appropriately grant
intervention to the environmentalists to support the district court’s decision on appeal. See Solid Waste
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996); Mausolf v. Babbitt,
85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996), appeal after remand, 125 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 1997).
414. As I mentioned in the text, this comment is purely anecdotal, but it came up a surprising
number of times in casual discussions I had with others while working on this article.
415. Indeed, some courts have used this argument to justify finding that the government does not
adequately represent the interests of a private outsider, because the government must take into account
the public interest as a whole, not the parochial interests of an individual. See cases cited supra note
317.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p215 Appel.doc 09/15/00   4:55 PM
298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 78:215
a nonparty is not entitled to the best lawyer available. Moreover, if this is the
concern, then outsiders can provide assistance directly to the party with
whom they want to align themselves. Outsiders do not need to burden the
court and the original parties by involving themselves formally into the
litigation, and they can still prove effective through this informal
participation.416
As their third claim, proponents of a broad right of intervention argue that
intervention offers a chance for unrepresented views to participate in
litigation that affects the holders of those views. In this argument, the value
of intervention is not to the proceeding or to the original parties, but to give
the intervenor a sense that it has at least been heard, even if its views do not
carry the day.417 It is hard, however, to quantify the benefit of being heard,
and often additional voices can drown out the effective presentation of
argument. The Supreme Court made this point effectively in Allen
Calculators.418 Moreover, in many instances the intervenor has had the right
to participate in the proceedings that led to the underlying source of the
litigation. Suppose environmentalists challenge the sufficiency of
environmental review supporting a decision by the Army Corps of Engineers
regarding the flow of a river and its effects on salmon listed as endangered or
threatened.419 Hydropower interests would have had an opportunity to
participate in the Corps’ decisionmaking process and to comment on the
environmental documentation. Participation at the agency level, where
interested groups can supply raw data and scientific theories to the agency
decisionmakers, might have value. Participation in the subsequent court
proceedings, in which the scope of review is limited, is much less necessary
and is simply burdensome.
Supporters of a broad right of intervention make the best case for
416. For example, in the litigation between President Clinton and Paula Jones, a group of
attorneys, motivated by political interest, assisted the Jones legal team in devising arguments and
writing briefs. See Don van Natta, Jr. & Jill Abramson, The President’s Trial: The Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 24, 1999, at A1. This benefitted Ms. Jones directly in the form of a settlement and
furthered the political interests of the outsiders. Obviously, the suggestion will not work in all
instances— one could imagine a government lawyer being quite reluctant to take work prepared by a
private law firm and pass it off as the government’s view— but this suggestion does provide a means of
providing assistance without as many of the problems entailed in formal intervention.
417. See Yeazell, supra note 10, at 256-57 (seeing benefits to allowing people to grouse about
potential remedies).
418. Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1944) (stating
that members of the public frequently want to involve themselves in a “suit of large public interest”
but result of permitting multiple interventions is “accumulating proofs and arguments without assisting
the court”).
419. See, e.g., Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. NMFS, 56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995) (author
served as primary government counsel on appeal).
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participation with their fourth claim, that intervention allows interested
groups a voice in the litigation’s final remedy or settlement. Other forms of
participation, for example, as amicus curiae, do not provide interested parties
with a seat at the table for settlement discussions, and the original parties will
therefore ignore their legitimate concerns and the impact of the litigation on
them. This argument certainly has weight. Many courts have recognized that
the settlement of litigation may create the interest necessary to intervene.420
In addition, one would expect the original parties to fashion settlements that
visit the costs of the settlement on outsiders if they can.
This argument goes to the very core of the legitimacy of public law
litigation. One of the central characteristics of public law litigation is that the
relief in the case “often [has] important consequences for many persons
including absentees.”421 Normally, the law balks at the idea of a court
binding people without having heard them out first.422 The exclusion of
outsiders becomes even more problematic in the context of a consent decree,
where the two parties are using the court to make their preferences binding
on outsiders.423 Chayes recognized this problem, but in the end dismissed it
for persuasive reasons.424 Chayes argued that, in the context of public law
litigation, representation of all affected groups would be difficult to achieve,
but that no more representation occurred in other areas of government, such
as administrative agencies or legislatures.425 In addition, courts have at their
disposal a number of ways to find and protect unrepresented interests. These
means include intervention, to be sure, but also include such techniques as
appointing guardians ad litem (rather than relying on self-appointed
guardians in the form of intervenors) and retaining special masters and other
experts. Interestingly, proponents of a broad right of intervention in public
law litigation do not question this defense of the legitimacy of leaving some
out. Rather, they appear to take the view, at least sub silentio, that it is
acceptable to leave out interests so long it is not their own.
Nevertheless, for public law litigation to work, the court must be able to
proceed with parties that could be affected by the litigation. Actions taken to
420. See cases cited supra note 244.
421. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1302.
422. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
423. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321
(1988); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third
Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103; see also Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent
Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241 (discussing
particular problems of consent decrees that set federal policy).
424. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1310-13.
425. See id. at 1311-12.
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revitalize the wild salmon stocks in the Pacific Northwest might affect
individual property owners in Seattle, but a court cannot realistically expect
to hear from each and every one of them. Intervention for every interested
person would not be a viable solution in a case involving this problem.
Moreover, what proponents of broad intervention ignore is that the
original parties may, in many instances, have existing incentives to invite the
outsiders into settlement negotiations or the structure of the remedy. First, if a
remedy will involve a number of individuals, allowing them to be heard
either individually or through a representative may increase the likelihood
they will accept the proposed solution.426 Second, in the context of a consent
decree, the original parties might have a more concrete desire to involve
known outsiders. In Martin v. Wilks, the Supreme Court made clear that
“[j]oinder as a party, not knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to
intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.”427 This
conclusion stems from the fact that “[a] judgment or decree among parties to
a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights
of strangers to those proceedings.”428 Thus, the original parties to a particular
litigation event often have sufficient impetus to involve outsiders in litigation
during the settlement process. Otherwise, dissatisfied outsiders can deprive
the original parties of what they achieved at the negotiation table.429 Thus,
suppose that the Sierra Club sued the Bureau of Reclamation for operating a
dam in a manner that jeopardizes the continued existence of a species of fish
listed under the Endangered Species Act. The Bureau and the Sierra Club
reach an agreement that requires the Bureau to leave a certain amount of
water in the river system for the fish. The agreement would likely take the
form of a consent decree. If that were the case, the result in Martin v.
Wilks would strongly encourage the Bureau and the Sierra Club to involve
irrigators who take their water from the dam. If they are not parties to the
consent decree, the irrigators could challenge the Bureau’s actions taken
426. See Yeazell, supra note 10, at 258 (“[T]he involvement of bitterly opposed parties in a
process of hearing, negotiation, and compromise . . . may be the only way to give them all a stake in
implementing the decree which results.”).
427. 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989).
428. Id. at 762.
429. In 1991, Congress responded to Martin v. Wilks in legislation that now prevents an outsider
to a decree in an employment discrimination case from challenging the remedy imposed in the decree
if the person knew of the proposed remedy and had an opportunity to object or if the person was
adequately represented. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1) (1994). This amendment changes the ground
rules in such cases to some extent by mandating joinder or intervention of outsiders who may be
affected by the decree.
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pursuant to the settlement,430 and a court would not pay any deference to the
effect of the consent decree.431
Proponents of broad intervention also overlook some of the practical
problems that intervention necessarily entails. As stated above, no one
questions the need for some limitation on who can become a participating
party to litigation, if only to avoid the burden intervention places on the
original parties. This burden is hard to quantify in terms of hours or money
spent. The consensus of all commentators is a recognition that adding parties
adds time to the proceeding and requires more coordination costs (such as
scheduling hearings or filing pleadings). Second, the history of the device
demonstrates that intervention is not adapted to all of the uses to which the
proponents of the broad right wish to put it. The flaws in this procedural
device attend each stage of the proceeding. If the district court errs in
allowing intervention, the rules concerning appellate review provide no way
to oust the erroneously admitted intervenor until it is too late to fashion
430. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 54 (1997) (granting standing to challenge government action
that allegedly protected listed species too much).
431. The aftermath of the litigation in Martin v. Wilks provides a persuasive example on this point.
In that case, black firefighters sued the City of Birmingham for discrimination in the hiring and
promotion of black firefighters. After a trial, the parties agreed to the terms of a consent decree that
required affirmative action. A union, which presumably desired to preserve the status quo, moved to
intervene; the court denied intervention. See 490 U.S. at 759. Subsequently, individual white
firefighters challenged the employment decisions that the city made pursuant to the consent decree. In
Martin v. Wilks, the Supreme Court held that the white firefighters could “collaterally attack” the terms
of the consent decree, and that the decree itself did not provide a defense to their claim that the
employment decisions that the city took were racially biased. See id. at 761-69. On remand, the
Eleventh Circuit eventually held that the terms of the consent decree violated the Constitution, and
voided the affirmative action program established by the consent decree. See In re Birmingham
Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1994). Although one can never
predict counterfactual history with confidence, one can suspect that if the original parties had
explained the need for the consent decree and brought the white firefighters on board, the remedy
imposed may not have been as aggressive as the consent decree actually reached by the original
parties, but it may not have suffered a challenge by the outsiders. Ironically, the original parties
opposed intervention by the organizations that opposed the decree in the first place. See United States
v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1983). Unfortunately for the original plaintiffs, they lost
everything because of the subsequent litigation.
Indeed, in some instances, the original parties may wish to force a recalcitrant party into the
litigation. One example is Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). That case
involved a challenge to the President’s Plan for settling the spotted owl controversy. See supra note
61. Representatives of the timber industry had participated in the litigation as intervenors on behalf of
the defendant federal agencies. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash.
1994), aff’d 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). The timber interests were not pleased with the President’s
Plan, but wished to challenge it in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia rather
than the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, presumably because they
believed that the Western District of Washington would approve of the plan to rid itself of the myriad
spotted owl cases. See id. at 1300. The federal government therefore sued the intervenor as a
defendant, specifically with the intent of binding it with the judgment, and the Ninth Circuit approved
of this practice. Moseley, 80 F.3d at 1405-06.
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effective relief for the burden borne by the original parties. The present rules
regarding the status of the intervenor do not make clear exactly what rights
the intervenor has and what responsibilities the intervenor bears. Finally, the
present rules provide no clear way for an intervenor to prove its standing to
sue should one of the original parties drop out and the intervenor wish to
appeal.
The potential for a broad right of intervention raises more than just
practical problems. One argument that Chayes and Fiss advance in support of
broader rights of participation stems from the self-appointed nature of the
original parties, especially the plaintiff. In institutional reform litigation,
the named plaintiff and his lawyer speak not just for themselves, but
also for a group, for example, the present and future users of the
institution. There is no basis for assuming they are adequate
representatives of the group, for they simply elect themselves to that
position. Similarly, there is no reason to assume that the named
defendant and his lawyer are adequate representatives of the
organization’s interests. Here it is not a matter of self-election, but
election by an adversary.432
Chayes puts the same idea more succinctly: “Participation of those affected
by the decision has a reassuringly democratic ring, but when participation is
mediated by group representatives, often self-appointed, it gives a certain
pause.”433 To counter this problem, Fiss and Chayes advocate that the judge
involve outsiders in the litigation in order to ensure that the judge knows of
potential facts that the parties might hide and interests that the parties would
not advance.
But the concerns that Chayes and Fiss have about the self-appointed
nature of the original parties to the litigation are just as strong, if not stronger,
in the context of intervention. An intervenor participates in litigation purely
as a matter of its own choice, and, under many instances, it is interested in
vindicating a policy view that transcends the particular facts involved in the
litigation. One proponent for broad intervention argues that a court should
evaluate potential intervenors based on the “potential quality of the
applicant’s proposed participation.”434 This will usually mean that the well-
heeled and well-organized will be favored. In addition, institutions such as
national public interest groups and trade associations frequently move to
participate as intervenors, and there is every reason to believe that these
432. Fiss, supra note 39, at 25.
433. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1310.
434. Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note 10, at 447.
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organizations pursue self-interest beyond the interests of their members every
bit as much as a plaintiff or institutional defendant.435 Even organizations that
are on the same side of the controversy can have disputes among themselves.
For example, in the salmon litigation the commercial interests include
hydropower users, who want to increase salmon populations by decreasing
harvest, and the commercial fishing industry, which blames the dams for the
decline of the salmon. Similarly, one can imagine that differences in opinion
could arise between local and national environmental organizations.436 If so,
a court might do well to recognize the institutional bias of intervenors and
possibly downplay the information it receives from them.
In sum, intervenors make a contribution in some cases and do not in
others. The exact contribution that an intervenor can make in particular
litigation necessarily depends on the issues involved in the litigation, the type
of facts that the court can find or whether the court is limited in the sources to
which it can turn, the quality of information that the intervenor can supply,
and the representative capacity of the intervenor. One cannot conclude, as
435. In the context of environmental organizations initiating litigation, Professor Carlson makes
one doubt the extent to which these organizations actually represent their members. According to her,
[t]he attorneys working for NRDC or EDF [two national environmental organizations] have
virtually no contact with the members, and the cases they file tend to be cases the lawyers decide
are worthy causes, or are part of an overall litigation strategy. Members have no direct input in the
selection of litigation or in the direction of litigation strategy. The lawyers do not consult with or
even know the members of their organizations.
Carlson, supra note 385, at 961-62. These observations lead her to conclude that the tightened injury-
in-fact requirement will force the lawyers in these groups to pay heed to the needs of their human
clients. See id. at 986 (injury-in-fact requirement might help dispel the notion that “modern,
mainstream environmental movement is elitist and out of touch with real human concerns”). If
environmental organizations–and presumably other organizations–can be inattentive to the needs of
their members when they participate as a plaintiff, one can only suspect that they would be even worse
representatives of those views in the intervention context, when the interest required to participate is
much more attenuated and theoretical.
436. I am not aware of whether tensions between local and national environmental organizations
in fact exist in the salmon context. I merely point this out to show that a court could become
complacent thinking that environmental concerns were represented because for example, a national
organization such as the Sierra Club intervened, when a local organization might have a vastly
different view. In a recent article, Todd Zywicki harshly criticizes the national environmental
movement as representing parochial interests at the expense of effective environmental regulation.
Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 874 (1999) (“[R]ather than being
unbiased advocates of the public interest, environmental interest groups are riven with conflicts of
interest that lead them unerringly to support centralized command-and-control methods of pollution
control.”). In particular, Zywicki condemns the national-level groups for having a national focus and
for attempting to “strong-arm” local level organizations. Similarly, Zywicki argues that present
members of the regulated community have a vested interest in retaining command-and-control
regulation either because the companies make money from it or because the regulations create a barrier
to market entry and therefore reduce competition. See id. at 856-74. Although this overstates the point,
one can confidently predict that there will be self-interest in those who decide to intervene in a case.
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proponents of a broad right to intervene do, that intervention across the board
is usually good or at worst benign; it can result in serious costs to the parties,
the tribunal, and the litigation itself.
IV. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS TO INTERVENTION
The preceding section should not be taken as a broad-based objection or
aversion to intervention. Intervention can be valuable in appropriate cases.
But as the materials describing the history of the device and the present state
of the jurisprudence demonstrate, intervention is not well-suited to
accomplish the goals that the advocates of a broad right support.
Much of the disarray in intervention jurisprudence stems from the
problem of identifying the appropriate participants in a particular case. The
court must winnow out who is needed, who is desirable, who is acceptable,
and who would simply be an officious intermeddler. The factors that a court
must examine under Rule 24 are tailored to help the court make that decision.
In particular, the interest and impairment criteria should assist the court in
identifying appropriate parties to add. Nevertheless, the cases have not firmly
established the necessary type of interest, nor have they elucidated how
impaired the interest must be by the ongoing litigation. The Supreme Court
has not helped matters because it has not precisely defined the necessary
interest except to describe it as a “significantly protectable interest.”437 In
addition, district courts in those circuits where the court of appeals reviews
de novo a district court’s denial of intervention have great incentive to allow
intervention where it is not required by the rule to avoid the delay of an
appeal. Thus, the device of intervention could be improved by some changes
to the approach to Rule 24 itself and to the appellate procedure that surrounds
the rule.
In particular, the courts of appeals should alter how they review decisions
denying intervention.438 Specifically, the courts of appeals should review all
decisions for abuse of discretion, and consider the litigating posture of the
case and whether the district court permitted some participation when
437. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
438. The courts could reduce the incentives to grant intervention somewhat by altering the rules
concerning the timing of appellate review and either making all decisions concerning intervention
immediately appealable, or by making all decisions appealable only after final judgment. Apart from
the historical explanation of the current approach, the courts have struck the appropriate balance on the
timing question. If a court erroneously denies intervention, then the impact on the nonparty is
immediately palpable. The case, so far as that party is concerned, is over. However, if a court
erroneously grants intervention, the original parties will still be around for the rest of the litigation.
Allowing an immediate appeal of a grant of intervention probably would spawn more appeals than
necessary.
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reviewing denials of intervention. To be sure, the changes that I suggest are
minor, and do not call for a full-blown alteration of Rule 24. I suggest minor
changes because the courts, by and large, have made proper decisions on
intervention. If anything, however, they have typically leaned in favor of
intervention. My suggested changes tip the balance somewhat against
intervention, but should not be taken as hostility to the practice.
Initially, those courts that review intervention decisions de novo should
abandon that approach and review the district court’s decision for abuses of
discretion.439 The Supreme Court could accomplish this by reviewing the
split in the circuits; if it does not, those courts of appeals that have adopted
the de novo standard should reconsider that decision en banc and reverse it.
The abuse of discretion standard of review has several benefits in the public
law context. Most importantly, it would change the incentive structure that
district courts face. This shift in the standard of review would encourage
judges to act in the manner they think best for the issues before them. In
addition to having an appeal from the view of the judge, the shift from de
novo review to abuse of discretion review has theoretical appeal. Putting
more authority in the hands of the district court comports with Chayes’s
original conception of the judge in public law litigation. Chayes explicitly
compared the judge in public law litigation to the chancellor in equity and
hailed the “[t]riumph of [e]quity” that the development of public law
litigation represented.440 Intervention itself has strong origins in equity.
Federal appellate courts usually review equitable decisions such as the scope
of an injunction under the abuse of discretion standard.441 Leaving the
decision of intervention to the discretion of the trial judge would thus
comport with Chayes’s original thinking and the jurisprudence on equity.
Second, intervention is like joinder, and the Advisory Committee saw
joinder and intervention as interrelated. Joinder decisions— in particular, the
question of whether to dismiss an action for want of an indispensable party—
are left to the discretion of the district court judge.442 If a district court has
discretion to determine whether to dismiss an action altogether, surely district
439. Several commentators exploring intervention in the private law context have made this
suggestion, including some who advocate eliminating intervention of right altogether. See, e.g.,
Brunet, supra note 10, at 742; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 375; Shapiro, supra note 10, at 758-59;
Shreve, supra note 10, at 924.
440. See Chayes, supra note 1, at 1292 (emphasis omitted).
441. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982) (describing discretionary
power of court sitting in equity).
442. See, e.g., Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1996); HB Gen. Corp. v.
Manchester Partners, L.P., 95 F.3d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1996); Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass’n
v. National Bank, 699 F.2d 1274, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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court judges can be entrusted with the decision of whether to add a party to
litigation.
Some may fear that using the abuse of discretion approach will make
intervention of right under Rule 24(a) resemble permissive intervention
under Rule 24(b). Judge Friendly noted this possibility, but dismissed it.
Although [the abuse of discretion] standard of review may tend in
practice to blur somewhat the distinction between intervention as of
right under Rule 24(a)(2) and permissive intervention under Rule
24(b), the great variety of factual circumstances in which intervention
motions must be decided, the necessity of having the “feel of the case”
in deciding these motions, and other considerations essential under a
flexible reading of Rule 24(a)(2) . . . are precisely those which support
an abuse of discretion standard of review.443
The tendency to blur the two is only a tendency, however, not an inflexible
reality. In some instances an intervenor will have a right to intervene even
with an abuse of discretion standard in place. For example, if the intervenor
can show Article III standing and inadequate representation, a court would
abuse its discretion by denying intervention of right. Nevertheless, as a
general matter, the trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to
determine whether the intervenor will add to the litigation and whether the
litigation could adversely affect the intervenor’s stated interests. The
appellate court faces the intervention question in a vacuum and generally
does not bear the costs of adding the additional party. Although one may
argue that this makes the court of appeals more neutral on the intervention
question, in reality it allows the court of appeals to overestimate the benefit,
and underestimate the cost, of potential intervenors when it has only the
narrow question of intervention before it.
In addition to altering the standard of review, courts of appeals should
take into account additional considerations when determining whether the
district court abused its discretion. First, the courts of appeals should look at
the subject matter and scope of the litigation. For example, the court should
examine whether the district court will itself determine facts or whether the
law will restrict the court’s ability to look beyond a set record. The Tenth
Circuit considered this criterion in Alameda Water & Sanitation District v.
Browner.444 In that case, the plaintiffs requested a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers to build a large water project.445 The Corps granted the
443. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 991 (2d Cir. 1984).
444. 9 F.3d 88 (10th Cir. 1993).
445. See id. at 90.
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permit, but the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) vetoed the approval,
and the plaintiffs challenged EPA’s decision.446 A number of environmental
organizations moved to intervene. The district court denied intervention on
the ground that the government adequately represented the intervenors. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit found another reason to affirm this decision,
namely that the intervenors had an insufficient interest in the action.
Here, the [intervenor] wishes to participate in the lawsuit so that it can
offer additional reasons for upholding the denial of the permit. That
evidence, however, would be irrelevant in the district court where the
only issue is whether, when confined solely to the reasons cited in the
administrative record, the EPA lawfully vetoed the . . . permit. The
opportunity to offer extraneous evidence beyond the administrative
record, and thus beyond the scope of the narrow issue before the
district court, is not an interest protectable in the underlying action.447
In my view, the Tenth Circuit’s actions here take proper account of the
interests of the parties, the role the intervenor can play, and the task before
the trial court. Looking at the underlying subject matter of the case would
move away from the oversimplified view of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that Robert Cover described as “trans-substantive.”448 The
underlying legal issues in a case must at some point affect the procedures
used, because they determine what can happen as a result of the suit.
A second and related consideration that the court of appeals should take
into account in reviewing an intervention motion is whether the applicant for
intervention had an opportunity to participate in prior administrative
proceedings. If an environmental organization had the opportunity to inform
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of its data concerning salmon
mortality, and NMFS considered it, then the need for the environmental
organization to participate as a party in subsequent litigation is reduced.
Another factor that the courts of appeals should consider in deciding
whether a district court abused its discretion is whether the district court
permitted the proposed intervenor to participate as an amicus curiae. The
amicus curiae, unlike the intervenor, historically accomplished much of what
446. See id.
447. Id. at 91.
448. See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (“We have become so transfixed by the achievement of James Wm.
Moore and his colleagues in creating, nurturing, expounding and annotating a great trans-substantive
code of procedure that we often miss the persistent and inevitable tension between procedure
generalized across substantive lines and procedure applied to implement a particular substantive
end.”).
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the proponents of public law litigation set out for intervenors. The amicus
curiae developed as a means of assisting a court reach the right decision,
whether it be through providing recent case authority to which the judge may
not have access or by pointing out facts that tend to undermine the claims of
the parties or by demonstrating that the lawsuit was collusive.449 Although
the amicus was originally thought of as providing a neutral, disinterested
voice, more recently courts have allowed the participation of parties with a
political agenda.450 Although some scholars have criticized the contents of
amicus briefs,451 participation as an amicus curiae can in many instances
prove an effective alternative to formal intervention of right.
To many, participation as amicus curiae in lieu of intervention is less than
satisfying because a court need not necessarily address the views of the
amicus, and the amicus has no right to present arguments and witnesses.452
But these concerns are unpersuasive for two reasons. First, an amicus can
have a significant impact on the outcome of litigation. Scholarship suggests
that amicus filings may have influenced the decisions of the Supreme
Court,453 and recent experience demonstrates forcefully that an amicus can
direct the result in litigation despite the best efforts of the original parties.454
449. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 695-97 (1963).
450. See id. at 697-704.
451. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme Court’s 1997-1998
Term Employment Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823 (1999) (criticizing arguments in
amicus briefs to the Supreme Court); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk
Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Brief, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993) (criticizing social
science arguments to Supreme Court in amicus briefs); Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating
Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243 (1992)
(discouraging amicus participation in district courts).
452. See Jones, Litigation Without Representation, supra note 10, at 33, 68 (downplaying
usefulness of amicus participation); Vreeland, supra note 10, at 297.
453. See, e.g., Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly Fire: Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 74 JUDICATURE 261 (1991); Suzanne Uttaro Samuels, Amici Curiae and the Supreme
Court’s Review of Fetal Protection Policies, 78 JUDICATURE 236 (1995). The most recent thorough
study of the overall influence of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court is Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Brief on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743
(2000). There is some evidence that amicus participation in the Supreme Court has not influenced the
court in environmental litigation. See Susan Helman, Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Court:
Assessing the Impact of Interest Group Amici Curiae in Environmental Cases Decided by the Supreme
Court, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1991).
454. In United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578
(1999), the court of appeals held that the warnings called for by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486
(1966), did not apply to detainees in federal custody because of the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1994). Dickerson involved an appeal by the United States from the grant of a motion to suppress a
defendant’s testimony because the defendant had not received Miranda warnings. The Justice
Department did not rely on § 3501 because it had taken the position that § 3501 was unconstitutional.
Amicus curiae urged the court to apply § 3501, which it did over the objection of all parties. See
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 681-83. To be sure, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has opined that many
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Second, as a practical matter, in many instances a grant of intervention
may resemble participation as an amicus. Commentators recognize that
courts may limit grants of intervention or place conditions on an intervenor’s
participation; indeed, they urge that this ability ameliorates the potential
negative effects that a broad right of intervention may inject into litigation.455
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s rules concerning appellate review of a limited
grant of intervention make it difficult to obtain a broader grant of
intervention.456 Although some find participation as an amicus insufficient
because an amicus cannot appeal, neither can an intervenor who lacks Article
III standing.457 Although an amicus does not have a formal seat at the table in
potential settlement discussions, neither can an intervenor block a settlement
“merely by withholding its consent.”458 Thus, in many instances participation
as an amicus will vindicate the interests of the outsider without necessitating
formal intervention as a party. Therefore, if a district court permits an
outsider to participate as an amicus, a court of appeals should be more
reluctant to reverse the decision denying intervention as an abuse of
discretion.459
The Advisory Committee could encourage amicus participation in the
district court by amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide
expressly for amicus participation. Both the Rules of the Supreme Court and
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for amicus participation.460 The
Advisory Committee could model a new rule on either of these existing rules.
A new rule might encourage potential intervenors to focus their attention on
amicus participation, rather than seeking formal intervention of right.
amicus filings do not benefit the court and simply repeat the positions of the original parties, and he
accordingly denied leave to participate as an amicus. See Ryan v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir.
1997); see also Luther T. Munford, Listening to Friends of the Court, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, 128.
455. See, e.g., Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note 10, at 449-50 (arguing that courts should
condition intervention in close cases to ensure high-quality input with minimal disruption to parties);
Vreeland, supra note 10, at 307-09.
456. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (holding limited
grant of intervention not subject to immediate appellate review).
457. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
458. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986).
459. A favorable example of this idea is found in Northwest Forest Resource Council v.
Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996). That case involved a suit by members of the timber industry
who wished to have certain sales released under the 1995 timber salvage sale rider. See supra note
108. Environmental organizations moved to intervene. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial, noting
that the intervenors could add nothing to the consideration of the case. 82 F.3d at 837. But the Ninth
Circuit allowed the intervenor to participate as an amicus on the merits, thus ensuring that the trial
court heard anything the putative intervenor could bring to the action. Id. at 830 n.7.
460. See SUP. CT. R. 37; FED. R. APP. P. 29.
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CONCLUSION
Although its extent may have waned in recent years, public law litigation
has firmly entrenched itself as a significant part of the business of the federal
courts. The chief challenge of the defenders of public law litigation is the
problem of a court making decisions that affect people not formally
appearing before it. Proponents of public law litigation are thus faced with
the tension between desiring increased participation and recognizing that the
lawsuits they advocate and wish to promote will necessarily affect
nonparties, and that involving all nonparties would cripple the litigation
going forward at all.
I have focused on the procedural device of intervention, and how parties
use it in modern day public law litigation because proponents of public law
litigation have hailed it as the solution to the central dilemma. I have shown
that it is not a perfect solution. The device has evolved from its ancient roots
and has become a more flexible tool in managing litigation. Nevertheless, it
has the problems of its past. These problems are now reflected in the
limitations courts have placed on it. The limitations, in turn, stem from the
inevitable effect that adding parties has on any litigation, namely burdening
the parties and the court and slowing down the resolution of the dispute.461
Despite these problems, courts have attempted to use intervention to
accomplish pragmatic accommodation of the interests of the parties and of
the outsiders. An actual examination of the jurisprudence shows not hostility
to intervention, but an attempt to use it wisely.
I have explored environmental litigation at length because it offers a new
perspective on the intervention decision that differs from the civil rights
litigation. This new perspective helped crystallize the conclusion that looking
at the underlying legal merits of a dispute— moving slightly away from the
trans-substantive approach— can justify participation in appropriate cases and
exclusioin in others. Freeing district courts from the strict supervision of
courts of appeals will allow district court judges to examine freely the
contours of the dispute before them and use their own abilities to manage
complex litigation. Amending the approach that courts have taken by looking
at the context of intervention, including the underlying merits of the dispute
and what other means the court or the parties have undertaken to hear the
views of the outsider, will more realistically identify those individuals or
entities that must become parties or quasi-parties to the litigation. These
461. See Subrin, supra note 13, at 1001 (discussing the general burdens that an equity-based
system of civil procedure places on operation of the courts).
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shifts in emphasis will not do away with intervention in public law litigation.
That result is emphatically not the purpose of this article. Rather, I aim to
improve the device to ensure that public law cases move efficiently through
the judicial system. These cases have been, are, and— barring drastic action
by Congress or the judiciary— always will be a significant part of the docket
of the federal courts. They can be time-consuming and burdensome, but they
are also significant in vindicating public values expressed by the Constitution
or statutes. Rethinking intervention from this new perspective will help
achieve the salutary ends of this important form of civil litigation.
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